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ABSTRACT   
    
          This dissertation integrates humanities with social science methodologies within a 
critical framework, seeking to explore the relationship between the neoliberal 
restructuring and the intersection of gender, class and heteronormativity in contemporary 
China. In this project, neoliberalism is conceptualized as an art of governance centering 
on the intersection of race, gender, class and sexuality to create market subjects and 
sustain market competition. Focusing on China’s recent socio-economic and cultural 
upheavals, this dissertation tries to address these questions: 1. How have class 
inequalities, binaristic gender and heteronormative discourses been employed 
intersectionally by the Chinese state to facilitate China’s social transformation? 2. How 
has this process been justified and consolidated through the intersection of gender, class, 
sexuality and race? 3. How do the marginalized groups respond to these material and 
cultural practices? Building on the discursive analysis of China’s televised 60th 
anniversary ceremony and If You Are the One, a popular Chinese reality show, as well as 
the data from the interview, focus group and participant observation of more than 100 
informants, it is found that the intersection of gender, class and heteronormativity is 
central to China’s neoliberal transition. A group of flexible and cheap laborers have been 
disarticulated and rearticulated from the population as the voluntary servitude to China’s 
marketization and re-integration with the global economy. New controlling images, such 
as the bourgeois nucleus family, are created to legitimize this process. However, these 
disparate material and discursive practices have entailed contradictions and conflicts 
within the intersectional biopolitical system, and created contingent spaces of 
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ungovernability for the marginalized groups. Building on these discursive analyses and 
empirical data, I reconceptualize intersectionality as a multi-dimensional-and-directional 
network to regulate and manage power for social organization and regulation, which 
grounds the biopolitical basics for the neoliberal economy. Thus I argue that we need to 
engage with the dynamics between the intersectional biopolitical structure and people’s 
emerging experiences to construct a grounded utopia alternative to the neoliberal 
dominance for substantive social changes.  
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Chapter One 
The Gendered, Classed and Sexual Prisms to Understand Contemporary China  
Introduction 
          In 2008, in the wake of the neoliberal rule of deregulation, a financial crisis 
exploded in the U.S. and soon escalated into worldwide economic meltdowns. Called 
“Great Recession” by commentators,1 the detriment of this crisis is only secondary to that 
of Great Depression, and sees no ending in the industrialized world yet. The development 
locomotives of capitalism have been noticeably stalled since then: while the U.S. is 
struggling with the fluctuating figure of unemployment rate, the persistent weakening of 
the Eurozone has impacted its core members, such as Germany and France, as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) warns.2 The decelerated growth, burst bubbles and 
loss of jobs have exacerbated many people’s quality of life to such an extent that it has 
infringed upon their dignity as human beings—consequently, massive protests and 
uprisings occur on a transnational scale, to name a few, the Occupy Wall Street 
movement in the U.S., and the violent protests in the U.K. and Europe. Scholars have 
been tracking and researching these grassroots movements to scale other dimensions of 
                                                            
1 For instance, see Wessel, D. (2010, April 8). Did Great Recession live up to name. The 
Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from  
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303591204575169693166352882.html 
 
2 Best-news.us. (2013, April 18). IMF warning: European economic crisis spread to the 
core countries such as Germany and France. Retrieved from http://www.best-
news.us/news-4340794-IMF-warning:-European-economic-crisis-spread-to-the-core-
countries-such-as-Germany-and-France.html  
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socialities and humanities alternative to the reigning global capitalism and neoliberalism. 
For instance, an indigenous movement in Australia as what Elizabeth Povinelli calls “late 
liberalism,” refers to “the effects of anti-and postcolonial and new social movements on 
how difference is treated in liberal worlds” (2011, p.101). For another, as a consequence 
of the Great Recession and its Ponzi casino economy, the development of post-
neoliberalism largely signals the failure of neoliberalism. As we can see, both a populist 
version (a la Hugo Chavez) and a social democratic version of post-neoliberalism are 
launched in Latin America, endeavoring to remediate the effects of neoliberalism and 
deepen democracy.  
          The People’s Republic of China seemed an exception to this globalized crisis and 
its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by 10.3 percent, reaching a record of over six 
trillion dollars in 2010. China’s double-digit growth rate for nearly thirty years has been 
the world’s envy.3 For instance, in contrast to other areas devastated by the flight of 
capital unbridled by neoliberalism, only Shanghai, a coastal city in eastern China, has 
attracted twice as much foreign direct investment as India, another development 
powerhouse, each year (Chen, 2009). One glimpse will help us see the bigger picture, “at 
some point in the mid-1990s half of the world’s cranes were working in the Pudong New 
Area…of Shanghai” (Chen, 2009, p. xvi). Different from the deeply troubled developed 
                                                            
3 From 1979 to 2004, the average growth rate is 9.6 percent.  People.com.cn. (2001, 
January 9). Zhong guo GDP shu ju xiu ding: 1979-2004 nian jun zeng zhang 9.6%. (The 
adjusted GDP growth rate of China: the annual growth at 9.6 % from 1979 to 2004). 
Retrieved from http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/1037/4011263.html. From 2002 to 2012, 
this number rises to 10.6 percent.  Xu, Y. (2012, June 25). Shi nian lai wo guo GDP zeng 
zhang jin si bei nian jun zeng zhang lv 10.7 % (The average annual growth rate reached 
10.7 % in the past decade). Retrived from http://finance.qq.com/a/20120625/002394.htm   
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countries, the 2008 crisis only gave a brief pause to the fully charged Chinese economic 
machinery. With the 586-billion-dollar worth stimulus package in 2009, the Wen Jiabao 
administration reclaimed its confidence that the PRC would take the lead in the recovery 
from the financial crisis.4 In 2010, China leapfrogged Japan and gained on the U.S., 
becoming the second largest economy in the world.5 By 2012, China had overtaken the 
U.S. as the largest economy in international trade.6 By contrast, the largest capital 
sending country and economy, the U.S. has turned into a huge debtor matrix, closely 
bounded with its major creditor China through the so-called “economic marriage.” Sixty 
years ago, “only Socialism can save China” from the combined exploitation by capitalism 
and imperialism, as the Chinese Communists avowed. Ironically, many Westerners now 
believe that “only China can save capitalism” from its impending bankruptcy, as we have 
seen at the beginning.  
          The “exceptional” case of China is championed by some Western scholars as the 
“Beijing Consensus” (BC) in its full distinction to the intellectual/pragmatic scaffold of 
                                                            
4 8020rc.com. (2009, January 2). Zhong guo shuai xian zou chu wei ji shi zai bi ran 
(China will lead the recovery from the economic crisis). Retrieved from  
http://www.8020rc.com/news/19/18746.html  
 
5 Li, Z. Z. & Wang, H. (2011, February 14). Ri ben gong bu GDP shu ju bei zhong guo 
gan chao ju shi jie di san (Japan’s released GDP data shows it has been overtaken by 
China and regressed to the world No. 3). Retrieved from 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/j/20110214/08519369574.shtml  
 
6 Shi, X. H. (2012, February 11). Zhong guo chao guo mei guo cheng wei shi jie zui da 
mao yi guo (China surpasses the U.S. and becomes the world No. 1 in international trade). 
Retrieved from http://world.people.com.cn/n/2013/0211/c57507-20479666.html  
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the global restructuring,7 the “Washington Consensus” (WC). Though there is no 
consensus over what the BC means, different from the laissez-faire market in the Western 
societies, it is considered featured by the larger policy toolkit, more controlled resources, 
and long-term planning by the state, as well as the higher allegiance of enterprises to the 
government.8 As the consequence of the 2008 crisis, a plethora of academic efforts are 
directed at neoliberalism and its relationship to the Great Recession and the increasingly 
authoritarian political ecology (see in Duménil & Lévy, 2011; Chomsky & McChesney, 
2011). As many scholars maintain (see in Harvey, 2005; Stiglitz, 2003; Hardt & Negri, 
2000; Sassen, 2007; Hardt, 2010), the current crisis takes it root in the dominant rule of 
liberalization and globalization of sovereignties-economies as mandated by the WC. By 
contrast, Joshua Cooper Ramo (2004) obliges China’s bliss to the BC framework that has 
configured a unique trajectory of development external to the global restructuring, thus 
saving China from the rampant recession.9 This stance is also endorsed by the Chinese 
authority. In an editorial by The People’s Daily, a major mouthpiece of the party-state,10 
                                                            
7 Ramo, J. C. (2004). The Beijing Consensus: Notes on the new physics of Chinese power. 
The Foreign Policy Center. Retrieved from http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/244.pdf  
 
8 Bennhold, K. (2011, January 28). What is the Beijing Consensus). New York Times. 
Retrieved from http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/what-is-the-beijing-consensus/. 
This argument ignores the BC’s similarity to the WC: the austere streamlining of the 
government structures, tightening of budget and the disruption of the public sectors 
undertaken by the state.   
 
9 Ramo, J. C. (2004). The Beijing Consensus: Notes on the new physics of Chinese 
power. The Foreign Policy Center. Retrieved from http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/244.pdf 
 
10 Ren, Q. & Xi, F. (2012, June 11). Xin zi you zhu yi de shi zhi (Unpacking the essence 
of neoliberalism). The People’s Daily.  Retrieved from 
http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2012/07-11/4023108.shtml  
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the BC discourse is reiterated to validate the Chinese exceptionalism and reject the reality 
that China’s development is deeply embedded in the global restructuring, as Deng 
Xiaoping’s policies require. Lampooning the skyrocketing social inequalities and 
antagonism in the Western societies, this piece, however, turns a blind eye to China’s 
own social problems, e.g. the massive insurrection and rebellion that show no signs of 
halt, particularly after 2010.11 Like the economic transformation, as I see it, these 
grassroots resistances are part and parcel of the worldwide struggles with the 
exacerbating economic injustice and social inequalities. Even the Chinese economy 
proves not impervious to the global market: its growth decelerated to 7.8 % in 2012, and 
would continue on the slack track in 2013, as forecast by the IMF.12 
          This analytic framework of the BC versus the WC is embedded in the widely 
circulated approach to China’s recent socio-economic transformation within academia, 
which is polarized on the issue of Socialism/capitalism. In contrast to the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe where the abrupt suspension of planned economy was accompanied 
by the political overhaul, China’s state-controlled marketization has given rise to heated 
                                                            
11 In September 2011, the conflicts between the people of Wukan, a village in south 
China shocked the world. To show their determination to fight with the embezzlement of 
the collective land property by the local officials, over 20,000 villagers elected their own 
government and organized the fight against the armed suppression by the police. 
Thereafter, several massive insurrections were kindled by the corrupted governments and 
enlarging class inequalities across China, from Zhongshan and Zengcheng in Guangdong 
Province to Zhili and Zhuji in Zhejiang Province, and then to Shifang in Sichuan 
Province, Qidong in Jiangsu province, which mobilized tens of thousands people to fight 
against the complicit control of the state and market. 
  
12 Orlik, T. (2013, May 29). IMF Forecasts Lower China Growth, Warns on Debt. The 
Wall Street Journal. Retried from 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323855804578512310920944442.html 
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debates over its politico-economic ontology. The dazzling speed and scale of capital 
accumulation and development under the directive of the Communists not just arouses 
envy from the Western politicians, but also poses a theoretical conundrum for many 
Communist ideologues and bureaucrats that deem economic base to be the ultimate 
engine of social development and political change. In response, Deng coined a 
terminology, “Socialism with Chinese Characters,”13 to sidestep this controversy. This 
highfalutin yet confusing term is not so much the consolidation of jurisprudential status 
quo of China as an attempt at harnessing the ideological legacy and legitimacy 
foundation of the Socialist state to stabilize the economic transition. In the international 
geostrategic arena, this binaristic framework attests to the residual Cold-War episteme 
and new demand of finding another Communism deputy to strengthen the capitalist 
solidarity, oblivious to the fact that the Chinese Communists are probably the most 
staunch ally and savior of capitalism. In a speech delivered at the Occupy Wall Street 
movement, Slavoj Žižek made this point clear, “If Communism means the system which 
collapsed in 1990, remember that today those Communists are the most efficient ruthless 
capitalists.”14 In this regard, it is not difficult to understand why both the BC and WC 
frameworks have invited so much criticism, and many scholars call for attention to the 
intertwined nature between China’s marketization and Western countries’ WC-guided 
economic restructuring (see in Dirlik, 2006; Kennedy, 2010; Naughton, 2010). 
                                                            
13 As posited by Deng, the market is not the hallmark of capitalism, and Socialism can 
also rely on the market for the economic development. This ideology lays the foundation 
for the creation a Socialist market economy dominated by public sectors.  
 
14 Occupy Wall Street. (2011, October 9). Today Liberty Plaza had a visit from Slavoj 
Zizek. Retrieved from http://occupywallst.org/article/today-liberty-plaza-had-visit-slavoj-
zizek/ 
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         Some other scholars, both from within and outside China, try to situate China’s 
development in the global context to scrutinize the nuances and intricacies of its socio-
economic upheavals through the lens of neoliberalism (see in Wang, 2003, 2009; Pun, 
2005; Ong, 2006; Zhang & Ong, 2008; Rofel, 2007; Yan, 2003, 2008). As Wang (2003), 
Ong (2006) and Rofel (2007) argue, the party-state adopted and adapted neoliberalism as 
an exigent rationale to address the legitimacy crisis entailed by Mao’s stringent “class 
struggle” policy in the late 1970s, in tandem with Margaret Thatcher’s liberalizing reform 
in the U.K.,15  and successfully avoided the drastic political tumult and reshuffling. The 
convergence between China’s reform and neoliberal restructuring in the global context is 
not just chronological, but also epistemic. However, China’s neoliberalization is 
distinguished in that different from the (liberal) Western democracies, the Communist 
Party still holds reign and monopoly over the Chinese society. As Zhang and Ong (2008) 
suggest, the key to China’s socio-economic transition is the creation of proper subjects 
for the new social relationship organized through the market. However, their work has 
not revealed the specific mechanism through which these subjects are (re)created. In this 
project, building on Michel Foucault’s concept of neoliberal governmentality, Daivd 
Harvey’s notion of accumulation by dispossession and feminist scholarship of 
intersectionality, I conceptualize neoliberalism as an art of governance centering on the 
intersectional biopolitics of identities to create market subjects and market competition. 
Building on this framework, I want to explore the articulated relationship between 
                                                            
15 As other scholars point out, this was not a completely voluntary decision of the party-
state, but a result of impoverished peasants’ struggle to push their interests. See in 
Bernstein, T. P. (1999). Farmer discontent and regime responses. In M. Goldman and R. 
Macfarquhar (Ed.), The paradox of China’s post-Mao reforms (pp. 197-219). Cambridge, 
MA and London: Harvard University Press. 
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China’s neoliberal transition and identities of gender, class and sexuality to see how 
specific neoliberal subjectivities are (re)produced for China’s social transformation. To 
do so, a brief review of China’s socio-economic transition since 1978 is needed to 
elucidate this relationship.  
China’s Neoliberal Transition 
          China’s neoliberal transition was initiated by Deng Xiaoping’s pronouncement of 
reform and opening up at the end of 1978. Though Deng is widely hailed as the major 
architect of reform and opening up in China, China’s transition was “heavily 
experimental in nature rather than relying on a blueprint approach” (Huang. 2008, p. xv). 
The reform first started in rural areas by replacing the collective economy of the People’s 
Commune with the family-based farming system. The unleashed productivity soon 
yielded bountiful produces that peasants were allowed to sell in the market after turning 
in the tax grain. Though this policy effectively narrowed the income gap between 
urbanities and rural residents by raising the price of agricultural commodities through the 
market, it was resisted by the disgruntled urban citizens troubled by the rising living 
expenses (Naughton, 1995). The party-state was then compelled to launch reform in cities, 
and special economic zones were first established in southern China in 1984 to 
experiment with the market mechanism. In these specially zoned-out extra-sovereign 
territories, tax break, favorable legal support (e.g. delegitimizing workers’ union, 
differential treatment of Chinese and foreign citizens) and cheap or even free supply of 
land property were provided to attract transnational capital (Ong, 2006; Rofel, 2007). As 
Mary Elizabeth Gallagher (2005) notes, the foreign sector served as a laboratory for 
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difficult and politically sensitive reforms, particularly those about state-owned enterprises. 
Then the successful experiences of how to create and maintain the market for foreign 
corporations and joint ventures were expanded on a wider scale. The success stories of 
these companies reduced people’s worry over the threat to the Socialist regime by the 
reduction of public ownership, creating a buffering zone for further ideological 
reformulation (Gallagher, 2005).  
          In the late 1980s, the reform in urban areas started with the so-called two-track 
price system.16 This price dichotomy not only created perfect conditions for rent seeking 
of government officials, but also reproduced competing interest groups who had been 
unified by the centralized Socialist economy.17 As Wang (2003; 2009) suggests, in 1988, 
tremendous inflation burst as a result of the lifted price control, leading to a large-scale 
social mobilization that finally turned into the Tian’anmen Square movement—the first 
massive uprising against neoliberalism, well predating the 1999 Seattle and 2000 
Washington protests against the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the IMF. 
Thereafter, marketization was suspended for three years, and then resumed by Deng’s 
1992 southern tour. As Fulong Wu, Jiang Xu and Anthony Gar Yeh (2007) contend, the 
                                                            
16 As Wang states, the dual-price structure included state-plan prices that applied to 
means of production and market prices that applied to consumer items. See in Wang, H. 
(2009). The end of the revolution: China and the limits of modernity. London and New 
York: Verso.  
 
17 As Wang (2009) shows, a broad array of corrupt and underground activities were 
carried out by state cadres and official organs who could manipulate this system and 
economic reform for their own interests. Besides, workers, particularly urban workers 
suffered from inflation, and students were disgruntled about the corrupt Communist 
bureaucratic system. These were the major groups involved with 1989 Tian’anmen 
movement.  
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opening up of Pudong area in Shanghai in 1993 marked China’s full-scale marketization 
and re-integration with the global economy.  
          Thereafter, China’s socio-economic transition was deepened through privatization 
and deregulation in a wide swathe of public sectors as well as state abdication of welfare 
provisions. For instance, welfare for urban residents, such as education and medical care 
were largely relegated to the market (Li and Zhong, 2009). Accordingly, the budget 
spending on them kept dropping:  
[T]otal government health expenditures (excluding outlays for the government 
insurance program that covers government employees only) were still 0.8 percent 
of GDP in 1986, but declined to only 0.5 percent in 1993. Current outlays for 
education were still over 2 percent of GDP in 1985, but had declined to 1.66 
percent in 1994 (Naughton, 1999, p. 38). 
          The Zhu Rongji administration (1997-2002) accelerated the reform by privatizing a 
number of non-performing state-owned enterprises (SOE), and fostering a housing 
market via a broad array of financial reforms in mortgage. Millions of workers, mostly 
women, were laid off and thrown into the misery of struggling and striving (Davin, 2004). 
At the same time, as the state retreated, the market edged in as the major allocator of 
housing. Land, “whose monetary value had been neglected since 1949, suddenly assumes 
a very important role in the overall Chinese economy” (Li, 1996, p. 3). Therefore, Zhu’s 
policies sowed the seeds from which a gigantic housing bubble was later developed, 
though his successor Wen Jiabao reaped most of the criticisms. When Wen came into 
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power in 2002, housing was chosen as the major growth pole of the Chinese economy 
(Wu, 2002). By the end of 2010, a bubble no smaller than the one at its acme in the U.S. 
in 2007 had been foisted on Chinese people as one of the new “Three Huge Mountains” 
(the other two are medical care and education), in contrast to imperialism, feudalism and 
bureaucratic capitalism in pre-Socialist China.  
          China’s entry into the WTO at the end of 2001 promoted its marketization and 
accession to the global order of capital to a new level. For instance, thereafter the term 
“Made in China” became popularized around the world with the remarkably increasing 
volume of export commodities.18 Despite the overwhelmingly laudatory discourse of this 
deal in Chinese media, the party-state had to largely revise its traditional view of 
sovereignty, and make a number of concessions to gain the membership of the U.S.-
controlled supranational neoliberal entity (Rofel, 2007). Thereafter, contrary to the 
triumphant story of the benefits of globalization, China demoted from the ranks of the 
most egalitarian societies, at least in terms of people’s income in Mao’s era, to one of the 
most unequal in the distribution of wealth and opportunity. For instance, the Gini 
coefficient—a measure of income inequality commonly used by economists and 
institutions from absolute equal 0 to absolute unequal 1—grew from around 0.23 in 1980 
to 0.47 in 2005 according to China Statistical Yearbook, far above the internationally 
                                                            
18 Xiao, D. (2011, November 11). Ru shi shi nian zhong guo jing ji jing li de shi da bian 
hua (Ten changes of the Chinese economy ten years after China’s entry into the WTO), 
International Herald Leader. Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2011-
12/11/c_122401910.htm 
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acknowledged alarm level of 0.40.19 The result of a recent research shows that this 
number reached 0.61 in 2012—a figure very rarely seen in other countries.20 The gender 
gap of income also enlarged. In 2010, urban women’s income decreased to 67.3 percent 
of that of men’s from 77.5 in 1990. For rural women, this number witnessed a larger 
reduction, from 79 percent in 1990 to 56 in 2010.21   
          China’s economic reform has not only widened social inequalities, but also entailed 
ideological crisis. As Wang (2003, 2009) notes, as early as the mid-1980s, a series of 
debates over the nature of reform were carried out among intellectuals. The dispute and 
debate between neoliberal scholars and New Leftists became a frequent scenario in 
Chinese academia and media since then (Leonard, 2008).22 As Harvey (2005) points out, 
liberalization of economy in the U.S. proceeded upwardly as the intellectual 
reformulation in major programs of economics funded by big corporations and private 
funds preceded and trumpeted the economic restructuring. By contrast, China transitioned 
                                                            
19 China Statistical Yearbook. (n. d.) 1980-2005 zhong guo ji ni xi shu bian hua qu shi 
(The development of China’s Gini-coefficient between 1980 and 2005). Retrieved from 
http://www.docin.com/p-284329851.html  
 
20 Beijing Times. (2012, December 10). Bao gao cheng zhong guo jia ting ji ni xi shu da 
0.61 shou ru cha ju shi suo shao jian (Reports show that China’s Gini-coefficient reaches 
0.61, unparalleled in the world). Retrieved from  
http://business.sohu.com/20121210/n359957132.shtml  
 
21 China Daily. (2012, November 28). Income gap between the sexes widening. Retrieved 
from http://english.sina.com/china/2012/1127/531563.html 
 
22 New leftists are different from old leftists in that the former recognize the drastic 
tragedy entailed by Mao’s practices of Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, 
and acknowledge the positive effects of the economic reform (see in Wang, 2003). In 
contrast, old leftists insist on Mao’s trajectory and calls for the rejuvenation of Mao’s 
policies.  
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from Socialism to neoliberalism in an opposite direction. As the architect of China’s 
modernizing project, Deng had both iron fists and charisma to design and enforce the 
neoliberal policies, and popularize the neoliberal ideology in a pellucid way. For instance, 
he adroitly translated the Western discourses of neoliberal tenets into such brisk popular 
slogans as “focusing on the central task of economic construction” (market 
fundamentalism), “white cat, black cat, whichever catches mice is a good cat” (market 
pragmatism), and “the rich leads the poor, finally realizing the common prosperity” 
(rising water will lift all boats). In another instance, Deng talentedly animated China’s 
pockets-and-bits experiments of neoliberalism by calling it “crossing the river by groping 
the stones.” These ideologically inflected discourses have permeated Chinese people’s 
vernacular languages and daily regimentation through repetitive citation, cross-
referencing and performances by mass media. In my conversations with many workers, it 
was not uncommon to see that they would invoke these slogans to describe their daily life. 
Thus the Chinese neoliberal practices and ideology have been mutually strengthened in a 
self-referencing-and-fortifying matrix that begs a more sophisticated theoretical 
framework to reckon with. As the works of Ong (2006), Rofel (2007) and Yan (2003) 
indicate, Michel Foucault’s concepts of governmentality would be useful for the case of 
China. Foucault’s challenge of the reified understanding of the political system and 
economy is especially helpful to unpack China’s Communist-directed marketization.  
The Foucauldian Concept of Neoliberal Governmentality  
          In The Birth of Biopolitics (2008), Foucault explicitly critiqued the transcendental 
narrative about the predetermined progress of human societies, particularly Marxist 
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historical materialism that sees economic base as the ultimate engine of social 
development. Aligning himself with the critical camp of philosophy blazed by the 
scholars like Hegel, Nietzsche, Weber and Frankfurt School scholars, Foucault argues 
that rather than striving for a categorical understanding of Truth, philosophy should 
primarily center on “an ontology of the present”—engaging with the contingencies and 
specificities of the moment we are currently inhabiting to see what we can learn and do 
(2011). As he suggests, instead of using the logic of capital as a priori for a deductive 
explanation of capitalism, we need to see how capital is deployed, directed and 
reproduced to constitute and sustain our current system and conditions that happen to be 
called “capitalism” (Foucault, 2008).  
          Building on this vantage point, Foucault (2008) contends that neoliberalism is not 
another stage of capitalism, but rather a type of governmentality, or an art of governance 
with a self-coherent agenda to organize, regulate and manage societies. As he sees it, 
governmentality is the reasoned way of governing best, the calculation of governing 
practices to maximize economic and political profits for societies. An independent 
domain of practice, governmentality is in a dialectic relationship with state, which is both 
the object and product of specific governing practices. Guided by no transcendental rules, 
governmentality is historically contingent and exigently malleable and there is no 
definitive boundary between different types of governmentality (Ong, 2006). Foucault 
further clarifies governmentality as “the techniques and procedures by which one sets 
about conducting the conduct of others” (2011, p. 4), or “an action upon an action, on 
existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future” (1982, p. 789). 
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In other words, to govern is “to structure the possible field of action of others” (1982, p. 
790). On this account, there would be a plethora of governing subjects other than 
state/government as the only entity that “governs.”  
         As Foucault (2008) notes, liberalism is a type of governmentality that first took 
form in the mid-18th century—the ascending era of capitalist economy. Under this logic, 
governance needs to be well balanced—“not too much, not too little”—to sustain a self-
organized free market. It is also Euro-centric because with a premise of the “perpetual 
development of Europe,” it is meant to regulate the “zero sum” rivalry between European 
states so the competition won’t result in drastic collision and even wars. It lays the 
cognitive foundation for the contemporary neoliberal script of globalization that deems 
non-EuroAmerican areas the exploitable market and source of labor and raw materials. In 
contrast to the liberal governance that presumes a naturalistic, autarkic and free market, 
neoliberalism is new in that it posits an interventionist role for multifarious governing 
entities to create, maintain and promote market competition (Brown, 2005).  
          Foucault (2008) also criticizes Marx’s inattention to laborers as corporeal beings. 
As Foucault puts it, the theoretical difficulty of Marxism lies in its discussion of labor as 
the abstracted medium for value production and extraction. Contrarily, Foucault 
dexterously extends the analytical scope of labor beyond the domain of production, 
situates the issue of labor in the larger framework of politico-economic regimentation, 
and approaches labor as laborers with corporeal substance as the central target of 
governance. Human body and its sum total, the population entered “the order of 
knowledge and power, into the sphere of political technique” in Europe in the 17th 
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century (Foucault, 1990, p. 142). An agent of transformation of human life, this 
knowledge-power termed by Foucault as “bio-power” is “without question an 
indispensable element in the development of capitalism” (1990, p. 141). In this regard, 
well-calculated mechanisms and technologies to prepare and structure human beings for 
the market relationship is pivotal to neoliberal governmentality as its raison d'être. As 
Foucault (2008) says, at the core of neoliberal governmentality is the creation and 
engineering of what neoclassic economists call “Homo Economicus”—a rational and self-
reliant human being à la enterprising subject directed by the maximization of personal 
interests and self-preservation through market competition. The administration of bodies 
and calculated management of life thus become the central tenet of neoliberal governing 
agenda as what he calls “biopolitics” (1990).  The disciplines of bodies and the 
regulations of population constitute the two poles of biopolitics. Scientific, medical, legal, 
and cultural discourses as well as institutionalized systems were created to study, 
differentiate, stratify, hierarchize and engineer human beings as “population” to better 
govern the society. To name a few, clinic, asylum, prison and sexuality are the social 
system instituted under the aegis of biopolitics.  
          In The History of Sexuality Volume One (1990), Foucault demonstrates how the 
development of burgeoning capitalistic economy in Europe from the 18th to 19th century 
was made possible through the regulation and adjustment of bodies and population by 
controlling and normalizing the spectrums of sexual possibilities. As he illustrates, all 
sexualities (particularly homosexuality) except for that between heterosexual couples 
were delegitimized to normalize heterosexuality as the only acceptable social rule, which 
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could guarantee the reproduction and supply of more capable subjects for capitalist 
economy and market competition (Foucault, 1990). This argument is instrumental to the 
understanding of sexuality as a conduit for China’s socio-economic transition in the 
reform era, when it is constructed a new category (rather than activity) to classify and 
regulate the Chinese population.  
          As China moved away from Socialism, it turned to the “Asian model” of 
development in the late 1970s (Goldman & Macfarquhar, 1999), whereby market, labor 
and capital accumulation are under the strict control by the state (Ong, 1999). As two 
contingent variations of neoliberal governmentality, the difference between the Western 
and the Asian model is pragmatic rather than teleological—to liberalize the economy by 
an unleashed market penetrating other social domains or state-regulated capital 
accumulation and calculated marketization of public sectors (Stiglitz, 2003; Cheah, 2007). 
In China’s case, as Zhang & Ong (2008) suggest, as the Socialist politico-ideological 
foundation of the state still persists, the key to China’s neoliberal transition is the creation 
and regulation of new subjects for the market relation.  
          It is interesting to note that in tandem with the twin pillars of reform and opening-
up, was Deng’s pronouncement of Planned Family in 1978. Actually, the biopolitical 
management of population is not new in China. In the 1950s, the government took a 
pronatalist position to sustain the supply of labor for Socialist construction. Though the 
birth control started in some cities in 1960, it was “during the decade of the 1970s when, 
as a result of both explicit government birth control campaigns and altered definitions of 
ideal family size, China’s total fertility rate fell from 5.8 in 1970 to 2.7 in 1978” (Davis & 
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Harrell, 1993, p. 14). As a biopolitical governing technology, Planned Family is not 
simply about the control of population growth, but also the regulation of its quality in 
relation to the calculated economic growth. As Article 25 of the 1982 Constitution 
amendments stipulate, “the state implements the birth control to manage the population in 
accordance with the economic development.”  
          In the early 1990s, China’s accelerated marketization witnessed another interesting 
phenomenon—the proliferation of the Western discourse of homosexuality (Rofel, 2007). 
As a label to categorize human differences rather describing a type of human behavior, 
this cultural shift did not mark the beginning of Chinese homosexualities, nor did it 
increase same-sex intimacies and encounters that had already left behind a history of 
thousands of years. It brackets off the people who are so labeled from the society with a 
perpetual imprint of derogatory meanings. Though the proliferation of this discourse was 
to a great extent related to the state concern about the spread of HIV, the construction of 
sexuality as an identity in the context of China’s marketization and globalization highly 
reverberated with Foucault’s descriptions of sexuality and Europe in its burgeoning era of 
capitalism. His theorization alerts us to the convoluted relationship between sexuality, 
economics and political regime in contemporary China notwithstanding, the contextual 
complexity and historical singularity of China’s neoliberalization beg closer 
scrutinization. Focusing on the formation and reformation of my own sexual identity with 
China’s socio-economic transition, I will further elaborate on this relationship later in this 
chapter.  
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Identity-Induced Accumulation by Dispossession  
          Except for sexuality, Foucault leaves a theoretical lacuna by under-discussing how 
race, gender and other identity categories also underpin biopolitics as its basic parameters 
to govern human beings (Stoler 1995). Contradictory to the neoliberal ideology that 
embraces a free market, labor market is actually segmented through race, gender, and 
class in its spatio-temporal deployment (Harvey, 2005). As Margaret Somers (2008) 
astutely points out, the essence of market is that unequal subjects are transacting equal 
values through an exchange relationship. In this sense, such categories of embodiment as 
race, gender and class constitute the fundamental dimensions of biopolitics for its 
exercising and functioning (Giroux, 2004, 2008). As Martin Manalansan (2003) indicates, 
heteronormativity is also a significant caliber to organize the transnational labor 
migration and movement in the context of globalization. The unequally structured labor 
market through identity categories, however, is often glossed over by a euphoric rhetoric 
of “global division of labor” to garner the comparative advantages of different countries 
to maximize the benefits of capital. 
          Feminism and critical race theories prove instrumental to dismantle the gendered 
and racialized logic of labor division (Mohanty 2003; Davis 2005). Though neoliberal 
globalization has been polarizing and splintering class relations across the world, other 
scholars emphasize that this proletarianizing process is also racialized and gendered, 
unequally impacting the life of people of color (Winant, 2004), and women (Mies, 1999). 
For instance, feminist scholars have been striving to unpack the deleterious effects of 
globalization from women’s experience. As Sassen (2007) notes, the first two generations 
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of feminist scholarship of globalization has documented women’s encounter with 
globalization, and globalization’s negative effects on women (see in Hawkesworth, 2006; 
Naples & Desai 2002; Bayes et. al. 2001). Other scholars, however, call for a more 
nuanced framework to dislodge the relationship between globalization and gender. As 
Haleh Afsha and Stephanie Barrientos (1999) contend, women are not merely victims of 
globalization, but sometimes players involved in this process. Rather than a unified and 
homogenizing project, globalization is multi-faceted, both excluding and including 
different groups of women. In the case of China, through her years-long ethnographic 
work of an export-processing factory, Pun Ngai argues that “[t]he biopower of the factory 
machine is not only interested in molding a general [proletarian] body but also a 
particular sexed body, a feminine body to fit the factory discipline” (2005, p. 136). 
Though these scholars seek to configure a more complex understanding of gender and 
globalization, gender still equals “women” in this approach (Scott, 1986). As an 
analytical category of globalization, gender analysis needs to be broadened to unpack 
how globalization is enabled and enacted through the gendered biopolitical governance 
targeting both men and women. Likewise, we also need to investigate how neoliberal 
globalization is proceeding thorough other biopolitical categories, such as race, class and 
sexuality.   
          David Harvey’s concept of “accumulation by dispossession” (2003) proffers a 
useful instrument to rethink the relationship between neoliberalism, corporation 
globalization and identity categories.  As Harvey (1982) sees it, the root of neoliberal 
globalization is the overaccumulation of capital—the saturated market and shrinking 
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demand vis-à-vis over produced commodities—which left little space for capital 
reproduction in the industrialized countries in the late 1970s. Besides over-consumption 
(see in Baudrillard, 1998; Jameson, 1984), another outlet to the overaccumulated capital 
is what Harvey calls “accumulation by dispossession”—“to release a set of assets 
(including labor power) at very low (and in some instances zero) cost” (2003, p. 149), 
particularly in non-Western countries. The overaccumulated capital can seize hold of 
such assets and turn them into profitable use. Though accumulation by dispossession 
takes place in various and contingent forms, such extra-market systems/cultures as 
“kinship structures, familial and household arrangements, gender and authority relations” 
definitely play an important role (2003, p. 146). As Mies (1999) shows, the migrating 
capital keeps looking for young and healthy women around the globe with the nimble and 
swift fingers for cheap manufacturing jobs. In Africa, the reconstitution of the gender 
relationship is said to be fundamental to facilitate this process—men need to undertake 
more housework so their wives can take more jobs outside home (Marchand & Runyan, 
2010). Harvey thus contextualizes and historicizes the linkage between identity categories 
like gender and neoliberal global restructuring. However, in his introductory work to 
neoliberalism (2005), focusing on the negative effects of marketization on women and 
people of color, he fails to explore the specific mechanism of how capital is reproduced 
through these categories as conduits, leaving room for further discussion.   
          Like Foucault, Harvey also critiques the narrative of lineal social progression. As 
he opines, accumulation by dispossession is not the “primitive” or “original” stage of 
capitalism as Marx posits, but central to the whole process of capitalist development. It is 
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not exclusive to capitalist societies, either. Socialist/Communist states also used it to 
fulfill “the equivalent of primitive accumulation [of capitalism] in order to implement 
programs of modernization” (2003, p. 165). As he writes, 
“The recognition that primitive accumulation may be a necessary precursor to 
more positive changes raises the whole question of the politics of dispossession 
under Socialism. It was, within the Marxist/Communist revolutionary tradition, 
often deemed necessary to organize the equivalent of primitive accumulation in 
order to implement programs of modernization in those countries that had not 
gone through the initiation into capitalist development. This sometimes meant 
similar levels of appalling violence, as with the forced collectivization of 
agriculture in the Soviet Union, and in China and eastern Europe” (2003, p. 165). 
          As can be seen from the above quote, Harvey’s theorization is not just instrumental 
to clarify the relationship between identity categories and neoliberal globalization, but 
also foregrounds the contingency and exigency of governmentality—as state-sponsored 
biopolitics could apply to different political systems. This elucidation is particularly 
significant to the case of China as it disrupts the myth of biopolitics as “only applicable to 
capitalism.” In other words, biopolitics by the party-state would be the central site of 
inquiry to investigate China’s transition from Socialism to neoliberalism in my work. On 
this account, a historicized review of the biopolitical control of Chinese population by the 
Maoist regime is required for the further query of China’s neoliberalization. 
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          During Mao’s reign (1949-1976), the state-imposed class hierarchy was designed 
for the centralized economy and Socialist ideology. Building on the Stalinist model, the 
economic system prioritized industry over agriculture because the party-state believed 
industrialization was sine quo none to the building of Communism. Like the former 
Soviet Union, industrialization highly conflated with urbanization in China since 1949 
(Zhang, 2004), supported by the supply of subsistence and raw materials from rural areas. 
Then the generated profits were redistributed to rural areas. Dorothy J. Solinger calls this 
economic system “circular resource allocation system” (1999, p. 222). At the center of 
this system was the Communist bureaucracy that worked vertically to direct the flow of 
resources between different sectors and areas.  
          Different from the Soviet Union, China’s major problem, however, was its 
oversupply of laborers (Oakley, 2002). To maintain the social stability, the party-state 
created a registration system called Hukou in 1953 to prevent migration into urban areas. 
In this system, people are dichotomized into urban/rural resident based on the place of 
birth. It was not put into practice until 1958 when Mao’s Great Leap Forward policy 
ended up with the disaster of famine and millions of hunger-stricken people endeavored 
to escape to cities for survival (Whyte, 2010). Through the systems of state-controlled 
food rationing, housing, education and medical care, migration from rural areas into cities 
was almost impossible in Maoist China. As Cheng Li shows, “the annual interstate rate of 
moving in the United States is 4 percent. But in China, the annual cross-province 
movement rate was as low as 0.12 percent in the 1980s” (1997, p.130). As Fei-ling Wang, 
a long-time observer and expert of China’s Hukou system, contends, “it undoubtedly 
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creates and perpetuates some of the most rigid and unfair sociopolitical and economic 
discrimination and injustice in the world through administratively excluding the majority 
of the Chinese people from vibrant and prosperous urban centers” (2010, p. 336). As a 
system of “internal colonization” (Solinger, 1999), Hukou efficaciously helped organize 
the flow of resources and wealth under the directive of the state by classifying and 
hierarchizing Chinese population into different strata.  
          As a result, this state-imposed registration system created a huge class gap between 
urban/rural residents. The former enjoyed lots of welfare benefits, such as free housing, 
medical care and education, while the latter almost had none (Solinger, 1995, p. 126). It 
also created big internal inequalities within working class, between urban state-employed, 
collective enterprise employees, and rural temporary workers (Whyte, 1999). Moreover, 
to facilitate the collectivization of economy and shore up the revolutionary promise, “[a]ll 
Chinese families were classified in the early 1950s into class-origin categories based on 
their economic standing, property, participation in labor, and other characteristics before 
1949 (Whyte, 2010, p. 6). Thus “the class order in China…is clearly a function of 
governmental policy” (Solinger, 1995, p. 126).  
          Gender was another governing technology to organize Socialist economy and 
construct Socialist ideology. On the economic level, like many Eastern European 
countries (True, 2003), the party-state integrated women into public labor en mass to 
eradicate the bourgeois root of gender inequality, which effectively involved numerous 
women in the social production. On the policy level, the marriage system was reformed 
to grant women more agencies about their choice of husbands (Croll, 1983; Yan, 2003). 
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On the ideological level, the party-state crafted such masculinized images as “Iron Girls” 
and “The Red Detachment of Women” (Yan, 2008) to show that women were now 
“equal” to men, as the state’s Socialist imprint in its distinction to Western capitalism. As 
Dai Jinhua (2009) avers, these liberated Chinese women, however, are defined by 
revolutionary male norms. Even the generic rubric “women” was a Maoist ideological 
product (Barlow, 1994). Regardless of these state initiatives and policies, gender 
inequality persisted through the intact patriarchal relations that were never undermined in 
Mao’s era (Stacey, 1983; Andors, 1983; Wolf, 1985; Yan, 2003). Patriarchy was upheld 
by the patrilocal system sedimented from the feudalist tradition in which married women 
had to relocate to live with their husbands. Moreover, sexual division of work was still 
common in both public and private sectors. Overall, women had to take the “double 
burden” of working both outside and inside home (Hoing & Hershatter, 1988).   
          What is often ignored in the above analyses, however, is the fact that as two 
seemingly paralleled systems, class and gender actually intersected with each other for 
the social control in Maoist China. On the one hand, class stratification was perpetuated 
through gender difference: the state assigned class status was inherited through the male 
line, while residential status would pass to the children through their mother (Whyte, 
2010). Meanwhile, in its intersection with gender, the residence-based class hierarchy 
further complicated the effects on Chinese citizens. For instance, in urban state-owned 
enterprises that enjoyed the most welfare benefits, men greatly outnumbered women; in 
contrast, the gender ratio was more balanced in urban collective enterprises with much 
less benefits (Davin, 2004). Even within state-owned enterprises, women did not have 
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equal access to state-provided welfare, such as free housing, as their male counterparts 
(Davin, 2004). On this account, it is evident that class and gender were employed by the 
party-state as the intersectional governing technologies to organize the Maoist politic-
economic apparatus, which has been greatly under-discussed by sinologists. Feminism of 
color provides me the much-needed tool to interrogate the overlapping relationship 
between gender and class.  
Feminist of Color Scholarship on Intersectionality 
          Feminist of color scholarship of intersectionality has contributed significantly to 
the discussion of biopolitics by revealing the co-constituting relationship between 
categories. As the most important contribution feminism makes to academia so far, the 
concept of intersectionality is formulated through the politics of difference that is largely 
indebted to U.S. women of color and Third World women (Sandoval, 2000). As the 
consciousness deriving from the daily struggle with social domination, intersectionality 
takes its intellectual root in the contradictory experiences between the subjectivities of 
women of color and the social norm of identities (Brown, 1992). For example, as a poor 
black woman subject to racial segregation and economic hardship plus sexist 
discrimination, Sojourner Truth’s claim “Ain’t I A Woman” shows how she was 
excluded from the normative discourse of (white) womanhood for her blackness and class 
status (Brah & Phoenix, 2004). In her piece under the same title, bell hooks (1981) 
challenges the racist foundation of women’s second wave movement, and calls into 
question the universal rubric of “women.” Also, in what she calls “hegemonic feminist 
theory,” Gayatri Spivak (1985) criticizes the homogeneity of women’s experience 
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encapsulated in white middle class women that tenaciously reproduces “the axiom of 
imperialism.” As the examples of the consciousness of “outsider within” (Collins, 2000) 
and “la mestiza” (Anzadula, 1999) indicate, the contradiction between women of color’s 
experiences and normative identities is the quintessential intellectual quarry of the 
intersectionality scholarship.   
          Intersectionality unveils the fluidity and contingency of identity categories, and the 
overlapping social structures of inequalities and power. This consciousness can be traced 
back to the first wave of black feminism in the late nineteenth century. As Sojournor 
Truth’s earlier example indicates, African American women are acutely aware of how 
different forms of subjugation overlap with each other to shape their daily reality. Using 
the metaphor “intersectionality,” Kimberle Crenshaw (1989) first popularizes this 
concept and describes how the “gray area” has been built in anti-discrimination laws 
through the interstices between race and gender. As she illustrates, when both categories 
meet, intersection happens—the laws would not cover the specific issue of black women. 
The additive approach—“add and stir”—therefore does not apply to black females, 
whose experience is qualitatively different from that of black males or white females. In 
this regard, it reveals how identity categories are manipulated by hegemonic forces as 
discrete and fixed, entailing an “Oppression Olympics” among subjugated groups and 
silencing the discussion of intra-group differences (Shields, 2008). Furthermore, it shows 
that “subjectivity is constituted by mutually reinforcing vectors of race, gender, class, and 
sexuality” (Nash, 2008), opening up a multiple-axis analytical framework to scrutinize 
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the multi-layered, interlocked social realities, as what Patricia Hill Collins (2000) calls 
“matrix of domination.”    
           As a concept rooted in women of color, particularly African American women’s 
lived experiences, intersectionality relies on race and gender as the two commonly-
employed analytical pillars. As many scholars have been trying to elucidate, race and 
gender are not separate or paralleled but co-constitute and reinforce each other to uphold 
the social system of hierarchy (see in Eng, 2001; Brown, 1996; Williams, 1996; 
Rockquemore, 2002; García-López & Segura, 2008; Glenn, 1999, 2002; Kitch, 2009; 
Collins, 2000; Alcoff, 2005; Smith, 1999; McClintock, 1995). Naturalized as the 
corporeal basics of human body, race and gender provide the analytical leverage for the 
early intersectionality scholarship.   
          Besides race and gender, class is also approached as a cultural category which 
could spawn discursive effects on the body rather than index of economic status. In this 
regard, scholars try to investigate the intersectional relationship between class, gender 
and/or race to see how these different parameters constitute the social system that impacts 
different marginalized groups (see in Bettie, 2006; Adair, 2001; Steedman, 2006; Pascoe, 
2007; Mann, 2007). As can be seen, race, gender, and class have become the 
paradigmatic triad for feminist studies in particular and critical studies in general. The 
intersectional analysis of race, gender and class has informed new perspectives of 
analysis of culture, society and human beings (see in McClintock, 1995; Bettie, 2002; 
Acker, 2006).  
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        Informed by the concept of intersectionality, other identity categories have also been 
incorporated into the investigation of the social hierarchy through a multi-axis 
perspective. To name a few, these categories include but are not limited to sexuality (see 
in Halberstam, 1998; Collins, 2004; Pascoe, 2007; Somerville, 2000; Ferguson, 2004; 
Eng, 2010; Puar, 2007; Duggan, 2003; Briggs, 2002), nationality (see in Ramirez, 2007; 
McClintock, 1991; Grewal, 2003; Kauanui, 2008; Smith, 2005), able-bodiness (see in 
Garland-Thomson, 1997, 2000; Felstiner, 2007; Soldatic & Fiske, 2009), and citizenship 
(see in Ong, 1996, 1999; Glenn, 2002; Hart, 2006; Smith & Marmo, 2011; Yuval-Davis, 
Anthias & Kofman, 2005; Nuys, 2002; Ngai, 1999; Lee, 2010). 
          Though intersectionality is often applied to certain multiply oppressed groups, such 
as African American women (Nash, 2008), other scholars use it as a lens to investigate 
the social structure of inequalities (see in Kitch, 2009; Somerville, 2000; McClintock, 
1995; Glenn, 2002; Collins, 2000, 2004; Ferguson, 2004). As Collins (2000) states, 
identity categories intersect with each other to create a social structure of inequalities and 
power as what she calls the “matrix of domination.” In this regard, this concept would be 
useful for me to construct a new perspective to probe how different categories overlap 
with each other to constitute the intertwined social systems as the basis structure of 
biopolitics for the control and regulation of human bodies and population (Spade, 2013).  
         Moreover, though widely accepted as the most important contribution that academic 
feminism has made (McCall, 2005), intersectionality has also invited a plethora of 
critiques. The contestation between intersectionality and transnational feminism, two 
dominant intellectual rubrics in women, gender and sexuality studies, is worth 
 
 
30 
 
mentioning here. As Tomlinson (2013) notes, one critique of intersectionality tries to 
replace it with transnational feminism as the renewed and most-up-to-date framework for 
the feminist inquiries. As I argue in the dissertation, intersectionality and 
transnationalism are not mutually exclusive with each other. Building the case of China 
as an example, I will demonstrate that intersectionality is particularly valuable in the 
context of neoliberal globalization in that “capital as it functions now depends on and 
exacerbates racist, patriarchal, and heterosexist relations of rule” (Mohanty, 2003, p. 231). 
In the conclusion, I will get back to the major critiques of intersectionality and try to 
reconceptualize it for the analysis of neoliberalism in a transnational context. 
The Theoretical Frame and Central Thesis   
          Through a synergistic reading of Foucault’s concept of neoliberal governmentality, 
Daivd Harvey’s notion of accumulation by dispossession and feminist scholarship of 
intersectionality, I thus conceptualize neoliberalism as an art of governance centering on 
the intersectional biopolitics of identities to create market subjects and market 
competition. From this vantage point, I want to explore the articulated relationship 
between China’s neoliberal transition and identities of gender, class and sexuality. Using 
China as a case example, I hope to reveal the identity-based mechanism through which 
neoliberalism as a type of governmentality is practiced and enacted. As feminist 
scholarship of intersectionality suggests, as identity categories are all historically and 
contextually constructed rather than static and fixed, this structure is highly mutable and 
contingent, and may vary in forms and dimensions in different time and place. For 
instance, “ethnicity” has disparate meanings at different historical moments and in 
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different regions in China. (Honig, 1992). In this regard, rather than reiterating the grand 
narrative that sees neoliberal globalization as a unified and homogenizing project, I hope 
to conceptualize a more complex and contextualized framework to understand China’s 
neoliberalization through the variable contours of the intersection of identity categories.   
          Moreover, to fully understand how neoliberal governmentality functions, as 
Foucault (2011, 2012) suggests, we also need to scrutinize the formation of different 
forms of discourses and the constitution of the subject’s mode of being via these 
discourses. Simply put, the discursive production provides an important domain to 
examine how these normalizing technologies are articulated with social institutions to 
delimit and differentiate possibilities of actions for different groups, and people’s 
subjectivization by these discourses are important instances of disciplinary technologies 
of self-regulation and individualization, which motivate and direct people to realize these 
possibilities by internalizing the scripted ways of being. Instead of taking a reductive 
approach to neoliberal globalization and assuming a concomitant universal resistance (see 
in Hardt, 2010), I want to engage with the lived reality of how peripheral groups 
internalize, negotiate and resist the neoliberal governing logic, and then construct a 
contingent space for social change. If Chandra Mohanty (2003) is right about neoliberal 
globalization as commonly but differently impacting people across the world, this work 
would be necessary for us to orchestrate a common ground for further inquiries and 
activist efforts. In this regard, I hope my project contributes to a materially and culturally 
integrative framework to address the issues of economic injustice and cultural recognition 
of identities. I also want to respond to the critique of feminist scholarship of 
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intersectionality, and reconceptualize it as a metaphor (rather than a one-fits-all 
framework of solutions to all social problems about identities) to analyze the dynamics 
between the identity-based social structure and people’s emerging experiences for a 
transnational context to challenge the dominion and hegemony of neoliberalism. 
Moreover, I would seek to engage with the big questions that have widely been discussed 
across (inter)disciplines through a feminist lens, and make the voice of feminism resound 
louder and wider within academia. 
          Similar to many feminist efforts, this project is informed by my experiences as a 
transnational subject constituted by the gendered, classed, sexualized and racialized 
biopolitics. Building on self-reflexivity as a feminist method, the situated interrogation of 
my own categorized experiences will help me develop the theoretical discussions of 
neoliberalism and identities into concrete research questions.  
Feminist Reflexivity   
          Since its institutionalization in the 1970s, academic feminism has distinguished 
itself from other traditional disciplines for its persistent challenging of neutrality and 
objectivity as the so-called foundation of scientific knowledge. As a result, it is widely 
accepted that far from neutral and objective, knowledge production is sexually based 
(Grosz, 1993), socially situated (Haraway, 2003), inflected by pre-constituted standpoint 
(Harding, 1993, 2006, 2007), and laden with power dynamics (Butler 2004; Gannon & 
Davies, 2007). In this regard, feminist scholars contend that lived experience is an 
important site for novel knowledge production. Among them, Gloria Anzaldúa proffers a 
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good example. In her classic work La Borderlands (1990), Anzaldúa invokes her 
experiences of multiply indexed identities to produce a transgressive understanding of the 
system of inequalities and an inclusive consciousness of social justice for all subjugated 
groups. With the poetic descriptions of her various moments of crossing the physical and 
psychological borders that straddle the U.S./Mexico boundary and various identities, 
Anzaldúa carefully mellows these experiences into a border socio-historical picture of the 
struggles of Chicano/a. As she demonstrates, only by transgressing these socially 
imposed external and internal borderlands and actively negotiating with the 
contradictions emanating from the competing material and ideological forces of 
colonialism, militarism, sexism, racism and homophobia, can she (and other Chicanas as 
well) develop a transformative consciousness to build solidarity among all peripheral 
groups. 
          Feminist scholars have also designed specific methods to mobilize lived 
experiences for new knowledge. For instance, Mary Margaret Fonow and Judith Cook 
(1991) identify reflexivity as an important feminist method for this purpose, which 
requires intensive critical engagement with researchers’ own values, beliefs, and 
perspectives, as “a potentially transformative process for researchers, participants, and 
the larger community of knowledge builders” (Hesse-Biber & Brooks 2007, p. 422). 
Reflexivity has been widely employed in dissertations produced by women and gender 
studies majors (Fonow & Kitch 2012). However, as Joan Scott (1986) argues, personal 
experience could not be simplified as a natural foundation of knowledge because it is also 
socially and culturally embedded. On this account, using reflexivity in a static, 
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dehistoricized and decontextualized way, most of these efforts fail in their feminist claim 
of transforming knowledge production (Fonow & Kitch, 2012). As Jacqueline Martinez 
(2006) holds, rather than approaching reflexivity as a temporally and spatially indexed 
process of inquiry, these scholars use it as a catch phrase to reinforce their established 
perspective as the unconscious vantage point, failing to bring their emerging lived 
experiences into a sustained dialogue with the changing socio-cultural contexts that 
continuously reshape their experiences. By re-inscribing the preexisting cultural 
presumption and standpoint, this approach also fails to grapple with the underlying 
structure of power for new knowledge production.   
          In response to these critiques, I use semiotic phenomenology as a feminist method 
to perform organic and embedded self-reflections to further the understanding of the 
intertwined relationship between China’s socio-economic reform, the ongoing project of 
globalization and the interfaces of identity categories that vary with these processes. As 
defined by Richard Lanigan (2009), semiotic phenomenology is a method “in which the 
expressive body discloses cultural codes, and cultural codes shape the perceptive body—
an ongoing, dialectical, complex helix of twists and turns constituting the reflectivity, 
reversibility, and reflexivity of consciousness and experience.” Simply put, it centers on 
the reflection of culturally indexed bodily experience to generate a sustained dialogue 
between our emerging experiences and the shifting socio-cultural norms. As Martinez 
suggests, among variable philosophical trajectories of phenomenology, semiotic 
phenomenology posits a goal to “explicate the structural (semiotic) constraints that limit 
and enable human conscious awareness and the experiences created by virtue of being 
persons located in time, place, and culture” (2006, p. 297). In other words, it enables a 
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reflexive framework for a synchronic analysis of our situated bodily experience, 
challenging us to investigate the culturally and physically located norm within certain 
historical moment that continues to shape our perceptive body. Also, as she states, 
semiotic phenomenology takes the Peircian approach to semiotics, which relies on a 
diachronic engagement to grapple with the ongoing signifying process (semiosis) 
formulated through the sign system. Drawing upon Peirce’s categories of Firstness 
(vague awareness that has not come into the culturally indexed perception), Secondness 
(the perceived experience through an established sign), and Thirdness (the creation of a 
new sign by articulating the newly perceived experience with another sign), Martinez 
argues that, since the subtlety and intricacy of human experience are beyond established 
cultural norms, the contradiction between the perceived experience and cultural norms is 
an important site for knowledge production. Semiotic phenomenology foregrounds 
researchers as a site of inquiry, and thus proffers an instrument for me to reflexively 
engage with the dialectics between my expressive body and the cultural system of 
identity categories to better understand the relationship between China’s socio-economic 
transformation and the shifting contours of gender, class and sexuality.  
          In this regard, situating my personal Odyssey in the process of global restructuring, 
I scrutinize how my neoliberal subjectivity has been shaped and reshaped by the 
gendered, classed, sexualized and racialized biopolitics. This methodological endeavor 
resonates with Foucault’s argument (20011) that querying “the ontology of self” is 
crucial to the analysis of neoliberal governmentality. With a deconstructive and 
contextualized reading of my meritocratic and marketized subjectivity that has been cast 
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and recast by various biopolitical technologies, I will develop my crude curiosity about 
China’s marketization and accession to the global network of capital into a manageable 
research agenda. As Ong astutely points out, overseas Chinese “have been the 
forerunners of today’s multiply displaced subjects, who are always on the move both 
mentally and physically” (1999, p. 2). In this regard, my experiences of dislocation, 
relocation, displacement and transgression, coupled with the proper academic training in 
theories and methodology, will become the intellectual forays for reflexivity to produce 
new understandings of neoliberalism, corporate globalization and identities. By pushing 
the boundaries of my established perspectives, I develop the abstract theorizing of the 
intersectional biopolitics of neoliberal governmentality into concrete research questions 
and appropriate research methods.  
Deconstructing My Neoliberal Subjectivity in China     
         Different from the U.S. norm of hyper masculinity (Kimmel 1996), one culturally 
distinguished characteristics of Chinese genderscape till recently is the soft, literary 
manhood (Louie, 2002; Song, 2004). This cultural norm of masculinity takes root in the 
Confucian tradition that valorizes male literati of the gentrified class as the central figure 
in the political order of the feudal state. In feudalist China, the patriarchal gender 
relationship was the important discursive resource to consolidate and legitimize the state 
system and the subject-monarch relationship (Bray, 1997). Many subjects internalized 
their constructed feminine role (subordinate to the “masculine” monarch) through the 
performance of the softened masculinity, which turned into a cultural standard of 
manhood among the ruling class (Zhang, 2008). Moreover, in contrast to the Western 
 
 
37 
 
dimorphic gender system premised on compulsory heterosexuality (Butler, 2006), the 
traditional Chinese aesthetics of manhood was to no small extent calibrated by the male 
homoerotic relationship. The positive portrait of ancient Chinese gay men as “young with 
feminine face and fragile body” in literatures further reinforced soft and literary 
masculinity as the normative gender discourse in Chinese history (Wu, 2003). In this 
regard, as Tani Barlow (1994) notes, traditional Chinese gender system is not as 
distinctively demarcated as in the Western context despite its equally oppressive 
patriarchal system, if not more so. In the Maoist era, the ambiguous gender line was 
revamped for a Socialist version of “gender equality” largely at the expense of men: 
women were masculinized as equal to men in public sectors of employment, and they 
also gained more agencies in the private domain of marriage (Croll, 1983; Yan, 2003). 
Meanwhile, in its intersection with social class, gender was co-opted by the Maoist 
ideology with the embrace of revolutionary working class and peasant masculinity as the 
symbolic face of the Socialist state. For example, the imagery of workers operating 
machines is a central symbol of the new political regime. Even so, soft masculinity never 
completely lost its cultural values during Mao’s reign (Wang, 2003).  
          As the state’s focus shifted from Socialism to neoliberalism in the late 1970s, the 
gentrified soft, literary masculinity that had been kept at bay prevailed again. In an article 
of the Chinese idols in different eras, the author suggests that in the early 1980s, the 
imagery of men of letters replaced the working class/soldiers to become the new caliber 
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of Chinese masculinity.23 In Desiring China, Rofel (2007) also illustrates how the 
educated men were valorized as the central figure that could not only lead and support the 
family, but also salvage the country from the traumatizing Maoist monopoly over 
economy and culture. My boyhood conflated with this cultural shift. Born into a working 
class family in the hinterland of China in the late 1970s, my embodied soft, literary 
masculinity was the only cultural capital for me to distinguish myself from my peers from 
the similar class background. This gender performance was further referenced and 
reinforced by my outstanding scholastic achievements at school. As the class gap had not 
yet been recreated by Deng’s reform policies, the embodied masculinity provided a 
symbolic stamp connecting me to the imagined elite class status.  
          As China’s marketization accelerated, it not only reshaped the socio-economic 
ecology, but also reconstituted the genderscape. In the late 1980s, a multitude of gender 
discourses mushroomed to disseminate an essentialized notion of sexual difference. As an 
important mechanism to re-integrate China with the global capitalism, the restructured 
mass media played a big role in this process (Zhao, 2008). On the one hand, there was the 
proliferation of discourses of gender differences—female images with emphasized 
feminine and sexual features started to dominate mass media (Croll, 1995; Evans 1997; 
Honig & Hershatter, 1988). On the other hand, a discourse of “remasculization” became 
prevalent in mass media, seeking to recover men from the traumatizing experience in 
Mao’s era and reconstruct the so-called macho images of men in post-Mao China (Rofel, 
2007; Zheng, 2009; Lu, 2000). This discursive shift also conflated with the Western 
                                                            
23 Luoyang Web. (2007, August 15). Dream lovers in different eras. Retrieved from 
http://lady.lyd.com.cn/w.asp?id=474  
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cultural penetration spearheaded by such media spectacles as the hyper masculine icons, 
like Rambo and Zorro. When these muscular and tough Westernized images of 
masculinist heroes were widely celebrated by general Chinese, the soft, literary 
masculinity was stigmatized as too “creamy” (naiyou, which means “not tough and 
manly enough” in Chinese), and lost its currency in the media market.  
          The habituated gender subjectivity, however, had been deeply inscribed onto my 
daily regimentation of identity and become an essential hermeneutic horizon of feeling, 
thinking and behaving for me (Alcoff, 2005), rendering me out of tune with the socio-
cultural wave in China’s swift social changes. Though my “not manly enough” gender 
identity became a delegitimizing mark for me, my self-consciousness formulated through 
this gendered disciplining was not flexible enough to keep abreast of the new trend, 
placing me in incessant anxiety and struggle throughout my adolescence. My trouble with 
gender underlay all my choices later.  
         The Westernized dimorphic gender discourse needs to be further deconstructed 
through a queer lens. As Foucault’s (1990) description of the burgeoning European 
capitalism indicates, to subject a diverse spectrum of desiring modalities to the 
reproductive zealotry to satisfy the increasing demand of labor for capitalist market, all 
desires outside the heterosexual nucleus family needed to be policed and disciplined. In 
this regard, Siobhan Sommerville (2000) argues that the notion of pathological 
homosexuality was invented at the end of the 19th century to reinforce the patriarchal 
family institution predicated on a clarified gender line in Western societies. As Foucault 
writes, in the 19th century, the sodomite as a temporary aberration was turned into 
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homosexual as a species, through “a certain way of inverting the masculine and the 
feminine in oneself” (1990, 43). In other words, homosexuals as an identity were not only 
produced as the abnormal inversion of the heterosexualized gender order, but also the 
boundary of heterosexuality to normalize the latter as “compulsory and natural.” 
Therefore, hinged on the newly constructed identity of “homosexuality,” 
heteronormativity and dimorphic gender configuration co-constituted and reinforced each 
other to guarantee the heterosexual familial matrix running smoothly for the burgeoning 
capitalist economy. For example, as Kimmel (1996) shows, in the mid-19th century, the 
nucleus family became an important site for the professing of gender and sexual 
protocols to boys in the U.S. Their sexual desire needed to be correctly directed (towards 
the opposite sex), and appropriately released (for procreation and not wasted in 
masturbation). As many people assumed, learning how to manage one’s sexual desire 
was the premise to become a rational and self-disciplined man for market competition, 
and only with economic success could a man fulfill his responsibility as the family 
provider. In other words, through the stringent policing over their sexuality, the boys 
were not only recreated as the self-reliant subject for the market economy, but also the 
gendered being to perpetuate the nucleus family as the foundation of the capitalist 
economy and society.  
          In the early 1990s, a discourse of homosexuality was introduced into mainland 
China through media products, further naturalizing the (unequal) difference between men 
and women. For the first time, homosexuality as an identity, in its distinction to 
homosexuality as activities, was constructed in China (Rofel, 2007), becoming an 
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important thermometer to assess the socio-economic changes. While China extended its 
reform from “dots and bits” experiments to a full-fledging project and strove for the 
unlimited accession to the global economy, (non)coincidentally the increasingly visible 
homophobic frenzy accompanied the restructuring of the genderscape to reconstitute the 
social norm. Learning from mass media, people started to reclassify themselves and 
others with the category of sexuality as part of the biopolitical control of the population. 
Not surprisingly, my carefully concealed sexual desire (for men) became fathomable 
through my questionable soft masculinity, which subjected me to constant voyeuristic 
scrutiny on a daily basis. Like C. J. Pascoe’s (2007) description of the U.S. high schools, 
homophobic slurs became a popular rhetoric among Chinese boys and adolescents to 
assert their manliness in the early 1990s. For these (heterosexual) boys, it was just a 
rhetorical swordplay about masculinity competition. For me, it was a gendered and 
(hetero)sexualized biopolitical tutelage and surveillance that haunted me throughout my 
pubertal years. Only until the new century did I finally come to terms with my “perverse” 
sexuality. This agitated and stressed experience later became the most important impetus 
stimulating me to strive for emancipation with personal achievement—the essential 
argument of meritocracy.  
          During the same period, the idea of meritocracy and individual freedom ascended 
and started to replace the Socialist notion of equality and social justice. In the 1990s, 
while released from the collective duties and missions, people needed to become 
responsible for their own well-being as the state retreated from welfare provisions to 
enhance its administrative efficiency. Like the “pulling yourself up with your bootstraps” 
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stories in the Western societies, the successful experiences of self-made economic 
accomplishments by poor farmers, such as the ten-thousand-Yuan household, were 
repeated by mass media, beckoning more people to join the auspicious Socialist market 
economy. For people having been living under the stricture of the Maoist state and 
collectivized social production, this rhetoric was truly appealing as it tempered with their 
long-subdued individualistic ambition for the new market relationship. For the youth 
from the poor/working class background like me, hard work and competition became the 
legitimized and touted means to success, outlining a prospect of social mobility. As I 
recall now, the constant stress and anxiety emanating from my non-normative gendered, 
sexualized and classed identities were the primary subjectivizing mechanism that called 
on me for individual freedom, and directed my dislocation across China and relocation to 
the U.S. for the maximization of personal interests and self-preservation.  
          As China’s marketization accelerated and intensified after the mid-1990s, a direct 
result was the restoration of class inequalities (Harvey, 2005). Meanwhile, gender was 
not only (hetero)sexualized, but also became classed. As Tiantian Zheng (2009) points 
out, the 1990s has seen the prevalence of a discourse of entrepreneurial masculinity that 
centered on the control of women’s body and sexuality, consuming power and 
enterprising capacity to shore up the masculinist superiority. As China was increasingly 
rewired with the world economy after Deng’s 1992 Southern tour, its genderscape also 
blended into the global backdrop, in which the business masculinity becomes a 
transnational cultural norm (Connell, 1998, 2005). In this regard, it is not difficult to 
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understand why my inferior class background further delegitimized my gender identity 
for the inability to participate in conspicuous consumption like a “real man.” 
          Not until the late 1990s had I truly felt for the first time the transformative power 
of marketization on class, gender and sexuality with my relocation across China for 
education. As neoliberalism was first adopted as “exception” in coastal and urban regions 
(Ong, 2006), at that time its social effects had not been felt as concretely in my 
hometown—a small town in hinterland China—as in the Eastern metropolitan 
constellations where my university is located. During my college years, in our dormitory 
that accommodated eight young adults, the bedtime talk was often dominated by the 
heterosexualized bloating of masculine power or more accurately, the masculinity 
competition of which money usually made the final decision. The roommates from the 
affluent areas kept increasing the stakes of this competition by showcasing how they 
could capitalize on their consumption capacity to impress girls and dwarf their rivals. As 
one of them claimed, he and his girlfriend(s) could easily spend 50 dollars in a karaoke 
bar overnight—a sum enough for a whole month of feeding to me. It made it clear that 
the intersection of manliness and (hetero)sexual virility was hinged upon a bourgeois 
lifestyle. In contrast, the lack of economic resources deprived the rest of us the 
entitlement to participate in (or at least pretend to participate in) this “real men’s talk.” 
For the marginalized members, the meritocratic narrative that “more education will bring 
a better life” seemed the only viable solution to our troubled gender, sexual and class 
identities, beckoning us into the neoliberal dream with more investment of time and 
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energy in studies. Among them, I became the lucky one: in 2004, my arduous work 
finally bore the fruit with the admission to a top-rated graduate program in Shanghai.  
          A center of the global metropolitan constellations, Shanghai, due to its advantaged 
geopolitical location and thick history of bourgeois legacy and colonialism, becomes a 
“hub” that mediates transnational capital and the bountiful raw materials and laborers in 
interior China with the economic reform (Sassen, 2009). As the “dragon head” of the 
cartographic territory, Shanghai is embraced by the state as the spearhead that directs 
China through the fierce global competition (Wu et al., 2007). This positioning also 
places Shanghai in the epicenter of multifarious ideological and discursive forces 
unleashed by the liberalizing effects of market economy. As Cheng Li (1997) notes, the 
zealotry for Western modernism and bourgeois lifestyle gleaned from Shanghai’s 
wartime colonial legacy re-thrives after held at bay by the Maoist state for 30 years. As 
numerous people from other parts of China, particularly rural areas are magneticized to 
Shanghai for opportunities, the ethnocentrism of Shanghai natives coupled with the 
colonist discourse of Western modernity is translated into explicit nativist discrimination 
against less-developed Chinese areas in general and migrants from these areas in 
particular.  
          As a new immigrant in Shanghai, I partially internalized the colonial legacy of 
Western supremacy in Shanghai local culture, but at the same time, my meritocratic 
dream was shattered by the compounded classist, nativist marginalization and enlarging 
social inequalities. Like many others, this complicated emotion was crystalized as a 
critical perspective of the polarized anti-Communist outrage (through the anxieties over 
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my gender, sexual and class identities) and American apologist expectation for 
emancipation. As Stanley Rosen (2003) notes, in contemporary China, urban Chinese 
youth have developed two disparate images of the United States: a highly negative view 
of American hegemonism abroad alongside a highly positive assessment of American 
values and lifestyles at home. Like millions of young people who are antagonistic to the 
party-state but never have a chance to really experience the American life, the 
romanticized longing for the American life and the despaired alienation from the 
Shanghai urban life blended into a polarized hermeneutic interface for me. In Shanghai, 
every year millions of people come from other areas for prosperity and social mobility, 
only to find our neoliberal meritocratic dream get razed by the reality: the skyrocketing 
housing price, the overt discrimination and even the right to love disenfranchised by the 
market logic.  
          Though blessed by the graduate degree from an elite university and the 
government-issued Hukou as the recognition of my “Shanghaineseness,” like other 
migrants, I could not find a job to afford a small condo as the dwelling. As news reports 
repeat recently, myriad young people are “escaping from Bei Shang Guang” (an acronym 
for Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, the three major metropolises in China) after 
finding their striving would never yield the desired outcomes since the market has been 
distorted by nepotism and bureaucratic power. Consequently, many of them impute these 
problems to the Communist ideology and bureaucracy. Swung by the transnational 
discourse of neoliberalism that liberalization, deregulation and democratization of 
economics and politics (as Westerners have been doing) would achieve a prosperous and 
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equitable society, they submit to the idea of human rights and personal freedom, which is 
often manipulated by neoliberal ideology to further the self-serving market rule in the 
Western societies (Harvey, 2005). Distressed by the Party’s failed promise of building 
social equality and harmony, they displace the failed meritocratic dream in the Chinese 
context onto the uncharted “liberated” Western world, particularly the U.S. As a sturdy 
member in this camp, I submitted my application materials for several U.S. graduate 
programs, and half a year later, set on the journey to “the land of opportunities” for the 
renewed hope of emancipation and freedom.  
Reflecting on My Racializing Transformation in the U.S.  
          As a new category imposed by the U.S. politics and culture, race became the most 
significant caliber of my identity and intellectual transformation. When I checked the box 
that said “Asian/Pacific Islander” in order to get the entry into the U.S. territory, though I 
had little clue of what it meant, my body was already invested with new meanings that 
would translate into tangible effect and affect for me in the new context.  
          As Howard Winant writes, race is “a concept that signifies and symbolizes socio-
political conflicts and interests in reference to different types of human bodies” (2004, 
155). Sally Kitch (2009) further pushes this argument and suggests that there is a 
gendered foundation of racial formation in U.S. history. As a racial category, Asian is 
also founded on gender and sexual ideology for its early formulation. As for Chinese and 
Japanese, two pioneering immigrant groups later categorized as “Asian,” the 
manipulation of the discourses about the sexuality of Chinese and Japanese women first 
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classified them as two different ethnic groups, and then conflated them as one race (Lee, 
2010). In contemporary U.S. society, David Eng (2001) contends that the intersection of 
race, gender and sexuality renders Asian men the “racial castration” with queering effect.  
Not heterosexual enough, Asian men are considered a threat to the heteronormative white 
masculinity (Collins, 2004). This intersectional relationship, however, produced novel 
and even “freeing” experiences for me. I was happy to find that my questioned gender 
and sexual identities in China were legitimized by my new racial identity—my favorite 
flamboyant and “girly” shirt that might look problematic for other racial groups were 
acceptable for me as an Asian man, as a cohort member told me. My American dream of 
emancipation from the (Communist-foisted) gender and sexual norm seemed 
preliminarily realized.  
         Like gender, class and sexuality, the meanings of race need to be deconstructed 
through a contextualized and politico-economic lens. The values laden with “Asian” have 
been shifting with the U.S. politico-economic agenda. Different from its derogatory 
connotation of promiscuous “yellow peril” that would pose threat to the U.S. civilization 
in the late 19th century (Reddy, 2003), or the pollution of the racial purity of white 
Americanness in the early 20th century (Nuys, 2002), the racialized meanings of Asian 
seem to have been whitened as the title “Model Minority” suggests. However, this racial 
“reformation” needs to be teased out in the context of the biopolitics-induced neoliberal 
policies since the 1970s. In the globalized industrial hierarchy, the U.S. biopolitical 
agenda has sought to attract technological professionals from other countries, particularly 
Asia to strengthen and perpetuate its dominion in new “knowledge economy” (Ong, 
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2006). The economic success of one segment of new Asian immigrants, usually well-
educated middle class professional men, has been racialized in cultural terms to justify 
this process—“Asians” are culturally attuned for success in the free market, in stark 
contrast to “lazy” blacks and Latinos (Maeda, 2005). Mari Matsuda (1996) directly calls 
this racial myth an instrument of the distributive, gender, and racial injustice for 
neoliberal restructuring. Though “Model Minority” provides a discursive instrument for 
the self-pride and solidarity of Asian Americans, it also reproduces the racial biopolitics 
to fuel the neoliberal governance. Students from Asia usually have no clues about how 
much Asian Americans have benefited from the civil rights movement spearheaded by 
African Americans. It is common to see that these students hurl racist slurs against other 
minorities to signify their elevated status in the racial hierarchy. With the egregiously 
high concentration in the labor-intensive industries, the U.S. people of color have been 
unequally impacted by the flight of capital for cheaper and submissive labor, and bear the 
most brunt of neoliberal restructuring. Moreover, their embodied phenotypical difference 
becomes the corporeal justification for the biopolitical rearticulation of human beings that 
has been cast and recast with the varying needs of avaricious capital.  
          The above critique of racialized neoliberal biopolitics in the U.S. seems cogent and 
coherent as ex post facto thought. It, however, did not pop up as a natural result of the 
theoretical and methodological training until the contradictory bodily experience from the 
cleavage between the racial ideology and the lived reality marked a liminal space for my 
intellectual transformation. One day I got an email from a student in our program 
inquiring about the graduate course of statistics that I would teach. I was quite shocked 
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because my training did not qualify me for any courses about statistics, not to mention a 
graduate one. Almost simultaneously, it occurred to me that before this incident, I had 
been told quite a few times by other students that “I don’t belong to the class about 
humanities as an Asian man.” This time I did not just simply shrug off this unexpected 
message as an innocuous coincidence as usual. It rather carved out a new horizon that 
animated the racial boundary entrenched in the U.S. political economy. Obviously, the 
racialized and gendered values invested in my name already prescribed a trajectory for 
me inadvertently, even before I set my feet on the “land of opportunities.” To certain new 
immigrants from Asia, this trajectory might seem freeing and empowering as it pre-
positions them in an avenue with more access to economic/professional success (than 
other minority groups). However, it is not essentially different from the trajectories 
prescribed for their less educated, impoverished immigrant ancestors. No matter it is an 
IT engineer, a railroad builder, a gold miner or a laundry shop worker, the wobbling 
interface of the prescribed trajectory is fundamentally directed by the varying needs of 
capital and market. Contrary to the myth of “Model Minority,” Asians are far from being 
“whitened” to be a member of the club of racial superiority. When neoliberalism takes its 
toll in the economy, new Asian immigrants are situated in a no safer zone than our 
ancestors. For instance, as the widely-circulated China-bashing discourses in the wake of 
the 2008 crisis testifies, like the poor workers in the 1860s and early 20th century, new 
immigrants from China would often be manipulated as the scapegoat for the chaos 
entailed by ruthless and brutal capital that pays no heeding to ethical values other than 
profits and market share. Contrary to the highly propagated notions of freedom, equal 
opportunities and human rights, the U.S. economic prosperity and vitality have been 
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generated and perpetuated by the differentiation, classification and hierarchization of 
human beings through categories and categorizations. This novel understanding of 
biopolitics and the U.S. economy dismantled the romanticized imagination of the U.S. 
exceptionalism. It needs to be further reckoned with for more new understandings of 
neoliberalism, corporate globalization, identities that can be fathomed with concrete 
research questions and methods.  
Research Questions  
          Through a historicized and contextualized analysis of my intellectual changes 
along with the formation and reformation of my various identities, I extend my scope 
from comparative/binaristic to relational and transnational, and link my gendered, 
sexualized, classed and racialized subjectivities embedded in different geopolitical and 
socio-cultural contexts with each other through the lens of global restructuring.24 It 
challenges me to further query the relationship between identities, neoliberalism and 
corporate globalization to see how the globalized neoliberal economy is enacted and 
enabled through the intersectional biopolitics. As Foucault (2008) suggests, the 
subjection and subject-making to extend the values and relations of markets for the 
broader organization of politics, economy and society through biopolitics are key to the 
art of neoliberal governance. In so doing, neoliberal governmentality integrates totalizing 
sovereign power with individualizing disciplinary power for its implementation (Foucault 
1979), and the technologies of subjective individualization with procedures of objective 
tantalization (Foucault 2011; 2012). In this regard, Foucault (2011; 2012) argues that to 
                                                            
24 Here I follow the example of Anzaldua’s classics (1999), La Borderlands.  
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fully understand how neoliberal governmentality is exercised, we need to scrutinize the 
dynamics between the formation of different forms of discourses to sustain the overall 
governing structure as well as the constitution of the subject’s mode of being through 
disciplinary technologies.  
          However, as Giorgio Agamben (2000) argues, Foucault fails to clarify how these 
two different types of power are integrated with each other in the daily practice of 
governmentality. As he writes, “what is the point at which the voluntary servitude of 
individuals into contact with objective power?” (2000, p. 6). As Agamben points out, 
biopolitics is the linkage, and “the production of a biopolitical body is the original 
activity of sovereign power” (2000, p. 6). As the critical review of my experiences 
indicates, by laying out multiple possibilities and psychological tendencies of action via 
the intersectional gendered, sexualized, classed and racialized parameters of biopolitics, 
people are recreated as voluntary subjects geared up for self-preservation and market 
competition. Therefore, the first question I want to address in this project is: how have 
the state-imposed class inequalities, binaristic gender and heteronormative discourses 
been employed intersectionally by the state to disarticulate and rearticulate the population 
to facilitate China’s neoliberal transition and accession to the global system of capital? 
Guided by this question, I seek to fathom the basic mechanism of biopolitics that 
undergirds China’s transition from Socialism to neoliberalism.   
          Also, as Brown (2005) puts it, different from the Marxist doctrine that views 
ideology as determined by economic infrastructure, neoliberal ideology sometimes 
converges with, but more often than not diverges from neoliberal governing practices. As 
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Caren Kaplan and Interpal Grewal (1994) suggest, neoliberal ideologies take “scattered” 
forms, varying from locations to locations. In the U.S., the political legacy of liberalism 
has been translated into an “anti-big-government” discourse and fetishistic rhetoric of 
individual freedom to legitimize the encroachment of public areas, like education, health 
care, by market. Also, as suggested earlier, the alterable cultural contour of identities 
provides a fundamental repository for the justification of neoliberal practices. For 
instance, the racialized image of new Asian immigrants as “Model Minority” is an 
important ideological justification for the U.S. neoliberalism (Matsda, 1996), and the 
iconizing discourse of hyper masculine hero is the new pivotal point to legitimize China’s 
suis generis practices of neoliberalism (Zhang, 2013). On this account, I want to 
investigate: in countries like China where there is less liberalist legacy, how do the 
intersectional contours of race, gender, class and sexuality help produce new discourses 
to legitimate its marketization and re-integration with the global economy? 
          Marginalized groups, however, are not the passive subjects that can be fully 
manipulated by neoliberal governmentality, and the multiple parameters of biopolitics 
leave out a plenitude of ruptures and fissures for them to challenge the neoliberal 
dominance. In 2010, a grass-roots music band composed of two poor migrant male 
workers became an Internet sensation in China. As the band name—Xu Ri Yang Gang 
(meaning macho men in the rising sun) and their super masculine rendition of a sorrow-
stricken song indicate, they tried to resist the social marginalization and valorize their 
status as the validated Chinese citizens through an effusive performance of hyper 
masculinity. On the one hand, they have internalized the transnational masculinist 
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hegemony of neoliberal subjectivity (Zhang, 2013). On the other hand, the symbolic 
weight of hyper masculinity as the central neoliberal ideology was mobilized by them to 
turn the state’s neoliberal practices on its head. This strategy worked quite well—after the 
homemade video was posted online, it aroused overwhelming resonance from all walks 
of the Chinese society, registering nearly ten million hits within a short time.25 They were 
even invited to perform at the 2011 Spring Festival Gala, a significant “ideological state 
apparatus” (Althusser, 2001) in China. Building on this example, I want to investigate: 
how do the marginalized groups internalize, negotiate with and challenge the material 
and cultural practices of neoliberal governmentality to create livable space for them in 
China?  
          To further clarify the intrinsic connection between these three questions that unites 
them into a coherent project, I would draw on Charles Sanders Perice’s theorization of 
the sign system to illuminate the process of knowledge making through the signifying 
economy (Merrell, 1995). As Peirce points out, the process of knowledge production 
proceeds on three interconnected levels between the objective structure and subjective 
experiential bodies: the crude level that he calls “Firstness” where people’s bodily 
experience not yet coded by established cultural terms has not entered their consciousness; 
the intermediate  called “Secondness” whereby the bodily experience has been perceived 
via certain signs; the abstract level that he terms “Thirdness” in which different pre-
                                                            
25 Xie, L. & Geng, H. (2011, November 11). Hu nan sheng wu shu ji cheng ting nong min 
gong chang “chun tian li” re lei ying kuang (Secretary of Hunan provincial committee of 
the CPC claimed to be move into tears by the migrant peasant vocal duo). Retrieved from  
http://news.163.com/10/1111/01/6L6119FA00014AED.html 
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constituted concepts, notions, norms and ideas articulate with each other to make new 
meanings (Merrell, 1995). As we can see, by excluding personal experiences from 
knowledge making in the name of “neutrality and objectivity,” modern scientific 
approach is only restricted to the third, abstract level. Precluding the bodily experiences 
from discussion, concepts from books interconnect with each other to create a continuing 
process of knowledge making on an abstract level. It not simply leaves out a vast terrain 
as sites for novel knowledge, but also further marginalizes those groups who have been 
historically excluded from the white male dominated academia. Moreover, as neoliberal 
globalization is deeply intertwined with the racialized, gendered, sexualized and classed 
biopolitics, it is imperative for us to explore people’s lived reality of internalizing, 
negotiating with and resisting the biopolitical structure of neoliberal governmentality to 
deepen our understanding of its intrinsic mechanism of functioning, exercising, and 
(re)production. Only by actively engaging with the dynamics between the intersectional 
biopolitical structure and people’s responses to it, can we generate transformative 
knowledge of neoliberalism and corporate globalization for substantive changes. 
          As I argue, feminist concept of intersectionality provides an effective instrument 
for this purpose. Though this concept is deeply situated in the U.S. historical and socio-
economic background, as Jennifer Nash (2010) argues, rather than designating a “one-fit-
all” transcendental paradigm to solve all problems related to identities in all cultures and 
societies, intersectionality is more of a metaphor for us to refresh our knowledge of the 
emerging contradictions between the intersectional biopolitical structures of neoliberal 
governmentality and people’s daily life. To perpetuate this structure for the vested 
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interests, the privileged groups try to maintain these identities as paralleled and separate 
for social control. As Collins observes, we “[s]egregate people into boxes of ghettos, 
barrios, closets, and prisons, rank the boxes as being fundamentally separate and unequal, 
and keep the entire system intact by forbidding individuals to get to know one another as 
fully human beings” (2004, p. 248). In this regard, intersectionality is of particular import 
for us to reveal the operative mechanism of neoliberalism and corporate globalization, 
and locate possibilities for substantive changes.   
Methods and Data Collection 
          Guided by these questions, my research proceeded along two trajectories: one is 
about the intersectional biopolitical structure of neoliberal governmentality in China; the 
other is the grass-roots response to the material and cultural practices enacted through 
this structure. In light of the different purpose and nature of the two trajectories, I will use 
mixed methods: Foucauldian discursive analysis for the former, and the qualitative 
methods of interview and focus group for the latter.  
1. Discursive Analysis 
          Discourse is not just rhetorical, but also material: it is the manifestation of specific 
ideologies and supported by concrete social structures and institutions (Foucault, 1972, 
1990). Discourses can be created and upheld through multiple venues, to name a few, 
laws and official proclamations, public debate and mass media. Interconnecting 
discursive formations with social institutions, juristic apparatus and administrative system, 
discursive analysis is instrumental to reveal the basic biopolitical structure of neoliberal 
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governmentality. I choose the 2009 televised ceremony of China’s 60th anniversary, and 
If You Are the One, a reality TV show as the primary sites of inquiries.  
          As an important nationalistic ritual, the 2009 ceremony was live broadcast to 
millions of Chinese households by China Central Television (CCTV), one of the most 
important mouthpieces of the party-state. Though Chinese mass media are increasingly 
marketized with China’s neoliberal transition, CCTV is no doubt still a state-controlled 
monopoly centered on the propagation of the Party line (Zhao, 1998). As Zhao writes, the 
ceremony is a meticulously framed media spectacle showcasing “the achievements of 
China’s modernization and the glories of another ‘New’ China, made this time during the 
reform era starting in 1978” (2010, p. 8). Zhao’s conclusion makes clear the statist and 
nationalist nature of this ritual. While China’s neoliberal practices have deeply 
transformed the class relationship and the discourse of class struggle becomes a taboo in 
Chinese media, the triangulated relationship between class (as classless society), gender 
(as gender egalitarianism) and state (as the Socialist state) needs to be revamped to 
reconstitute the power structure. Thus gender becomes the pivot to reconstruct Chinese 
nationalism and identity (Zhang, 2013). In this regard, this nationalistic ritual is an ideal 
site to explore how new discourses are produced through the intersection of gender, class 
and sexuality by the totalizing sovereign power to reformulate the Chinese statehood and 
citizenship for the justification of neoliberal transition.  
          According to the data of Nielsen, If You Are the One has been the most popular TV 
show since its first broadcasting in Jiangsu Star TV (Jiangsu Wei Shi) in 2010. It has 
reached a large audience pool among Chinese overseas as well, which can be attested by 
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the heated online discussion after each episode is shown. As Alex Chan (2002) notes, in 
its neoliberal conditions, the party-state recognizes its declining ability to control what 
people think, and shifts its focus from political propaganda to setting social agenda. For 
instance, “some ideologues have found that talk show hosts in the newly commercialized 
media outlets are more effective ideological workers than those in the Party’s ideological 
departments” (Zhao 1998, p. 8). Meanwhile, as China is getting more open to the 
Western world, particularly after its accession to the WTO, the party-state has gained 
experiences to tailor the transnational cultural products and capital to its own politico-
economic agenda (Fung, 2008). Media discourses are employed as important disciplinary 
and normalizing technologies by the state for China’s neoliberal transition. Based on the 
British TV program, Take Me Out, this dating game show transforms the original script 
that highlights intimate interaction into a TV arena where male and female participants 
are competing with each other to get the attention from the opposite sex. Featuring young 
and attractive women propagating the “love for money” ethnics, this TV show has 
entailed massive social debate over what should be a “good” gender relationship in 
contemporary China. On this account, it is a good site to see how different disciplinary 
and normalizing biopolitical technologies are employed to create neoliberal subjectivities 
and legitimize the process of neoliberalization.   
2. Qualitative Methods of Interview and Focus Group  
          Defining my work as exploratory not for generalization and prediction, I use 
qualitative methods to examine people’s daily reality of internalizing, negotiating with 
and challenging the biopolitical structure (Singleton & Straits, 2005). Since I focus on 
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media representations as governing technologies to explore the biopolitical system of 
Chinese neoliberalism, semi-structured interview with questions about the media 
products, If You Are the One, is a viable method to explore people’s daily encounter with 
neoliberal governmentality (Babbie, 2008). Since the 2009 ceremony is a state-sponsored 
media spectacle, it would probably force interviewees into expressing the “politically 
correct” answers, I do not use this material for interviews. As the British cultural studies 
scholars argue (e.g. Hall 1980; Morley 1992), drawing upon their discursive repertoire 
and daily experience, people have disparate schemes of media interpretations, and can 
generate their unique meanings of cultural products. As people tend to be more frank 
about their feelings while situated in the group dynamics, focus group is a good method 
to induce interpersonal communication for more information (Morgan 1997; Farley 1994; 
Edmunds 1999; Krueger 1994). The effectiveness of the mixed method of interview and 
focus group has been proved by my field group. Groups composed of people who are 
familiar with each other, such as friends, relatives, would usually turn into lively, 
energized and frank conversations with each other. In this regard, I combined interviews 
with focus group to better understand the daily reality of my informants. As suggested by 
Morgan (1997), I started with some interviews to get some basic idea of my informants, 
and then used this information to guide the group discussion. Building on the new 
information from the focus group, I then redesigned my interview questions. In this way, 
I used the two qualitative methods complementarily for data collection.  
            As my research is an exploratory project, I did not use random sampling 
techniques (Singleton & Straits, 2005). I narrowed the range of informants down to the 
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poor/working class people “who are working in Jiangsu province” for two reasons: 1. As 
one of the earliest opened-up regions to transnational capital, Jiangsu province heavily 
relies on export-oriented economy. The statistics shows that export accounted for 43 
percent of the GDP of Jiangsu in 2010, compared with the number of 18 percent for 
Japan in 2008.26 Thus it provides a good place to explore China’s export-oriented 
economy to understand how it fuses with the global economy. 2. As a program of Jiangsu 
Star TV, If You Are the One has the highest coverage of audience in Jiangsu. Using 
convenience and snowball sampling technique, I used my personal internetworks and 
found two groups of workers as my primary research subjects: male construction workers 
in both Wuxi and Hai’an, and female apparel workers in Hai’an.  
1) Male migrant workers in the construction industry  
          Housing is chosen as the most important growth pillar of the Chinese economy 
since Premier Wen came into power (Wu et al., 2007). Through the intersection of state-
imposed registration certificate Hukou and gender difference, most of rural migrant male 
workers are concentrated in the construction industry (Li, 1997). Particularly after 2008, 
after the U.S. housing bubble burst, billions of dollars flooded into the Chinese market, 
particularly Shanghai and its adjacent areas, shoring up new demands of labor for 
construction work. Pulled by the inrush of capital, more rural men go to these areas for 
jobs. As the peripheral group in the urban environment, they have to confront the overt 
discrimination and dehumanizing domination by the state on a daily basis. On this 
                                                            
26 See Wang, X. Z. GDP ju shi jie di er bei zhi yi yi bu da (China’s GDP ranked the world 
No.2 but with no essential improvements). China Economic Weekly. Retrieved from 
http://www.jsass.com.cn/xzsd/152/1137.html  
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account, through the formal interviews, casual conversations and observations, I tried to 
understand how are they are struggling with the intersectional biopolitics of neoliberal 
governmentality in the daily life.  
2) Female workers in apparel factories in Hai’an 
          Within the global system of labor division, jobs of “sunset industries”—labor-
intensive industries such as textile and apparel making are now outsourced to other places 
with cheaper labor. Since they are less educated and skilled, more flexible and 
submissive, women of color in the Third World countries are often the primary target of 
transnational capital (Mies, 2007; Hawkesworth, 2006). Adjacent to Shanghai, Jiangsu 
province’s pillar economy is its plethora of export-processing plants, which attract 
numerous female workers from other less developed rural areas. These female workers 
have to negotiate with the neoliberal normalizing technology that highlights their 
domestic role, and the disciplinary technology that seduces and coerces them to be 
independent subject in the market. Thus I concentrate on the female apparel workers in 
Hai’an as another marginalized group to probe the effects of the intersectional biopolitics.    
          I have interviewed thirty one female workers and twenty nine male workers, and 
been to their work place and dormitories for observation. I have also talked to some 
owners and managers of the apparel factories and housing development corporations, 
local peasants, businessmen doing international trade, owners of family mill of apparel 
making, labor contractors, and a labor trafficking agent via formal interview or casual 
conversation. The length of the interviews/conversations ranges from fifteen minutes to 
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132 minutes, and all of them were recorded with an audio device. I have also done three 
focus groups with the women workers, and three with the male workers, which include 6-
8 participants to match the general requirement of this method (Morgan, 1997). As a 
result, my informant group ended up with over 100 research subjects. 
          In this chapter, I have briefly reviewed China’s transition from Socialism to 
neoliberalism, and examined this process through the lenses of gender, class and 
heteronormativity. Using my own self formation and transformation along with this 
process as an example, I try to concretize the abstract discussion of the relationship 
between the identity categories and neoliberal restructuring into the specific research 
questions and methods. In the next chapter, I will focus on China’s televised 60th 
anniversary ceremony to elucidate how the triangulation of gender, class and sexuality 
has been manipulated to (re)produce various discourses for the justification of China’s 
transition from Socialism to neoliberalism.  
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Chapter Two 
 Queering China’s National Body 
          Since the 2008 crisis, China has been the center of limelight for its remarkable 
economic performance.27 In some Westerners’ eyes, however, China’s prospect is 
polarized—collapsing as another Soviet Union or overtaking the U.S. as the new 
locomotive of the global economy. For Panos Mourdoukoutas, a longtime contributor to 
the Forbes Magazine, China is the Messiah to salvage the troubled capitalist world. 
Indeed, Mourdoukoutas hails China as the next candidate (after its predecessor Japan) to 
save the world economy.28 Acting like a benevolent lender to the U.S. and Europe, China 
seems to be performing well in this role.29 Unlike Mourdoukoutas, others hold a more 
pessimistic view. For example, The Wall Street Journal published one article recently, 
                                                            
27 In contrast to the capitalist world that was deeply mired in the Great Recession, 
China’s GDP growth reached a surprising number of 9.2 percent and 0.2 increase 
compared with the year before. Website of China Central Government. (2011, January 
11). Zhong guo 2009 nian GDP zeng zhang lv tiao cheng wei 9.2 % (China’s 2009 GDP 
growth rate recalculated as 9.2%). Retrieved from http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2011-
01/11/content_1782547.htm  
 
28 Mourdoukoutas, P. (2011, August 18). Can China save the world economy? Forbes. 
Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2011/08/18/can-china-
save-the-world-economy/ 
 
29 Up to April, 2013, China holds 1264.9 billion dollars of the U.S. treasury, ranking the 
No. 1 among its creditors. Website of the U.S. government. (n. d.) Major foreign holders 
of security treasuries. Retrieved from http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-
center/tic/Documents/mfh.txt. As the European debt crisis got worsening in April, 2012, 
the Chinese government and the EU concluded a flurry of business agreements, including 
an up to four million purchase from Airbus and multi-million-dollar investments.  
Martina, M. & Rinke, A. China says willing to buy EU bonds amid worsening crisis. 
Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/30/us-china-europe-
idUSBRE87T0BY20120830  
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claiming that “China, once a catch basin for the world’s money, is now watching cash 
stream out.”30 The Forbes Magazine also warns against the potential of a meltdown of 
China’s banking system that could jolt the globe.31 For an economy heavily reliant on 
foreign direct investment (Harvey, 2005), this is a particularly dangerous sign.32 However 
mild this pessimism, it is nonetheless rebuffed by the Chinese authority as ever. As 
Premier Wen proclaimed in October 2012, regardless of the negative external and 
internal environments, the positive changes indicated by the improved industrial and 
financial indexes signaled that Chinese economy had been stabilized and poised for a 
bright future.33   
          Wen’s claim well encapsulates the triumphalist rhetoric that has long been 
endorsed by the party-state to galvanize and gentrify its sturdy practices of neoliberalism, 
which culminated with the high-profiled celebration of the PRC’s 60th anniversary in 
                                                            
30 Frangos, A., Orlik, T. & Wei, L. L. (2012 October 15). In reversal, cash leaks out of 
China. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443507204578020272862374326.html 
31 Fontevecchia A. (2013, June 17). China: Massive credit bubble fueled by shadow 
banking and securitization could collapse banks. Forbes. Retrieved from 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2013/06/17/china-massive-credit-bubbled-
fueled-by-shadow-banking-and-securitization-could-collapse-banks/ 
32 In A Brief History of Neoliberalism (2005), Harvey suggests that distinct from other 
booming Asian economies, such as South Korea and Singapore, the case of China is very 
distinctive in that it heavily relies on foreign direct investment. Harvey’s view is 
corroborated by Deng’s twin polices of reform and opening up guiding China’s socio-
economic transformation. The flight of transnational capital that has penetrated many 
sectors would no doubt devastate the Chinese economy.   
 
33 Wen, J. (2012, October 17). The new positive changes showing that Chinese economy 
has been stabilized. China News Web. Retrieved from 
http://finance.chinanews.com/cj/2012/10-17/4256048.shtml 
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2009. As the fourteenth grand commemoration of the foundation of Socialist China, the 
significance of this extravaganza is doubled for its conflation with the 30th anniversary of 
“reform and opening-up,” the milestone that re-embarked China on the track to 
abundance, prosperity and vibrancy. As President Hu Jintao’s inaugural speech at the 
ceremony avers, this event marks that “a modernized, globally oriented and futurist China 
is rising majestically in the Eastern quarter of the world.”34 Through China’s premiere 
flagship media monopoly CCTV, the symbolic grandiosity of this occasion was further 
elevated and disseminated to millions of domestic and overseas Chinese households to 
glorify the socio-economic accomplishments by the neoliberal practices.  
          Though the government refused to release the expenditures on the festive event, its 
organizing committee located in the former offices of the Olympics organizing 
committee, which was also composed of the similar staff members, indicates the state’s 
determination to re-create some of the glitz of the 2008 Summer Olympics. Different the 
audience for the Olympics from that mainly features international viewers, this show 
primarily targets domestic and overseas Chinese audience. In this regard, it is meant to be 
constructed as the spectacle “that presents itself simultaneously as all of society, as part 
of society, and as instrument of unification” for Chinese citizenries and diaspora (Debord 
2006, p. 118). With regard to televisual spectacles, drawing upon Benedict Anderson’s 
(1991) notion of “imagined community,” John Hartley argues that they are “one of the 
prime site upon which a give nation is constructed for its members” (1987, p. 124). 
                                                            
34 Hu, J. (2009, October 1). Speech at China’s 60th anniversary ceremony. Retrieved from 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/zhibo/20091001/ 
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Enabled by the modern broadcasting technologies, numerous Chinese households and 
Chinese overseas simultaneously participated in this jubilation of nationalistic pride via 
television as the privatized means of nation-state building (Hartley, 1987). In so doing, 
the party-state labors to recreate the PRC as the unified socio-cultural and political 
constant through the spectacle-induced inculcation of people’s identification.             
          Some sinologists have identified gender as a crucial component in the making of 
Chinese nation-state. For example, as Gilmartin et. al (1994) suggest, gender provides the 
language and categories through which family, state, and other social arrangements are 
articulated and justified in Chinese history. In the neoliberal conditions when the social 
structure has been greatly reshaped, as Zhang (2013) argues, gender replaces class and 
becomes the fundamental site for the reconstitution of the disturbed power triangulation 
of class, gender and state, and valorizes neoliberalism as the new imprint of the Chinese 
statehood. In this regard, in this chapter, centering on the ceremony as a nationalist 
spectacle, through the deconstructive reading of its symbolic economy, I want to map out 
the specific intersectional mechanism of gender, class and state to investigate the 
visual/discursive tropes invested in the nation-state building.   
          Gender has also been revealed to be an instrumental conduit to rearticulate the 
Chinese population for the neoliberal social relationship, and reconfigure the citizenry for 
the new nation-state unity. For instance, as a type of biopolitical technology, gender has 
contributed to the reproduction of the proletarian echelons (Pun, 2005), and citizens-cum-
consumers (Yang, 2012). It also proves fundamental to the legitimation of the new 
inequalities in urban China by masking the class distinctions (Hanser, 2005). On this 
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account, the state-sponsored spectacle of the 60th anniversary bears the analytical import 
that begs further reckoning to explore how the Chinese citizens are restructured by the 
biopolitics of gender and class to consolidate the neoliberal political order.  
          This analysis, however, ushers in other concerns and problematics: if we accept the 
feminist claim that all categories are fluid and porous, how can we employ gender and 
class as the central categories in the analysis of the intersectional mechanism of nation-
state building without reducing them to the only parameters of this intersection? If we 
only employ gender and class as the categories of norm to examine the structure of social 
control, how to achieve social justice that is at the core of feminism? If the ceremony is a 
technology through which subjects are called into being or “hailed” for nation-state 
building by the identification through categories, what would be other dimensions of 
socialities and alternative forms of being? As for these questions, using gender as an 
example, Judith Butler suggests that “it is important not only to understand how the terms 
of gender are instituted, naturalized, and established as presuppositional but to trace the 
moments where the binary system of gender is disputed and challenged, where the 
coherence of the categories are put into question, and where the very social life of gender 
turns out to be malleable and transformable” (2004, p. 216). Thus she calls for a strategy 
of “working within the categories.”  
          Echoing Butler, Jose Esteban Munoz (1999) further clarifies this strategy as 
“working on and against,” of what he calls “disidentification.” As he writes, it is “a 
strategy that tries to transform a cultural logic from within, always laboring to enact 
permanent structural change while at the same time valuing the importance of local or 
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everyday struggles of resistance” (1999, 11-12). As the essential imprint of queer of color 
analysis, as Roderick A. Ferguson (2004) suggests, disidentification would help unravel 
the hidden linkage between seemingly antagonistic formations by unpacking their mutual 
identification with certain categorical values. Therefore, building on a “queering” reading, 
I want to uncover heteronormativity as the hidden pivot that anchors the contested 
symbiosis of gender, class and state in neoliberal China and dislodge heteropatriarchy as 
the hegemonic linchpin for China’s transition from Socialism to neoliberalism. By 
dismantling the naturalized and reified categorical norms for social control and 
stabilization, as Butler (2004) argues, this theoretical criticism itself is transformative for 
feminist scholars to imagine alternative dimensions of living. I will first start with a brief 
introduction of the anniversary ceremony to familiarize my readers with this analytical 
milieu.  
          The live broadcasting of the ceremony by CCTV started at 10:00 a.m., October 1st, 
2009, and lasted for about four and a half hours. The whole festive ritual is composed of 
two parts: a military parade followed by a civilian parade of around eighty minutes, and 
an evening gala. In the first part, during a span of one and half hours, a budget of roughly 
forty four million dollars was allocated by the government to produce a militant glitz for 
patriotic demonstrations and nationalist pride.35 Arrayed into square-shaped legions, a 
display of fifty two new types of military hardware, including the most up-to-date ZTZ99 
main battle tanks and J-10 fighter aircraft,  marched along the potted-flower-decorated 
Chang’an Avenue to receive the applause and appreciation from the audience. Standing 
                                                            
35 Ria Novosti. (2009, January 30). China to hold frugal 6oth anniversary. Retrieved from 
http://en.rian.ru/world/20090130/119888198.html 
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onto a Hongqi HQE limousine specially designed for the event, President Hu became the 
fourth leader in the PRC history (following Mao, Deng and Jiang) to deliver an 
inspection of the troops, reasserting the Party’s grip over the military force, Chinese 
territory, sovereignty and people.  
          As for this militant demonstration of national cohesion and political allegiance, 
Carole Pateman (1988) and R. W. Connell (2005) suggest that state, nationalism, 
revolution, political violence are all best understood as masculinist projects for their 
involvement with masculine institutions, processes and activities. Moreover, Cynthia 
Enloe contends that “nationalism has typically sprung from masculinized memory, 
masculinized humiliation and masculinized hope” (1990, 45). With its blatant invocation 
of male chauvinistic power, militarism is inherently tied to the construction of 
nationalism (Nagel, 1998). Rather than adding more to the critical arsenal of masculinity 
and nationalism, the aim of this chapter, however, is to chart the specific mechanism 
through which the biopolitics of class, gender and sexuality is exercised intersectionally 
to normalize China’s neoliberalization. As such, I will leave the military demonstration 
out and center on the civilian parade as a primary domain for analysis.  
          In the hiatus after the parades, multiple programs boasting China’s socio-economic 
and political accomplishments were shown to reinforce the constructed identification and 
nationalist glory, which was wrapped up by a festive gala. Evening theatrical 
performances of this kind, such as the annual CCTV premiere Spring Festival Gala, have 
been the fundamental ideological instrument for the reproduction of the Chinese party-
state (Lv 2003, 2007). On this account, not quite different from other performances, the 
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gala does not bear the distinctive and paramount symbolic value as the parades, a once-
in-a-decade extravaganza, for this research. Hereafter this chapter will center on the civil 
parade for analysis.  
          Different from the demonstration of power and loyalty in the military parade, and 
festive commemoration of the regime by the gala, the civilian parade seeks to 
(re)construct the history and future of the PRC. As the CCTV anchors pronounced during 
the broadcasting, “100,000-strong representatives from all walks of the Chinese society 
and other countries comprise thirty-six parading groups, sixty effusively ornamented 
floats and six mini shows, and through the mosaics of these proceeding sceneries, people 
can piece up a panorama of the glamorous history of the PRC.” Unified under the theme 
of “Striving Forward with Motherland,” the civilian parade is structured into three parts: 
“Thoughts,” “Accomplishments” and “Prospect.” As suggested by their titles, these parts 
focus on the representation of the politico-ideological essence, socio-cultural 
achievements, and the bright future of the PRC respectively. They are further grouped 
into seven organizational categories. In a chronological order, these categories are meant 
to represent the PRC’s sixty-year history and depict a brighter prospect of the state, as 
can be indicated by their titles—“Foundational Struggling Efforts,” “Reform and 
Opening-up,” “Centennial Leap Forward,” “Scientific Development” (as the “Thoughts” 
part), “Dazzling Achievements,” “Splendid China” (as the “Accomplishments” part), and 
“Brighter Future” (as the “Prospect” part). The four sections of the “Thoughts” part are 
especially dedicated to the four top leaders of the PRC—the founding father, Mao 
Zedong, the architect of “reform and opening-up,” Deng Xiaoping, his successors Jiang 
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Zemin and Hu Jintao. On this account, a deconstructive reading of these parts will be 
conducive to a genealogical reading of China’s politico-ideological transition along with 
the shifting focus of national economy. The four sections are divided up and linked with 
each other by four mini shows that epitomize the core values during the four leaderships. 
In other words, they constitute the central framework for the organization of the 
reconstructive and futurist orchestration of the state, as well as my deconstruction of the 
ceremonial ritual.  
Gender as the Centralized Signifier   
          Led by the national flag and badge, the civilian parade begins with a group that 
emblazons an image of Chairman Mao. Grounded in the narrative and visual tropes with 
the Socialist imprint, this section endeavors to bring the audience back to the PRC’s 
foundational era. In this part, the three parading groups are named “Fighting Fearlessly,” 
“Creating New China,” and “Painstaking Pioneering Efforts” respectively. As these 
utopian flavored titles indicate, Mao’s era is characterized by the dauntless and highly 
romanticized zeal for the building of a new country out of the wrecks and ruins from the 
wars. Gender and class were the fundamental categories to the construction of the 
Socialist state.  
          In The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, Friederick Engels 
(2010) expands Marx’s emphasis on economics/structure to the private sphere—gender 
relationship to retheorize the societal developments for human beings. Building on the 
basics of historical materialist framing of social production as the ultimate determinant of 
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societal progress, Engels argues that production includes not just material production, but 
also reproduction of human beings and emphasizes the crucial role of women in human 
history. As he contends, gender relationship is the earliest, if not the original, form of 
class struggle, in that men could appropriate women’s labor for free through their 
dominance in the gender relationship warranted by the unequal division of labor in the 
private domain. This gender-based appropriation, coupled with men’s exclusive 
possession of means of production, grounds the material foundation that consolidates 
men’s control of private property as raison d'etre of various forms of patrilocal marriage 
to the detriment of women. In other words, women’s equal participation in public work is 
crucial to the building of a classless society. As a core ideologue and theorists for 
Communism and international Socialist movement, Engels’s theorization was later 
adopted as a blueprint to guide the socio-economic construction by many Socialist states, 
such as those in Eastern Europe, to incorporate women into public work en mass (True, 
2003). 
          In Maoist China, gender intersected with class for inter-normalization to 
consolidate the newly founded Socialist state. As Engels (2010) asserts, since proletariat 
have no private property to pass on to their descendants, and are less invested in 
sustaining the privatized social production system, their gender relationship and marriage 
are built on true love and equality rather than the utilitarian control of women for the 
patrilineal continuation. Gender equality is therefore embraced by him as an essential 
distinction between Socialism and capitalism. Building on Engels, the Maoist state 
required women to equally contribute to the Socialist construction in public like their 
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male peers. By normalizing and homogenizing the equal rule of gender, proletariat was 
also legitimized as the dominant class to lead the construction of the Socialist state. 
Linking gender equality with the Socialist state, the working class consolidated its 
political and hegemonic control during Mao’s reign. Simply put, class became the pivot 
of the triangulated power structure of class, gender and the state.  
          However, the ideal of gender equality, when translated into practices, was 
simplified as the refashioning of women’s image based on the masculinized norm. For 
instance, informed by Engels’s theory, a notion of ‘‘sublime’’ beauty–de-sexed, 
militarized, and masculine later became the only acceptable form of proletarian 
femininity in the former Soviet Union (Xu & Feiner, 2007), which signaled the equality 
between men and women via the identical gender code. Likewise, in Maoist China, as 
Dai Jinhua notes, the liberated women were often “defined by revolutionary (male) 
norms” (2002, p. 119). Just as a popular slogan says, women were supposed “to face the 
powder and not to powder the face.” This gender ideology could be best exemplified by 
the classic image in the 1960s—“iron girl brigades” or crack teams of female agricultural 
and industrial workers as the models of the Socialist future. Pictured with vigorous bodies, 
strong arms, and robust physiques, these women’s youth and gender enabled them to 
represent “the forefront of history” and “the spring time of Socialism” (Chen, 2003, p. 
276).  
          It is not surprising to note that in the civilian parade the reconstruction of Maoist 
China hinges on the symbolizing of the classed linkage between gender and state as well. 
This symbolic economy is enacted through a blending of the specially designed makeup, 
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dressing and hair style, hue combination, and demeanors of the parade 
participants/performers. For instance, the identical blue/white color and similar apparel 
style are applied to both male and female participants/performers in tune with their 
identical hailing gesture over the revolutionary victory, effectively blurring the gender 
difference and foregrounding the shared working class identity of the 
participants/performers. The centralized symbolic position of class is further buttressed 
by the summary mini show—Ansai Waist Drum Performance by 1,000 performers-cum-
peasants. According to the Communist propaganda formula, Mao’s trailblazing 
theoretical contribution is the reframing of Marxist doctrines for China’s historical 
specificity and contextual contingency, efficaciously mobilizing millions of impoverished 
peasants as the adamant and reliable ally of the working class against Japanese invaders 
and Nationalists.36 Thereafter, influenced by the Soviet realism,37 the Maoist 
representation of Chineseness was centered on “the depiction of workers as paragons of 
strength” with the teleological ends of furthering the Socialist state (Li 2008). Like the 
working class power often highlighted by the exaggerated heroic postures, the image of 
rough and tough peasants was also used to epitomize Maoist China (Wang, 2003).  
                                                            
36 Chen, X. (2012, June 30). Mao Zedong dui ma ke si zhu yi zhong guo hua de li shi xing 
gong xian (Mao Zedong’s contribution to the localization of Marxism in China). 
Guangming Daily. Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-
06/13/c_123273949.htm  
 
37 Soviet realism, or Socialist realism is a style of realistic art further developed in the 
former Soviet Union, which later became a dominant style of artistic production in other 
Socialist countries, including China.  With a clearly pronounced goal of servicing the 
Socialist economy and regime, this style often focuses on the representation of the life of 
the proletariat.  
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          In this mini show, over 1,000 male performers are reproducing a cultural event of 
drum performance, which is quite common during the season of harvesting in northwest 
rural areas. Their peasant identity is made clear by the specialty attires for northwestern 
Chinese farmers, the choreographic design that mimics a festive event of the harvesting 
season. Cross-referencing with other signifying devices, such as the preceding 
masculinized female workers whose images still linger with the audiences, this visualized 
codification of the Maoist ideal of the poor/working class is central to the reconstruction 
of the Socialist state.  
          In contrast, the representational emphasis shifts from the poor/working class to the 
proliferation and reconstitution of gender differences as the parade proceeds into China’s 
reform era. This switch is visualized through a more diversified spectrum of color, 
contrastive apparel and hair style along the gender line, and the reformulated performing 
pattern. For example, “Youthful China,” the mini show dedicated to Deng’s era, features 
a group of young people in a ballroom-dancing-like performance. It distinguishes itself 
from the rest of the parade with the particular gender trope by pairing each male 
performer with a female partner rather than arraying them into one gender 
undifferentiated group. Juxtaposing male dancers with their female partners, this 
representational strategy reproduces and reinforces the gender difference via the cross-
referencing between the robust, virile male bodies and the delicate, agile female bodies. 
The exotic postmodernist style of the costumes further engenders the performers by 
sexualizing their youthful body notwithstanding, it leaves little traces of class identity on 
their body, such as the cultural index of workers, peasants or bourgeoisie. Moreover, 
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framing the young performers in partner dancing charges the show with overt hetero-
romantic underpinnings.  
          The engendering symbolic regime is also applied to the mini shows that extol 
Jiang’s and Hu’s leadership. The one dedicated to Jiang features a group of young men 
waving colorful fans and marching forward against the strong wind, called “Crossing the 
Century.” As the CCTV anchors said during the parade, these able-bodied, virile and 
vigorous young men who are waving fans and clearing obstacles one after another to 
stride towards their destination symbolize the super power of the Yangtze River that 
spearheads China through negative external environments into an auspicious new century. 
In this framing, China’s transformation at the turn of the new century is said to be 
enabled by the young men’s masculinity. When the parade proceeds to the show for the 
then incumbent President Hu Jintao, the gendered representational focus also shifts with a 
close-up on the emphasized curvaceous body of the female dancers. In so doing, the 
parade reaches its first crescendo to commemorate the past accomplishments and 
envision the brighter prospect, which I will further examine in the next part.  
          Interestingly, the engendering visual and narrative trope can also be found in the 
reconstructive effort about Mao’s era. For instance, the masculinizing stricture over 
women’s self-fashioning is reduced by the softened but awkward reframing of their 
body—revolutionary female proletariat in a modernist feminizing skirt. In the following 
Ansai Waist Drum Performance, the classed underpinning of the show is diluted by the 
CCTV anchors’ gender saturated comment. As they said during the parade: 
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With a history of over 2000 years, Ansai Waist Drum was a wartime 
product. Now it has shed traces of conflicts in China’s new era blessed by 
peace and development, expressing the peasants’ visceral joy for a 
harvesting season and bountiful life. The intensive drums, staunch steps, 
variable patterns and macho yell indicate the masculine beauty of loess 
plateau men. The bold dancing posture and brilliant smile fully express 
Chinese people’s jubilance over their emancipation and democratic 
political participation.   
          As a retrospective representation of the PRC’s history, it is not surprising to see 
that this ritual is duly filtered through a contemporary ideological prism. In Theses of the 
Philosophy of History, Walter Benjamin (1969) astutely points out that all histories are 
perceived through certain presumptions of the past that are inevitably constituted by the 
ideology holding reign then. As he writes, “our image of happiness is thoroughly colored 
by the time to which the course of our existence has assigned us to” (1969, p. 253). In 
other words, the gendered reformulation of the working-class-based Maoist construction 
of the state again verifies the centralized position of gender in this nationalist ritual. To 
excavate the textured meaning of this symbolic switch from class to gender, further 
scrutinization is required by situating it in the contemporary socio-economic upheavals in 
neoliberal China.  
          In stark contrast to the anchors’ Socialist-realism-informed appropriation  of the 
peasant heroes and joyful images of village life for the reinforcement of the Communist 
rule (Hung, 1996), as the de jure “master of the country” according to the Chinese 
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Constitution, peasants have borne the major brunt of China’s neoliberal restructuring and 
ironically dropped to the bottom of the social ladder. Many of them live in extreme 
poverty and misery. As Chin-Chuan Lee notes, “the beleaguered peasants, who comprise 
70 percent of the national population and 50 percent of the labor force, have found their 
income in dramatic decline since 1997” (2003, p. 8).  After China’s accession to the 
WTO in 2001, the issue of unemployment is further exacerbated for peasants. As a result, 
the income ratio between urbanities and rural residents has galloped from 2.5 to 1 in 1980 
to 3.28 to 1 in 2005. According to the International Labor Organization, only in three 
countries did this number exceed 2 as of 2005.38 As the 2005 World Bank data reveals, 
55.62 percent of the one-billion-strong rural inhabitants live on less than 2 dollars a day, 
which is considered conditions of extreme poverty.39 Moreover, 41.4% of the national 
wealth is owned by 1 % of Chinese families, and of them, mostly urban residents.40 As 
Harvey (2005) argues, neoliberal restructuring has recreated class inequalities in post-
Socialist societies, such as China and Russia.   
                                                            
38 Hu, X. (2011, September 30). Zhong guo cheng shi jie cheng xiang shou ru cha ju zui 
da de guo jia (China becomes the country with the largest rural/urban inequality). China 
Economic Weekly. Retrieved from  
http://money.163.com/11/0920/01/7EBV0K7800252G50.html 
 
39 The World Bank. (n. d.)  People living on less than 2 dollar a day. Retrieved from  
http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/gstable2.pdf  
 
40 Xia, Y. (2010, June 8). Zhong guo cai fu xiang shao shu ren ji zhong 1% jia ting zhang 
wo quan guo jin ban cai fu (Wealth accumulated by small group of people 1% families 
owning nearly half of China’s wealth). China Web. Retrieved from 
http://news.sohu.com/20100608/n272636720.shtml 
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           The widening class gap after China’s switch to neoliberalism has resulted in 
various forms of resistance, ranging from strikes, protesting suicides, appeals to higher 
authorities for help, violent revenge to massive uprising. For instance, in 2011 the suicide 
epidemic in a Guangdong located factory of Foxconn, the major contracted manufacturer 
of Apple, appalled the whole world.41 The individual anxiety, hostility and despair 
permeating the Foxconn workers (or more appropriately, “Islaves” in an Applist term) 
channeled through the sporadic incidents later conflated and upgraded into large-scale 
strikes and bloody conflicts with management.42 In January 2012, in a Wuhan-based 
factory of Foxconn, over a hundred workers threatened to commit suicide together after a 
futile marathon of negotiation with management.43 Ironically, acting as an endearing ally, 
the state takes the side with capital to crack down these resistances to clear the obstacle 
for capital and its corporatized local deputies. It is worth reiterating here Louis 
Althusser’s (2001) argument that oppressive state apparatuses cannot forestall all revolts 
and rebellions. The antagonism temporarily deferred by violent suppression will only 
accumulate and accrue into a threat with higher stakes for the state. To ward off the 
potential of massive tumult and chaos, it now costs the government more money to 
                                                            
41 China.org.cn. (2010, December 8). Foxconn suicide epidemic. Retrieved from 
http://www.china.org.cn/business/2010-12/08/content_21503685.htm 
 
42 NetEase. (2012, September 24). Fu shi kang tai yuan gong chang bao fa da gui mo sao 
luan (Massive revolts outburst in Taiyuan Foxconn). Retrieved from 
http://tech.163.com/12/0924/10/8C5KPPIR00094MOK.html 
 
43 Xinhua Network. (2012, January 12). Fu shi kang bei bo fa sheng lao zi jiu fen bu fen 
yuan gong yang yan ji ti zi sha (Foxconn said to have labor-management conflict some 
employees posed threat of collective suicide). Retrieved from  
http://news.sohu.com/20120112/n332026451.shtml 
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preempt domestic uprising than upgrading the military defensive capacity.44 As a result, 
the Maoist discourse of class and class struggle has to be silenced and even tabooed, in 
mass media.45 As China’s neoliberal practices have deeply reshaped the class relationship, 
and the state has abdicated its promise of building social equality, the disturbed power 
triangulation of class, gender and state needs to be revamped for social stabilization. In 
the next part, I will further investigate how and why gender becomes the central 
normalizing technology to recreate the neoliberal Chinese nation-state from the historical, 
symbolic and political perspectives.  
Engendering the Neoliberal Chinese Nation-State  
          Gender is inherently intertwined with the (re)formulation of the Chinese nation-
state, providing the language and categories for the articulation and justification of family, 
state and other social arrangements in history (Gilmartin et al., 1994). Since pre-modern 
China, the gender relationship has been a crucial discursive and practical repository for 
male monarchs to legitimize their way of ruling and organizing the feudalist system 
(Zhang, 2013). As early as the Han Dynasty (206 BCE – 220 CE), the social norm for 
women prescribed by the Confucian classic, Three Obediences and Four Virtues for 
Women laid the gendered foundation for the ideologico-political organization of the 
                                                            
44 For instance, to stifle the potential uprising, all pigeons in Beijing are mandated to be 
caged, and taxis windows closed during the CCP’s 18th national congress. Kaiman, J. 
(2012, November 1). China congress: toy helicopters and pigeons vanish in security 
crackdown. The Guardian. Retrieved from  
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/01/china-party-congress-restrictions 
 
45 For instance, a soap opera exposing the class inequality was soon banned by the 
Chinese authority after triggering large-scale repercussion (Liang, 2010). 
 
 
80 
 
state.46 Codified by a female Confucian theorist, Ban Zhao, the gendered norm justifying 
women’s subordination to men provided a referencing point for the submission of 
subjects to the emperor to normalize the feudalist political hierarchy. For example, in the 
Song Dynasty (960 CE to 1279 CE), a group of thinkers developed this Confucian 
doctrine into a new philosophical system that depicts “the family as the microcosm of 
civic virtues and skills: one learned to govern the state by managing one’s own family” 
(Bray, 1997, p. 42). In other words, the gender relationship provided the hands-on 
rationale for the monarch to regulate and organize the political system of the imperial 
state.  
          The imperative to construct a modern state was heightened as the imperial order 
was disturbed by the Western colonial intrusion and grassroots rebellion. From the 
sixteenth century on, the feudalist state was challenged by a two-pronged threat deriving 
from the Western colonial pressure on the one hand, and domestic resistance on the other. 
Gender, again, became the primary domain for launching the pressing project of building 
a modernist state since the late nineteenth century, and women’s body and sexuality were 
mobilized by male literati as the privileged signifier to elaborate on how to build a 
modernist Chinese state. For instance, as Lydia Liu (1994) suggests, Kang Youwei and 
Liang Qichao, two leading male scholars in the late Qing Dynasty, attributed China’s 
socio-political crisis to the “uneducated and backward” Chinese women, and insisted that 
                                                            
46 In Confucian cannons, the three obediences require that a woman should obey her 
father before marriage, her husband when married, and her sons in widowhood. The four 
virtues include morality, proper speech, modest manner and diligent work. This idea was 
first proposed by a female historian, Ban Zhao.  
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the only way to build a modern Chinese nation-state should be to enlighten and 
emancipate these women. Likewise, since the late nineteenth century, Shanghai, the 
metropolitan vertex of competing ideological forces in modern Chinese history, has 
witnessed varied streams of discursive efforts centering on female prostitutes’ sexuality 
to compete for the moral advantages to construct the modern state, providing a site that 
“embraced populations from various nations, regions, and classes, and harbored political 
agitators ranging from Christian moral reformers to Marxist revolutionaries” (Hershatter 
1997, 7).   
          After the feudalist system was subverted in the early twentieth century, both 
Nationalist and Communist intelligentsia invoked gender to articulate their competing 
envisioning of how to build the state. For instance, the Chinese Communists defined 
“women’s status as equal citizens as a marker of China’s arrival at modernity,” and the 
Nationalist Party incorporated the mobilization of women for emancipation as an 
indispensable part of the National Revolution in the 1930s (Gilmartin, 1994). After the 
1949 peasant revolution, gender became a central territory for the Socialist economy and 
ideology. As Tani Barlow (1994) points out, compared with class, gender was a much 
safer category in that gender inequalities were considered “non-antagonistic 
contradictions,” and people would not use it to analyze social injustice during the Maoist 
era. In this regard, it is not hard to see why gender would replace the Maoist discourse of 
the working class/peasant as the centralized signifier in China’s prime celebration of its 
(contested) neoliberal accomplishments, which again attests to Lynne Segal’s observation 
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that “the metaphorical utilization [of gender] is always intensified in times of crisis, or in 
the consolidation of new regimes of power” (1999, 43).  
          The relationship between gender and nation has long been a key topic for feminist 
scholars, and they have proffered a plethora of insightful critique of nation building as a 
masculinist project. As Joane Nagel argues, “masculinity and nationalism articulate well 
with one another, and the modern form of Western masculinity emerged at about the 
same time and place as modern nationalism” (1998, p. 250). Women are often relegated 
to minor, often symbolic roles in nationalist movements and conflicts, either as icons of 
nationhood to be elevated and defended, or as the booty or spoils of war to be denigrated 
and disgraced (Enloe, 1990). Like pre-modern China, feminist theorists have noted that 
the Western nations are often likened to a family by the male authority to legitimate the 
state political order (McClintock, 1991; Skurski, 1994). Women are treated as a universal 
“empty signifier” across cultures, waiting to be invested and imbued with exigent 
meanings to create, concretize and police nation-state boundaries and collective 
imagination. Just as Caren Kaplan, Norman Alarcon and Minoo Moallem (1999) suggest, 
the defining lines of women vary with the differential needs of nation building projects. 
Yuval-Davis and Anthias (1989) also identified the specific ways in which women are 
involved with nation building through ethnic, national and state processes and practices. 
These feminist endeavors have unpacked the nation-state building as masculinist 
construction.   
          Building on the above-mentioned framework, feminist scholars have proffered 
numerous examples to unravel the relationship between women and nation. For instance, 
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Shawn Michelle Smith (1999) demonstrates that in U.S. history, the modern bourgeois 
conception of Americanness in its early distinction from the British aristocracy was first 
consolidated through the angelic, ethereal and sacrosanct moral ideal embodied by “true” 
middle-class women. In post-colonial India, Uma Narayan (1997) shows that women 
were assigned different symbolic roles to move forward the fundamentalist national 
movement and anti-colonialist struggle. In her review of Afrikaaner and African 
nationalisms, Anne McClintock (1991) astutely unpacks nationalism’s naturalness and 
universality by unfolding the meticulously framed images of women as its fabrics. These 
analyses are illuminating, inspirational and perspicuous, however, by prematurely 
replacing gender with women,47 the broader critical possibilities are precluded that 
gender as a lens of societal relationship could have opened up. In these examples, gender 
is approached as a category of analysis (qua women) rather than an analytical category 
for the broader social relation and structure as suggested by Joan Scott (1986). Moreover, 
the masculinist nature of nation and nationalism by no means utterly excludes women’s 
agency, as suggested by the revisionist historian Dorothy Ko.48 Therefore, a closer 
examination of gender, nation and state would be necessitated to unravel the specific 
                                                            
47 As a social system and parameter of power, gender would structure the society based 
on the perceived biological/sexual differences between men and women. So it does not 
just apply to women, but also men in general.  
 
48 For instance, Dorothy Ko argues that women were not just mere victims of male-
dominated Confucian culture. Relying on their agency, women created their own space of 
survival and meanings. See in Ko, D. (1995). Teachers of the inner chambers: Women 
and culture in seventeen-century China. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Also 
see Ko, D. (2005). Cinderella’s sisters: A revisionist history of foot binding. Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press.   
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mechanism that gender is highlighted for the normalization of China’s neoliberal status 
quo.  
          A critical exploration of the signifying mechanism for knowledge making can help 
unravel the intertwined constructions of gender and nation for clarification. As Roland 
Barthes (1972) maintains, human signification activities proceed at two different but 
interrelated levels, namely, denotative and connotative. Building on this differentiation, 
Stuart Hall suggests that denotation is “widely equated with the literal meaning of a sign: 
because this literal meaning is almost universally recognized.” In contrast, connotation is 
“employed simply to refer to less fixed and therefore more conventionalized and 
changeable, associative meanings” (2006, 168). Compared with arbitrary and unstable 
connotative level, denotative domain is more naturalized as “fixed.” These two levels are 
interconnected in that a denotative category could become a fixated plateau for the 
signification of broader meanings, creating what Barthes calls “myth” (1972). In human 
histories, such categories as race, gender and sexuality, due to their intimate relation to 
body, are often naturalized to generate authentic meanings for political claims that are 
otherwise more open and subject to challenges and rearticulations (Findlay, 2000, p. 11). 
We can see that the manipulation, alteration and (re)configuration of the bodily 
categories often prevail when contestations, exchanges, distortions and cross-pollinations 
over the politico-economic assumptions of nation-state are intensified, as suggested by 
Segal using gender as an example (1999).   
          However, as Pheng Cheah (2007) points out, as a more recent historical construct, 
nation is not always welded to state, and this is particularly true when the party-state has 
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deviated from its earlier promise of leading the Chinese nation and people towards social 
justice and equality. As the neoliberal practices have fundamentally restructured the 
social relations and recreated social injustice, the party-state turns to the cultural 
categories of nation and nationalism for legitimation (Goldman & Macfarquhar 1999). As 
perceived by the Communists, nationalism will help renew and reaffirm the state-defined 
boundaries between “us” and “them” to reunify the fractured society by the economic 
reform. However, as Yongnian Zheng (2004) argues, there is always disparity between 
state-inculcated nationalism and populist nationalism in Chinese history. In as early as 
the May 4th social movement at the turn of the twentieth century, the anti-imperialist 
sentiment of the patriotic students ran counter to the policy of appeasement by the 
Chinese government, entailing massive nationalist movements against the state. More 
recently, in the state-organized nationwide anti-Japanese protests in 2012, the nationalist 
substantiation crossed the state-set boundary and turned into democratic and anti-
corruption demonstrations in many places, having tremendously stretched the nerves of 
the Communist bureaucrats. As Chin-Chuan Lee suggests, “the authorities have tried to 
contain the popular contour within the official trajectory, fearful that an unrestrained 
spate of mass feelings might detour or even endanger the state’s other policy interests and, 
worse yet, could turn inwards against the regime itself” (2003, p. 3). On this account, we 
need to further query the specific mechanism by which the sovereign power re-
hyphenates the Chinese nation with the re-morphed state.  
          Pivotal to the construction of nation-state is the creation of a cogent concept of 
“people.” As Agemben (2000) argues, the idea of “people” today is a social construct for 
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upholding the otherwise illusive concept of state. Different from race that is peculiar to 
the Western context for social formation (Winant, 2004), and sexuality tabooed in 
modern human societies (Foucault, 1990), as a category inherent to human procreation 
and development, gender seems a more general and “universal” parameter for the 
Communists to reconstruct an inclusive image of Chinese people to recuperate the 
splintered nation. As we can see in the parade, gender is employed to not only dampen 
the Maoist class ideology, but also subsume differences of class, ethnicity, religion and 
region undergirding the Chinese society into a homogenizing image of Chinese people. 
The recreation of an imagined Chinese national community as a cultural construction is 
enabled and enacted through the gendered performance, which needs to be tethered to the 
state as a political entity.  
          As a cultural category, the gendered national identity of Chineseness has not been 
incorporated into the political domain, and is thus unprotected by any sovereign power, 
fitting into what Agamben (2000, 2009) calls “bare life”—human beings as 
natural/biological entities undefined by the state for the political belongings. As 
Agamben suggests, the inclusion of bare life into the sovereignty constitutes the original 
nucleus of state formation. As he writes, “the production of a biopolitical body is the 
original activity of sovereign power” (2000, p. 6). Drawing upon Ferdinand de Saussure’s 
theorization of linguistic formation as an analogy, Agamben clarifies how this works. 
Langue, as framed by Saussure as the intrinsic structure of a language system, comprises 
a stabilized structure for the day-to-day use of this language system as what he calls 
“parole.” Despite the variable and alterable features of parole, langue is stable, constant, 
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and therefore comprising the static and fixated underlying structure of a language system. 
Using the langue-parole relationship as an analogy, Agamben contends that the defining 
capacity of citizenry is the foundational source of sovereign power for the state. In other 
words, defining who to include and who to exclude is the essential index of the sovereign 
authority. Moreover, as Ong points out, citizenship is not simply a political identity wed 
to certain state, but also a process of subject-making entangled with the racial, gender and 
national dynamics. Terming this process as “cultural citizenship,” she suggests it is “the 
cultural practice and beliefs produced out of negotiating the often ambivalent and 
contested relations with the state and its hegemonic forms that establish the criteria of 
belonging within a national population and territory” (1996, p. 738). Through a 
synergistic reading of these two theorists’ works, now it is not difficult to understand how 
the Chinese state is (re)produced through the defining and redefining of the Chinese 
citizenry via a gender parameter, which can be further elucidated through a critical 
analysis of the mini show devoted to Hu, the then incumbent Chinese president.  
         The festive fervor of the civilian parade comes to the crescendo with the show 
designed as the footnote of the socio-economic achievements of the PRC in the past sixty 
years, particularly in its reform era. Titled “Blessing China,” it also aims to delimit a 
futurist image for the PRC. Naming China as its direct object, this show establishes an 
interlocution between the audience and the state via the performers as the symbolic 
bridge. As the song accompanying it suggests, the real subject of the commemorating 
ritual is all Chinese people. To cite its lyrics: 
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Today is your birthday, my China. In the morning I released a flock of white 
doves. The doves are flying through high mountain ridges, bringing you an olive 
leaf. We are celebrating your birthday, my China, wishing you free of suffering 
and serene forever. The Doves are flying across the sky and ocean, bringing you 
the nostalgia of your children far apart. A wish that the moon would always be at 
the full and your children always be happy is recounted from your children far 
apart. The doves are flying against the wind and through the rain, bringing you a 
golden ear of wheat. A wish that you would prosper regardless of the bad weather 
is chanted whole-heartedly by your children.            
          Titled Today is Your Birthday, My China, this song was composed for China’s 40th 
anniversary shortly after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. It aims to recreate a caring and 
protective parental imagery for the state and rebuild its affective connection with Chinese 
people in its crisis of legitimacy after the militant suppression of the civilian protests. In 
the post 9/11 U.S., the similar strategy was also employed by the Bush administration to 
reclaim the sovereign power of the state through the constructed image of a masculine 
paternalistic guardian for American people in return of their allegiance and abdication of 
certain civil rights (Young, 2003). Compared with the “strong and dominant” fatherly 
figure of the U.S. protecting its people, this song depicts China as a gentle and caressing 
feminine figure with the unreserved love for her children, seeking to purge the memory 
of the genocides that was still fresh on people’s mind. By comparing the post 9/11 U.S. 
with the post Tian’anmen China, we can see that as a parameter for the construction of 
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the state, the contour gender always varies with the exigency and contingency of the 
specific case.  
          When recycled twenty years later, the gendered meanings laden with this song has 
been reframed for the different politico-economic background. In the show, acting as the 
surrogate subject for all Chinese people, a group of young and attractive female dancers 
take the central position of the camera to dedicate their warmest bliss to the state’s 60th 
birthday. As the close-ups move up and down with their curvaceous body, their 
femininity is foregrounded and reproduced through the highlighted flexible and nimble 
bearing, subordinate expression and posture. The specially designed petal-shaped 
costumes, coupled with the agile and lithesome choreography further reinforce their 
femininity as submissive and compliant (to the powerful and masculine state). 
Surrounded by these dancers is a float shaped into a peony. As this huge flower grows 
into full blossom, it unfolds and upholds a female dancer wobbling her tender sleeves 
ethereally and submissively to the absented and abstracted state, only to add to the 
feminizing flavor of this statist occasion. As the surrogate subject of the celebration ritual, 
the dancers’ emphasized supple and delicate womanhood not only feminize all Chinese 
people, but also galvanize the superb masculine prowess of the state as the unspecified 
interlocutor. Anchored in the antithesis between the effeminate citizenry and the 
masculinized state, the entity of the Chinese nation-state is reimagined and re-stabilized 
through gender as the normalizing technology. 
          Here Foucault’s theorization of governmentality (2008) is instructive to recognize 
the contingent and exigent significance of this gendered normalizing technology in 
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contemporary China. As Foucault argues, the state is not a finished and static entity, but 
both the object and product of certain type of governmentality. On the one hand, one only 
governs a state that is already there, and one only governs within the framework of a state. 
On the other, “[t]he art of government must therefore fix its rules and rationalize its way 
of doing things by taking as its objective the bringing into being of what the state should 
be” (2008, 4). Simply put, the shape of the state is formulated and reformulated through 
certain ways of governing. As Hui Wang (2003, 2009) notes, well preceding the Seattle 
and Washington social protests at the turn of the new century, the Tiananmen social 
movement is probably the first massive social resistance to the detriment of neoliberal 
restructuring in the world. Thereafter, China’s twenty years of neoliberal practices has 
fundamentally transformed the Chinese society, enlarging the pre-1989 mediocre level of 
social inequalities to one of the highest in the world. The new socio-economic conditions 
shaped by the neoliberal practices necessitate the reformation of the statehood by 
decoupling it from the previous module anchored in the Maoist rhetoric of the working 
class/peasant to a new imagery animated by gender. This change is not only indigenous 
to China, but common in the context of neoliberal globalization. As Chandra Mohanty 
(2003) notes, Anglo-Saxon masculinity is now reproduced on a worldwide scale with the 
accelerated neoliberal restructuring. In this sense, the new Chinese statehood is 
incarnated and infused with a new personality by the gendered normalizing technology. 
This technology has also reconstructed the Chinese citizenship and welded it to the new 
imagery of the state, recreating the nation-state imagination in China’s neoliberal 
conditions.    
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          However, as Roderick A. Ferguson (2004) points out, as a site of identification, 
this ritual would provide a terrain in which seemingly antagonistic formations, such as 
Socialism and neoliberalism would find unanticipated convergence with each other via 
their mutual identification with certain established social norms. As Munoz (1999) 
astutely argues, queer of color analysis provides the useful hermeneutic instrument of 
disidentification to decode the pre-constituted cultural identities from within. In this 
regard, by deconstructing the categories of gender and state through a genealogical 
reading of their formation in the history of the PRC, I will illustrate how the biopolitics of 
sexuality that is textured into the intersection gender and class, grounds the insidious 
linchpin between Socialist China and neoliberal China. 
The Heteronormative Linkage of Socialist and Neoliberal China 
          In The History of Sexuality, Vol. One, Foucault (1990) demonstrates that sexuality 
is a biopolitical technology through which the European states regulated and managed the 
new modality of capitalist market economy. By delegitimizing all forms of sexual 
behaviors outside hetero-patriarchal nucleus families, the states could efficaciously direct 
social resources into the reproduction and nurturing of capable humans for the 
burgeoning market and capital. In the U.S., Jonathan Ned Katz (2010) finds that the 
concept of heterosexuality was first created by doctors in 1892 to normalize the desire 
with a monolithic other-sex inclination and procreative aim. Almost at the same time, the 
category “homosexuals” was used as the antithesis to the normative heterosexual desire, 
which defined a person whose general mental state is that of the opposite sex. On this 
account, Siobhan Sommerville (2000) is correct by arguing that the notion of deviant 
 
 
92 
 
homosexuality was first invented at the end of the nineteenth century in the U.S. to 
clarify and demarcate the gender line as an attempt to uphold the imperative 
heterosexuality.  
          Different from the Western societies, in pre-modern China, despite thousands of 
years of homoerotic/homoromantic practices, particularly between noble men, 
homosexuality as a derogatory identity had long been absent. In the literary tradition, the 
desire for sodomy and fellatio is often positively depicted as desirable and gentrified (Wu, 
2002; Wang, 2002). In contrast to the draconian punishment of homosexuals in the 
modern Western societies, the juristic regulation of homosexuality in China had been 
remarkably lax and lenient until very recently. In Sex, Law and Society in Late Imperial 
China, Mathew H. Sommer (2000) challenges the popular conception that the year 1723 
(during the reign of Emperor Yongzheng of the Qing Dynasty) marked the watershed for 
the establishment of a sodomy law. With a detailed reading of a number of law cases, 
Sommer argues that the penalties for homosexual offenses were not more severe than 
similar heterosexual rapes, and it was homosexual rape instead of consensual sodomy 
that was on the focus of Qing law makers’ attention. As for the establishment of a 
substatute detailing penalties for sodomy in 1734, he suggests that the impetus was to 
ensure that homosexual rape would not be over-punished compared to similar 
heterosexual cases. Sommer’s review of the law system clearly demonstrates the 
relatively amiable social environment in pre-modern China. As Pan Suiming, the leading 
Chinese sociologist of sexuality, asserts, the austere punishment of homosexuals is a 
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recent product by the Maoist state with the clearly pronounced purpose of protecting 
procreation and women.49   
           The putative control of homosexuality is part and parcel of the calculated control 
and regulation of population by the Maoist state. As Tyrsene White (1994) notes, from 
the early 1950s, Zhou Enlai, the then incumbent Premier, began to conduct nationwide 
investigation to plummet the living conditions of workers, and then found that 
households with fewer children were enjoying better living standard.  However, the 
proposal of birth control was rejected by Mao because he preferred the idea of “birth 
planning.” As Mao saw it, incorporating the regulation of women’s reproductive 
capacities into the comprehensive social organization and designing, which he believed to 
be within the reach of the party-state, would be conducive to his romanticized schemata 
of constructing a new China. On this account, because of Mao’s optimistic view about 
China’s overall capacity of agricultural and industrial productivity, “throughout most of 
the 1950s the Chinese government took a decidedly pronatalist position and did little to 
alter traditional expectations of marital fertility” (Davis & Harrell, 1993). Thereafter, 
despite the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the ensuing nationwide famine, the 
state did not readjust its planning focus, and promote birth control until after the 1960s. 
The fertility rate then fell from 5.8 in 1970 to 2.7 in 1978 (Davis & Harrell, 1993). With 
the imperative to encourage more procreation for the Socialist construction, it is therefore 
not difficult to understand why the Maoist state would have legislated the rigid and 
                                                            
49 See the interview with Pan. Retrieved from 
http://v.youku.com/v_show/id_XNDA4MTY0MTY0.html 
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draconian punishment of homosexuals since its foundation. For instance, homosexuality 
was categorized as a type of neuropathy and crime called “hooliganism” in Mao’s era.  
           The procreation imperative also informed and spawned the hetero-patriarchal 
norm in Maoist China. Different from Marx, Engels (2010) emphasizes that besides 
social production, reproduction also underlies human societies as the development 
foundation. Thus Engels brings back the issue of women to the politico-economic agenda 
of the state with the presupposition that they would take a central role in procreation to 
engineer social developments, naturalizing heterosexuality as an imperative for the 
Socialist state. As the ideological and intellectual scaffold of the Socialist states, this 
conception of historical materialism “along with liberal ideology, took normative 
heterosexuality as the emblem of order, nature, and universality, making that which 
deviated from hetero-patriarchal ideals the sign of disorder” (Ferguson, 2004, p. 6). On 
this account, though the Maoist state opened up more opportunities for women to work 
outside to facilitate the economy and sustain the Socialist ideology, it kept intact the 
hetero-patriarchal structure where women took a lesser position and major 
responsibilities of managing the household. As Maria Mies (1999) critiques, Engels’s 
construal of gender and family is the co-optation of feminism by the male-controlled 
Socialist movements to compete for state power.   
          Marxism finds the linkage with its intellectual enemy liberalism on the issue of 
heteronormativity. With the urbanization and industrialization of Chicago in the early 
twentieth century as an example, as Ferguson (2004) illustrates, the liberal ideology also 
presumes heteronormativity as the foundation of social developments. The large number 
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of poor and working-class immigrants would disturb the heterosexual normality and 
dimorphic gender system, thus threatening capitalism and market economy, as many 
bourgeois ideologues worried. Despite their heteronormative commonality, liberalism 
and Marxism diverge in their remedies to the sexual and gender alternatives. Liberalists 
seek to assimilate the working class sexual and gender deviants into the middle class 
familial paradigm, and Marxists trumpet the proletarian patriarchal family as the 
foundation of gender egalitarianism.    
          Heteronormativity also anchors China’s transition from Socialism to neoliberalism. 
In the late 1970s, the Deng’s administration inherited the Maoist concept of “birth 
planning,” and translated it into a new version of Planned Family. Written into the law, 
this biopolitical regulation of the population hinges on the calculated management of 
women’s reproductive capacity. As part of the 1980 constitutional amendments, Planned 
Family is stipulated as the basic state policy to manage the size and quality of Chinese 
population in accordance with the socio-economic development rather than the mere 
control of birth rate. Alongside the regulation of women’s fertility is the management of 
gender and sexual norm. As we have discussed in chapter one, China’s reform and 
opening up have witnessed the prevalence of an essentialized conception of gender 
difference. Meanwhile, the criminalization and pathologization of homosexuality by law 
has given way to other forms of policing, such as the popular culture (Rofel, 2007). No 
longer a type of crime, homosexuality is consolidated as a social identity which not only 
cordons off queerness as inferiority, but also marks out heterosexuals as normality.  
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          As for the intersection of gender and sexuality, Judith Butler (2006) argues that 
premised on the presupposition of the compulsory heterosexuality, the dimorphic gender 
system is established through the repetitive performing of the unification of the gender of 
the performance, and the gender and anatomical sex of the performers. In this regard, in 
neoliberal China, the dimorphized genderscape is warranted by the heteronormativity that 
is achieved by overcoming the homosexual desire. In this regard, as we can see, in the 
mini show dedicated to Deng’s era—the watershed between Maoist China and neoliberal 
China, by pairing men and women in ballroom dancing, a cultural milieu of the courting 
for a heterosexual relationship, gender is not just recreated as oppositional and 
complimentary, but also heterosexual and heteronormative.  
          As Marxism differs from liberalism in the disparate manifestations of 
heteronormative gender relationship, the hetero-patriarchy also takes different contours in 
Socialist and neoliberal China. In next chapter, I will focus on the bourgeois nucleus 
family as the neoliberal norm to interrogate the intersectional biopolitics of gender, class 
and sexuality that is mobilized to facilitate and legitimize China’s neoliberal transition.           
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Chapter Three 
Localizing Transnational Culture Industry of Love   
          In April 2010, according to CVSC-Sofres Media, an authoritative media research 
organization partnered with CCTV, If You Are the One (shortened as IF hereafter), within 
only three months after the inauguration, took over the laurel of the most popular 
entertainment TV program from Happy Camp, the decade-long king of the Chinese 
television market.50 During the first half of 2010, the show kept breaking ratings records, 
with around 50 million watching every episode. As a parochial weekend night dating 
game show, on the viewing rate chart it is only secondary to Network News Broadcast 
and Weather Forecast, two flagships of CCTV mandated by the state for broadcasting on 
provincial level TV stations.51 IF’s success in the attention market also translates into 
handsome economic returns—only in 2012, it seized commercial revenues totaling over 
1,800 million Chinese Yuan (about 300 million U.S. dollars).52  
          As a televisual spectacle, the influence of IF extends well beyond media industry—
it has escalated into a socio-cultural sensation via a bold strategy of incessantly 
                                                            
50 Yahoo.com. (n. d.). If you are the one: Entertainment program with social values. 
Retrieved from http://yxk.cn.yahoo.com/articles/20100522/33y7.html  
 
51 Wang, X. (2010). Exploring women’s status through If you are the one. Magnificent 
Writing, 20, p. 19.  
 
52 China Business Today. Wei shi guang gao hun zhan: Fei cheng wu rao 2012 nian xi jin 
18 yi (Provincial star Ts fighting for commercial market: If you are the one generated 1.8 
billion Yuan in 2012). Retrieved from 
(http://biz.cn.yahoo.com/ypen/20130412/1701833.html. The commercial revenue of IF is 
also only secondary to that of Network News Broadcast and Weather Forecast in 2012.  
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tantalizing the audience by stirring up, fermenting, fueling and refueling controversies 
over morality of love, marriage, family and gender relation. In each episode, the program 
features four to five male participants who strive to take one of the twenty four women on 
the stage as his potential date within a three-round game. Despite its avowed 
programmatic specialization in dating game, the central tenor of this show, as stated by 
its producer, is not so much about coupling heterosexual partners as exhibiting the new 
generation’s view on love in a spontaneous and non-concocted way.53 For instance, Ma 
Nuo, a female contestant triggered a massive social debate over the ethics of gender 
relationship for her unscrupulous propagation of the “love for money” telos in the 
program. Moreover, the representation of the female guests with Ph.D. degree as the 
unlovable underdog in the TV bazaar of love and provocative flaunting of wealth by 
“affluent second generation” (fu er dai), also generated as much controversial attention, if 
not more. As Zhang (2010) states, this program bluntly flirts with and exposes the anxiety, 
tension and confusion of the post-80s and post-90s urban youth that are embedded in 
China’s socio-economic upheavals through exaggerated visual and narrative tropes of 
their money-and-appearance driven love-seeking pragmatics. As Peijie Wang, the 
producer of the show claims, the show provides a lens for us to examine the Chinese 
                                                            
53 Wu, N. (2012, September 22). Hun lian jie mu “fei cheng wu rao” de jia zhi fen xi 
(Analysis on the value of TV dating game show if you are the one). Retrieved from 
http://www.jingyinglunwen.com/article/2012/0922/article_11549_2.html 
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society at large, and through it, “you can tell what China is thinking about and chasing 
after.”54  
          IF is part and parcel of the increasingly commercialized Chinese media outlets, 
which, as Yuezhi Zhao (2009) maintains, are both the fruits of market reforms and the 
very means of China’s marketization and re-integration into the global order of capital. 
The apparently state-controlled reorganization of the communication system along the 
market logic since the early 1980s is an integral part of China’s transition to market 
mechanism as well as the global restructuring to formulate a truly global communication 
system (Zhao, 2003). In this regard, to better understand IF and its significance in and to 
China’s socio-economic upheavals, we need to situate this cultural milieu in a broader 
context of the state-directed marketization of Chinese communication system. As Vincent 
Mosco contends, “communication is a social process of exchange whose product is the 
mark or embodiment of a social relationship” (1996, p. 72), and in this case, it essentially 
marks China’s transition from Socialism to neoliberalism.   
          The commercialization of Chinese communication system, to a great extent, 
encapsulates China’s experimental features of neoliberalization. As Zhao indicates, it was 
first initiated “as much from calculated neoliberal state policy initiatives from above as 
from the structural pressures of a developing market economy and the imperative for the 
modernization of the media system, the economic self-interest of media organizations and 
state media managers, as well as the state’s desire to divest itself of the burden of 
                                                            
54 Wong, E. (2011, December 31). China TV grows racy, and gets a chaperon. New York 
Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/world/asia/censors-pull-
reins-as-china-tv-chasing-profit-gets-racy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
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financial subsidies” (2008, p. 77). The introduction of advertising into TV and the 
permission of private sellers of newspapers in the late 1970s signified the 
commercializing shift of mass media. However, mass media’s liberalizing effects 
unleashed by market (though in a highly restricted way) kindled Chinese people’s long-
subdued passion for democratic discussion, which incurred serious concerns for the 
Communist leadership. As Zhao (1998) suggests, the 1988 documentary River Elegy (He 
Shang) had played a no small role in fermenting the massive challenge of the Communist 
bureaucracy and yearning for the Western democracy as a prelude to the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square movement. The crackdown on the movement then had the effect of suppressing 
democratic discourses of people’s equal participation and re-imposed draconian political 
control on media (Zhao, 1998). Thereafter, not until the Party’s unreserved embrace of a 
market economy in 1992 was the commercialization of mass media resumed and 
promoted to a full scale. As Chin-Chuan Lee (2000) states, since then China’s media 
reformation has witnessed a scene full of “ambiguities and contradictions,” resulting in 
the current mixture of the Party guidance and market logic.  
         Like other social sectors, the marketization of media proceeded under the directive 
of the party-state, first launched at the very top of the state media with the 
implementation of a business-oriented experiment. For instance, in the 1980s, with the 
new policy of “Public Institutions Operated as Enterprises,” the government incentivized 
central party organs, news agencies, radio and TV stations for market activities for extra 
revenues, seeking to change the monopolistic state-supported modality. 55As part of the 
                                                            
55 Ge, W. (2011, June 16). Zhong guo te se chuan mei ti zhi: Li shi yan ge yu fa zhan 
(Media system with Chinese characteristics—History and development). Qiushi Theory 
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neoliberal attempt at streamlining the government, the state was eager to dislodge its 
financial responsibilities, and “used the core and affluent Party press as a sponge to 
absorb the unprofitable, chaotic, and disobedient ‘small papers’ and magazines” (Lee,  
2003, p. 10). Meanwhile, under the mandate of increasing China’s soft power in the 
global competition, the recentralization campaigns were introduced in an attempt to build 
media conglomerates to compete for market shares at provincial, national and 
transnational levels since the mid-1990s (Zhao, 1998). As designated by the state, market 
competition would not simply optimize the reallocation of resources and reduce the 
financial burden of the state, but also sharpen the overall competitiveness of the Chinese 
communication industry. In this context, Jiangsu Broadcasting Corporation (JSBC), the 
producer and distributor of IF, was established in 2001 with a goal set as “centered in 
Jiangsu, excelling in Eastern China, taking the lead in the country and building the global 
influence.”56 As a multi-media conglomerate, JSBC’s businesses include television, radio, 
film, newspaper, website as well as distribution of visual-audio products.57  
          The restructuring of the media system pushed forward by headlong administrative 
orders soon confronted an array of problems. To name a few, the issues arose from 
budget plan to personnel regulation, from allocation of resources to the distribution of 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Web. Retrieved from 
http://www.qstheory.cn/wh/whtzggyfz/201106/t20110616_87758.htm  
56 See the website of Jiangsu Broadcasting Corporation, http://www.jsbc.com/ 
57 As the website of JSBC claims, it “incorporates 14 television channels, including 2 
satellite television channels (Jiangsu Satellite Channel and International Channel), 7 
terrestrial television channels (City Channel, Variety Show Channel, Film and TV 
Channel, Public Channel, Channel Win, Children’s Channel and Business Channel), 4 
digital pay TV channels (Fashion Channel, Kid’s Education Channel, English Education 
Channel and Fortune Channel) as well as a mobile TV channel (Jiangsu Mobile TV).” 
See the website http://www.jstv.com/jsbc_en/corporation/about_us/index.shtml  
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profits. As the state-engineered recentralization and conglomeration did not fully 
accomplish the marketizing goal of the communication system, after the 15th Party 
National Congress a new project called “cultural system reform” was initiated in 2003 to 
boost communication’s commercialization through a strategy called “divestment.” As 
Zhao notes, “by spinning off market-oriented operations from existing party-state media 
conglomerates and turning these operations into relatively autonomous market entities 
that are free to absorb outside capital and pursue market-oriented expansion” (2008, p. 
112), the commercializing logic of media is deepened while the state control over media 
is also strengthened. For instance, in a media organization, the business part of the 
operation such as advertising, printing and distribution, would be severed from the 
hardcore editorial department. In this regard, “by allowing the media to internally 
differentiate into editorial, non-business section and business section, it emboldens the 
media to pursue profits in a more unabashed and effective manner” (Zhao, 2008, p. 112). 
IF is a good example of this “divestment” initiative. In this system, while Jiangsu Star 
TV, the flagship in the JBC group, holds control over the editing and producing right of 
the program, guaranteeing its “correct” political route, the marketing and advertising are 
outsourced to private capital, efficaciously fusing the program with the need of audience 
on the one hand, and the impulse of the advertising market on the other hand.  
          The “cultural system reform” is not simply a voluntary initiation adopted by the 
state to further China’s neoliberal transition by transforming its media apparatus, but also 
a response to the demand of transnational media industry heightened by China’s 
accession into the WTO in 2001. As the “last” most lucrative industry in China (Zhao, 
2008), the highly protected media market has long been coveted by transnational capital. 
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The entry into the WTO becomes a legitimate conduit for transnational media 
corporations to extend the scope and depth of their penetration into the Chinese market, 
both through and beyond the formal provisions of China’s WTO accession agreements 
(Zhao, 2003). For instance, there is a demand that China gradually increases the annual 
quota of films imported from Western countries, particularly Hollywood, from 10 to 50 
as part of its responsibilities as a WTO member (Zhao, 2003). Meanwhile, the Chinese 
political elites also use the WTO entry as both material and symbolic opportunities to 
pursue the “divestment” agenda in a way they can still sustain their reign. Within the new 
structure, foreign investment in software components, such as information infrastructure, 
service provision, and technological knowledge, is viewed as compatible with the state’s 
agenda, but  under no circumstances will the government relinquish its authority over the 
hardware components, such as editorial right (Lee, 2003).     
          To sidestep the state’s control over the editorial core of the communication 
industry, transnational media corporations employ an array of flexible strategies. For 
instance, they try to extend their penetration and expand market share by selling 
copyrights rather than directly participating in production. This move also lends the 
Western experiences to Chinese media to create a shortcut to economic success. Two 
highly popular and profitable TV programs, China’s Got Talents and The Voice of China, 
the Chinese version of their Western counterparts (e.g. Britain’s Got Talents and The 
Voice of America), are two recent examples of this complicit relationship. In 2009, Hunan 
Star TV (the producer and distributor of Happy Camp), the primary rival of JSBC, bought 
the copyright of Take Me Out, a British dating game show from one of the largest 
transnational media juggernauts, Bertelsmann’s RTL Group, turning it into a Chinese 
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version with the same name (hereafter CTMO). In January 2010, Jiangsu Star TV 
followed Hunan Star TV’s suit and launched the mimicry of CTMO, If You Are the One 
as its own brand name program. This confrontational encounter of two major media 
agglomerates soon resulted in an inflation of dating game shows—over fifteen programs 
of this ilk mushroomed on China’s provincial TV stations, producing a nationwide 
televisual topology of love competition, or to borrow Max Horkheimer and Theodore 
Adorno’s term (2010), the “culture industry” of love. For Chinese media under the 
stricture of the interlocked party control and market force, pushing the commercial 
boundary of entertainment to the limit of certain universal human values (e.g. love) rather 
than others (e.g. human rights) would be a politically safe and economically wise strategy 
for the media corporations to maximize the profits without transgressing the Party line. In 
this regard, love is instrumentalized for the commercialization of Chinese mass media in 
particular, and China’s neoliberal transition in general. As a result, “if the vulgar was 
once denounced by both state Socialist and liberal cultural elites, ‘kowtowing to the 
vulgar’ is now the mantra of the Chinese media industry” (Zhao, 2008, p. 87). 
          The restructuring of Chinese media system to simultaneously serve the party-state 
and cater to market forces is thus at the core of China’s neoliberal transition. It also 
epitomizes China’s specific mode of socio-economic transition under the mantra of the 
“Asian Model,” which is distinguished by strategic state planning and intervention for the 
regulation of capital accumulation and labor market (Kang, 2012). Under this suis generis 
modality of neoliberalism, the polarized understanding of Chinese media system through 
either “Maoist nationalist” or “Western democratic” prism would not be conducive to our 
understanding of the dating game shows like IF as an index of the contemporary Chinese 
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media culture. Both Yuezhi Zhao (2003) and Anthony Fung (2008) have unpacked these 
binaristic frameworks. As they see it, the party-state and its well-controlled 
communication system is neither external to the global changes nor completely 
subordinate to the democratic influence unfolded by the opening up of the domestic 
communication market. As Fung suggests, in times of globalization, the increasingly 
marketized and globalized Chinese media system will not inevitably undermine the 
Party’s authoritarian control and lead to the Western (U.S. particularly) model of 
democracy. Rather, the transnational media corporations/capital and the Chinese state are 
interwoven with each other, “and the move of one party will also impinge on the 
subsequent strategies of the other” (2008, p. vx). Rather than an utterly passive receptor 
or absolutist self-reliant agent, the party-state is in actuality actively mobilizing and 
reshaping transnational media capital and culture to suit its own neoliberal tenor. By 
fusing the market needs with the Party line, the Chinese state has successfully 
transformed the Chinese media from a brainwashing state apparatus to “Party publicity 
Inc” (He, 2000, 2003). Jing Wang (2001) further relates this transformation to the broader 
domain of popular culture that has been cast and recast by the state politico-economic 
agenda. As she writes, “the state’s rediscovery of culture as a site where new ruling 
technologies can be deployed and converted simultaneously into economic capital 
constitutes one of its most innovative strategies of statecraft since the founding the 
People’s Republic.” On this account, the multiplication of dating game shows like IF 
should be read as a hybridized form of “indoctriment” that is situated in China’s 
neoliberal transition and re-integration with the global capital network.  
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          Following this framework and drawing from critical theory, this chapter seeks to 
elucidate the cognitive link between IF as an instrumentalizing media spectacle of love 
and neoliberal turn, and specify how this intellectual/policy transition is localized in the 
Chinese context through the biopolitical technologies. In so doing, I hope to lay bare how 
the localized biopolitical technologies are also part of the racialized, gendered, classed 
and (hetero)sexualized regulation of the global division of labor. Before I start, I want to 
emphasize that this fathoming of the state-sponsored biopolitics invested in the show 
does not rule out the agency and active voice of the participants and audience, as 
suggested by the British cultural studies theorists ( see in Hall, 1980; Morley, 1983). In 
chapter five, I would further discuss the audience’s (often contested) interpretations of 
this mediated biopolitical technology.  
Instrumentalized Love 
          As modeled after CTMO, IF is a spin-off (if not the direct copy) of the British 
dating game show TMO with limited changes.58 In the course of each episode, usually 
five (rather than four in TMO) male guests are brought onto the stage via a glamorously 
decorated love lift. The objective is also slightly altered as a man to gain a date with one 
of twenty four (rather than thirty) single women. Except for these alterations, IF outright 
resembles TMO in its programmatic settings. As can be seen, each selected woman stands 
on the stage underneath a light with a button of control in the front for them to signal 
their choice. At any point of the show, they can switch off their light as an indication of 
                                                            
58 Despite some slight changes of programmatic design, Jiangsu Star TV was charged by 
Hunan Star TV for its violation of the copyright. Xinhua Daily. (2010, April 8). Fei 
cheng wu rao xian ru ban quan zheng duo zhan (If you are the one gets into trouble for 
copyright issue). Retrieved from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/dfpd/2010-
04/08/content_9701054.htm 
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rejection. Every male guest needs to impress the women in a series of three rounds 
through prerecorded videos called The First Impression of Love, The Second Thought on 
Love and The Final Decision about Love. These videos usually cover such topics as male 
constant’s statement of personal background, description of his ideal date and his families’ 
or friends’ comment on him. In the emulation of regular date, this love selection is 
reciprocal as every bachelor has the right to select his first-sight “attraction lady” before 
the game starts off. If, at the end of three rounds, there are still more than two lights left 
on, the bachelor’s right will be upgraded as he will turn off all but two of the remaining 
lights and decide who would be his date. He can ask one question to the finalists before 
making a decision (of taking out one or none of them). If only one light is still on, he will 
have to make the decision whether to go on a date with that woman without asking his 
questions.  
          The program is scripted so that all male guests are in competition with each other 
though they might not participate in a confrontational encounter. The number of lights a 
man can keep on is the only token of victory in this game. If any contestant can keep all 
24 lights on (the number was later reduced to 22) and take away a woman, he and his 
date would get a free trip to a fancy tourist resort reputed for romantic encounters as a 
trial of honey moon. For those lucky ones, a glorification of delightful scattering of 
pedals and blithesome music will add to the festivity of their victory—a blessing scenario 
only reserved for a bridegroom and his lifelong beloved one. Moreover, the number of 
the lights does not just determine a contestant’s male right of selection, but also 
constitutes a verifiable token as the testimony to his masculine charisma—to the women, 
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the audience and most important, his male competitors. As Michael Kimmel (1996) 
astutely points out, masculinity, to a great extent, is a homosocial construction among 
male peers. To testify and confirm one’s masculinity, it necessitates both virtual and 
symbolic control of women in the presence of his male rivals (Connell, 2005; Pascoe, 
2007). For instance, in the gendered spectacle sponsored by this show, the consolidation 
and confirmation of one’s masculinity hinges on women’s attentive and affective 
responses symbolized by the turning-on-and-off of lights-tokens. 
          Different from their male counterparts, the competition between female 
participants is staged as much more explicit and even vengeful—sometimes as an overt 
fight for a commonly coveted man, and more often than not a covert emulation for the 
title of the “attraction lady.” As the rule states, in contradiction to the short stage life of 
men, women could stay until they finds their Mr. Right or opt to withdraw. Granted 
enough space and time, the selected women could maneuver the stage in their own favor 
to impress the participating bachelors as well as the myriad behind-the-screen backups by 
exhibiting their embodied beauty, glamor and/or virtue. If a woman is successfully 
matched up with a man, a substitute will be brought on with a self-introduction—it 
should be good enough to strike a lingering impression on male contestants and 
audiences. In this sense, the competition between female participants starts with their first 
appearance, and continues to ferment and intensify as the plots of the show unfold.  
          This script is interpreted by some commentators as “feminist subversion of the 
traditional gender paradigm because it enshrines the women to a domineering and 
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judging position (of men).”59 This argument is not entirely persuasive because it ignores 
that the men also hold the right of selecting, not to mention concealing the social 
structure of gender, sexuality and class that all women have to put themselves through for 
self-censoring and posturing in return for applause and social recognition. As a new genre 
of reality show, Chinese dating game show is definitely a site of gender politics, but not 
as a confirmation of which party is taking the lead,60 rather a televised arena with love 
staked as the ultimate prize. Actually, TV dating game show was introduced from 
Western societies into China in as early as the mid-1990s. As a revamped TV version of 
blind date—a traditional conduit for arranged marriage in the Chinese society, this old 
genre features men and women of equal number, often paired in a one-to-one interaction. 
This type of show had soon lost its appeal to a younger generation cultured in a liberal 
and individualistic environment, as well as competitiveness in the Chinese media market 
by the new century. A decade later, a revised version is, again, introduced to the Chinese 
market with the numeric equality replaced by a one-versus-multiple paradigm.61 In the 
new script, every man and woman are motivated as fully charged warriors geared up to 
fight for their own love. To win, one must strategically maneuver and deploy the 
armament in their arsenal. The winners’ success stories are collected and edited into 
                                                            
59 Zhan, N. (2010, October 21).  “Fei cheng wu rao” dian shi xiang qin jie mu xu shi hua 
yu fen xi (Discursive analysis of the narrative paradigm of the TV dating game show if 
you are the one). Media Today. Retrieved from  
http://media.people.com.cn/GB/22114/52789/205766/13016741.html 
60 For instance, another representative of this dating game show fad, Shanghai Dragon 
TV’s One of Hundred reverses IF’s script and puts a hundred men in a judging and 
selecting position of every female participant.  
 
61 Besides the British show TMO, the American popular TV program The Bachelor is 
another example of this new genre. 
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instructions with a “must-have” list of attributes/qualities for future contestants by 
viewers and fans of the program. Those who want to participate could easily find them 
online or in smart phone applications to maximize the hope of winning love—the 
ultimate stake for this competition, which can be and can only be acquired with certain 
socially recognized attributes as suggested by the instructions.  
          This new TV genre is a good example of what French philosopher Alain Badiou 
(2012) calls “love under threat.” As he points out, love is a quest for truth and cannot be 
reduced to any approximations as has been represented by IF. Aligning himself with 
philosophers like Plato and Kierkegaard, Badiou insists that in the impulse of love resides 
a seed of universality, and it is marriage as a social institution that channels genuine love 
towards this fundamental and universal destination. Provided it is represented as an 
exchange of mutual favors, which can be calculated in advance as achievable trophy by 
this TV genre, love has been divested of its universal implication and truth value as 
claimed by Badiou (2012). This exchange rule also grounds the 
marketization/commercialization of love, as we can see from IF.  
          This philosophical contestation over love needs to be teased out in the larger 
context of academic debate over reason, the core question of Western philosophy. As 
Max Horkheimer (1947) points out, there are two trajectories of philosophical 
conceptions of reason in the Western civilization: objectivistic and subjectivistic. Until 
the transition to modernity in the Enlightenment era, the objectivistic concept of reason 
had been dominant in the Western societies. Just as ancient Greek philosophers, such as 
Plato and Aristotle, state, reason is an objective capacity independent of human 
difference and variations that would lead us to the universal truth of nature. This 
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conceptual framework, as Horkheimer argues, grounds the epistemic foundation in the 
Western context for the discussion of such human values, as justice, equality, morality 
and of course, love. In other words, this framework of reason posits that as one of the 
transcendental human values, love, like social justice and equality, can only be accessed 
through human beings’ universal ability endowed by critical reason. In contrast, the 
subjectivistic notion of reason rejects the claim to universal truth, and places human 
beings at its center, arguing that the only criterion of reason is whether a person has 
chosen the right way to fulfill a goal. Simply put, only achieved ends could justify reason. 
Like Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse (1964) attributes the current conundrum that haunts 
human societies to the replacement of objectivistic reason by subjectivistic reason that 
traces back to the Enlightenment era. As he suggests, as reason is instrumentalized as a 
means of domination and subjugation, human beings have lost the critical capacity for 
emancipation, justice and love. In this regard, the different construals of love provide us 
the framework to investigate the dominant episteme that holds reign in certain societies 
as well as the concomitant societal constructions and systems.  
          At its cognitive core, Horkheimer (1947) and Marcuse (1964) have, to a great 
extent, provided an insightful anticipation of the current neoliberal turn, and proffered a 
critical instrument to deconstruct multifarious neoliberal governing technologies in the 
context of globalization. On the theoretical level, the instrumentalist notion of reason lays 
the intellectual foundation for neoliberal ideology. As the core argument of this ideology 
posits, individuals should be enterprised as independent subjects or “Homo Economicus,” 
so they will be able to compete in a free market. For the purpose of self-preservation and 
promotion, they would mobilize their reasoning ability and rationality to calculate gains 
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and losses and find the best means to maximize their profits. On a macro level, the social 
relation coordinated through individual competition will ultimately optimize the welfare 
and interests of human societies (Foucault, 2008). This cognitive frame has been 
multiplied into miscellaneous theoretical forays to justify and direct the neoliberal 
adjustment program to dismantle the public good and communal welfare in different 
countries. For example, China’s attempt to commercialize education and medical care by 
Zhu’s administration (1997-2002) seeks to transfer these public sectors from the state 
onto the shoulders of citizens. As self-responsible market subjects, the Chinese people are 
supposed to calculate their needs and find the optimum options in a way that their 
collective market-oriented activities would benefit the whole society. The vantage point 
of these neoliberal projects is hinged on the displacement of critical reason as the 
intellectual foundation of human values, such as justice, equality and love by 
instrumental reason. 
          IF provides another example for this intellectual transition.62 In IF love is 
reconstituted as an achievable item rather than pure impulse laden with a transcendental 
value free from calculations and pragmatics for the making of neoliberal subjectivities. 
Love is represented as a site for people to explore, testify, orchestrate, prove and disprove 
their reasoning and calculating capabilities—the required qualities for the market-
grounded human societies. Furthermore, love is reframed as an entity that could translate 
into market values. It would not only bring welfare and financial security for women 
                                                            
62 Here I am not arguing for the return to critical reason to retrieve human emancipation 
from neoliberalism. Nor am I romanticizing love as a transcendental entity as suggested 
by this philosophical camp. By this example, I want to highlight the differential 
construction of love as sites to understand the debate over the neoliberal society, and I 
will come back to this debate in the conclusion chapter.  
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through a conjugal bondage to a wealthy man, but also translate into real money in the 
market. For instance, the producer persistently correlates the program with China’s 
burgeoning online dating industry in a win-win deal. Among IF’s several dating-website-
qua-commercial-sponsors, jiayuan.com exponentially boosted its traffic and completed 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) on NASDAQ Global Select Market on May 12th, 2011. 
After accumulating over seventy million dollars in the stock market, jiayuan.com became 
one of the most successful representatives of China’s “new economy,” and turned into a 
transnational corporation with a value totaling 329 million dollars.63 If the 
instrumentalizing transformation of love is realized through market exchange, it is 
concretized through the gendered relationship of reciprocation, contestation and 
confrontation in the program. By flirting with and garnering people’s voyeuristic taste for 
the private world of affect, emotion and sentiment, IF deploys gender as a disciplinary 
technology of biopolitics to regulate, steer and engineer audiences along the cognitive 
line of market logic. Though commercialization/commodification of love/sex are not new 
to the Western and Chinese societies at all, by reforming of love as a terrain for 
competition, this new genre of reality show bequeaths the endorsement to instrumental 
reason that foreshadows the upcoming of the dominant neoliberal society. With the 
differential investments in the love competition, neoliberalism has also been translated 
into localized and contingent practices in different contexts. Transplanting the new dating 
game show genre from the Western soil to the Eastern earth, the Chinese party-state has 
meticulously trimmed and reshaped its contours to fit it into the politico-economic 
                                                            
63 Sina.com.cn. (2011, May 12). Shi ji jia yuan IPO shou ri shou pan 10.52 mei yuan 
(Jiayuan.com wrapped up at 10.52 dollars after its first of IPO). Retrieved from  
shouhttp://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2011-05-12/04055511496.shtml  
 
 
114 
 
schemata for China’s suis generis neoliberalization, which I will further discuss in the 
next part.  
Re-gendering the Hetero-Patriarchal Norm in Neoliberal China 
          After a trip to the U.K., a Chinese journalist expressed the astonishment after 
finding that different from IF, “male participants never talk about their income and 
female participants would not ask about it” in TMO.64 Similarly, in the U.S. popular TV 
show, The Bachelor, though only men with an established career would be selected by 
producers as qualified “bachelors,” each episode would nonetheless devote its time and 
space to the romantic and intimate interaction rather than merely boasting male/female 
contestants’ material possessions as the attraction point (Dubrofsky, 2006). In contrast, IF 
is rarely equivocal about its “objectification” of male participants—through their physical 
attractiveness, and more important, accomplishments in economic terms. For instance, 
regardless of the open-ended nature of the self-introduction part for men to strike the 
women with “the first impression of love,” this part has nearly been routinized as a 
statement of personal monetary achievements: job (and its location), education, income, 
savings, properties, car, etc. As my analysis of all episodes (up to September 22nd, 2012) 
shows, over one third of male contestants are framed in a driving seat while narrating 
their self-introduction, with the camera “accidentally” flashing over the wheel to give the 
audience a tantalizing glimpse of the brand label. In the episode aired on September 18th, 
2010, a contestant appalled the audience by a well-designed “irony”—a soulful statement 
about his pursuit of Platonic love was right followed by a flaunting of the wealth and 
                                                            
64 Chao, L. (2010, July 13). Qin lin yin guo fen xi fei cheng wu rao “yuan xing” cheng 
zhang (An on-site analysis of the “archetype” of if you are the one).Yangzhou Evening. 
Retrieved from http://www.sosol.com.cn/html/2010/20107/2010713_197609_1.html 
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properties. Ironic as it was, this strategy proved effective and he kept five lights on till the 
end—a very good result among all participants. Successful experiences like this are 
collected and edited into instructions for future contestants of love by viewers/fans. 
Although these instructions differ in the “software” part—from the dressing and styling 
code, tactics of posturing and bearing, to narrative strategy for self-presentation, they all 
share the same set of “hardware”: a good job/business, money, car and most important, 
property. In other words, the commonly “coveted” men are objectified through a 
quantified list of marketizable and exchangeable items. As we can see, a bourgeois dream 
typical of a Western middle class family is thus reproduced through and projected onto 
the redefined Chinese normative manhood.  
          Women on the stage are the present subject of this objectification of men. On 
January 17th, 2010, in the third episode after IF’s inauguration, Ma Nuo, a then 22-year-
old attractive model placed herself in a huge vortex as she rejected an invitation from one 
of her admirers for a romantic ride on his bicycle. Her blatant claim that “I would rather 
cry in a BWM car” was soon disseminated both online and offline, fermenting a social 
debate over the ethics of love and marriage. In the 19th episode on April 18th, 2010, Zhu 
Fangzhen followed Ma’s suit and threw a verbal bomb by stating that it would cost 
200,000 Yuan (over 30,000 U.S. dollars) for a man to shake her hands. As she added, 
only who could make more than 30,000 dollars a month would be considered by her. This 
scenario refueled the already boiling controversy that Ma had kindled, and needless to 
say, IF became the center of social attention with a skyrocketing audience rating. Many 
people questioned whether this provocative and effusive discursive trope was a planted 
gimmick of self-promotion. In response, Meng Fei, the host of the program had to draw 
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upon Network News Broadcasting, the most authoritative Chinese news program for 
comparison to claim IF’s authenticity.65 Though this claim per se might be true, if we 
take into consideration John Berger’s (1972) argument that all images (as well discourses) 
are man-made for certain purpose, a more rigorous critical reading of IF’s framing 
techniques is needed to uncover how the biopolitics of gender and class functions in this 
media sensation.  
          Not surprisingly, IF reaped a plethora of harsh criticisms for its bold framing 
strategy, and even castigation by the state. Many critics lament that the controversial 
figures represented by IF are the contributing factors to the deteriorating social morality, 
expansive mammonism and fetishism, as well as bankrupt Socialist value of justice and 
equality. For instance, a blogger calls for more stringent control of public figures like Ma 
so that ethics and moral values could be restored.66  In response to the overwhelming 
condemnation, the State Administration of Radio Film and Television of China (SARFT) 
issued two official documents on July 9th, 2010 to implement a stricter rule over TV 
dating programs and talk shows about emotional affairs. As these documents mandate, 
the pool of participants should be diversified to cover a wide range of social strata and 
programs must adhere to the basic Socialist values and morals.67 However, as the central 
                                                            
65 Meng, F. (2012, June 14). Fei cheng wu rao zhen shi du jue dui chao xin wen lian bo. 
If you are the one absolutely more real than The Network News Broadcasting. Forbes. 
Retrieved from http://www.forbeschina.com/review/201206/0017603.shtml 
66 Hong, X. T. X. (2010, June 8). Feng sha Ma Nuo men cai neng zheng que yin dao she 
hui jia zhi guan (Banning figures like Ma Nuo will reestablish the correct social values. 
Retrieved from http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4ac77e150100jqwm.html 
 
67 China Youth Daily. Dian shi xiang qin jie mu cu su guang dian zong ju chu shou jian 
du mo shi shi guan jian (SARFT intervenes into the vulgar TV dating game shows and 
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entity that is actively facilitating and spurring the marketization of mass media, why 
would the party-state take a self-contradictory role to step on the brake? 
          As Foucault (2008) suggests, state is not a fixated and static entity. Rather, as both 
the product and target of certain governing practices, it is in a perpetual process of 
formation and reformation, contestation and experimentation. Though governing 
practices usually centralize a coherent politico-economic tenor, they are always 
contingent and mutable, and there is no clear-cut boundary between different types of 
“governmentality.” When the Chinese state initiates its neoliberal experiments, the state 
per se becomes a site of contestation and conflicts, stretched between neoliberal and New 
Left camps (Leonard, 2008). In this regard, any reductionist assumption that the Chinese 
media system has been transformed into an utterly oppressive apparatus controlled by 
Communist bureaucracy and capital (see in Wang, 2009) would not be conducive to 
understand the complex meanings of IF in neoliberal China. On the one hand, as 
Anagnost (2008) points out, as the market logic of media precludes the Maoist discourse 
of working class and class struggle, mass media begin to embrace the discourse of “social 
strata” and dedicated themselves to the “the middle class,” making the growth of this 
class a national project that signifies China’s membership in the developed world. On the 
other hand, despite (neo)liberalists’ dominance over the Chinese communication system, 
leftists and subaltern groups could still temper with the Socialist legacy to create a 
contingent space for social justice and equality (Zhao, 2008), as long as the marketizing 
tenor of mass media is supposed to be contained within the Party bottom line. “Socialism 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
regulation is the key). The People’s Web. Retrieved from 
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/11892265.html 
 
 
118 
 
with Chinese Characteristics,” the exigent nomenclature coined by Deng to forestall the 
potential politico-ideological turmoil is thus not just nominal, but also materially tangible. 
As Arif Dirlik (2005) argues, whether to call the current Chinese system capitalist or 
Socialist will shape the social reality that it pretends to describe. As a result, Huang Han, 
a female social psychologist joined the program to counter-balance the sexual 
disequilibrium of this gender-politics-centered show. Moreover, as a professor of the 
School of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee, Huang’s presence symbolizes the 
undefined but omnipresent Party line circumscribing Chinese media. Huang’s two male 
partners, the host Meng Fei and Le Jia, the on-site mentor also shifted their role into a 
gate-keeper to mitigate the social repercussion deriving from the ruthless “Jungle Law” 
of love as represented by IF earlier. 
          In addition, changes were made on the programmatic level so audience could see a 
more diversified pool of players for love. For instance, besides wealthy businessmen and 
professionals, teachers, graduate students, government officials, bus drivers and workers 
are incorporated to recreate IF as an inclusive and equal game court open to all social 
walks. In accordance, female participants’ money-driven pragmatics of love is also muted, 
at least on an explicit, verbal level. The program carefully scrubs contestant information 
such as savings and salaries, too.  
          A more rigorous and in-depth reading of IF’s visual and narrative tropes, however, 
would help dismantle this “neutral and equal” claim, and untangle the intersectional 
gendered, classed and (hetero)sexualized nature of the neoliberal governing technologies 
invested in this cultural milieu. Rather than the direct (and biased) nomination by women 
(like Ma), the reconstitution of masculine norm is now notarized and warranted by the 
 
 
119 
 
“fair” result of the game, with women on the stage as its only judge. As the result verifies 
over and over again, who can smile the last would usually be endowed with such qualities 
as good education and job, high income, personal property and car, preferably nice-
looking and tall. For instance, in the episode of August 21st, 2010, when a contestant 
stated that he preferred economically stable women as his date, the flashes from the 
switching off of the lights soon enlivened the stage, and surely embarrassed this man. In 
another episode, after a contestant argued for the subversion of men’s breadwinner social 
role and confessed that he could not fulfill this ideal, lights flashed out one after another 
with no surprise. Moreover, on July 8th, 2012, after the video showed that a contestant 
shared a dormitory with a roommate, a dozen of women quickly turned him down. 
Numerous scenarios like this constitute a broader picture and send a clear message about 
the norm of Chinese manhood, in an equally efficacious way, if not more than the 
provocative pronouncement and theatric staging.  
          This codification of normative Chinese masculinity dovetails with the 
reconstruction of hegemonic masculinity within the context of neoliberal globalization. 
As Connell and Wood (2005) suggest, as the neoliberal market logic is transcending the 
nation-state boundaries with the quickened steps of globalization, flexible and affluent 
males, preferably having maintained a dynamical transnational business schedule, has 
become the new caliber of manliness. In the U.S, this imagery is re-incarnated in 
monetary, corporeal and phallic terms as “three bulges” of the wallet, muscularity, and 
crotch (Kimmel 1996). In the Chinese context, this brisk phrase is recast with Chinese 
characteristics as“gao fu shuai” (tall, rich and handsome). Antithetical to this norm is 
“diao si” (which literally means pubic hair), or “ai cuo qiong” (short, ugly and poor), a 
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traumatizing term of economically and physically marginalized men. As the buzzwords 
first popularized online, these discourses are now widely employed and deployed to 
describe gender relationship, marriage and class structure, as I have found in my field 
work. In a co-constituting relationship, gender is often invoked to articulate and 
legitimize the restoration of class privileges and soaring social inequalities, and 
conversely the recreated class privilege becomes the defining feature that would valorize 
men’s sexual appeal. Gender and class are thus mobilized intersectionally to normalize 
and reproduce the market-driven social relationship.  
          The norm of Chinese masculinity is further encoded in an entrepreneurial essence. 
As the content analysis shows, the most frequently adopted strategy for men to impress 
their potential date and defeat their rivals is to declare and define an entrepreneurial 
ambition. As Meng complained in one episode, the program is full of the clichéd 
scenarios about promoting one’s image as an emerging entrepreneur with global 
influence—developing his business into a listed corporation (preferably in New York) as 
the ultimate life goal. However, despite this pronounced critical gesture, Meng and his 
partners, Le and Huang, actually contribute to this entrepreneurializing codification of 
Chinese masculinity by fueling and refueling the meritocratic story of self-made men. 
The hosting team is explicitly negative about the high-sounding but loosely grounded 
entrepreneurial dreams, but they bequeath their endorsement to the surefooted “future 
entrepreneurs” who are fully charged and poised to start from scratches. For example, in 
the episode of May 28th, 2011, Zhang Zhaokun, a man at his early twenties trying to 
resurrect his family from the ruins of bankruptcy by building a small vegetable vending 
business, not only moved Le into tears, but also made Meng break the rules (for the first 
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time) to offer him a free trip to Hawaii with his date—a special treat only for the most 
popular male players. We can see how the “boot-strapping” logic of neoliberalism is 
reproduced and disseminated through this gendered storytelling line,68 as a disciplinary 
technology to interpellate Chinese men into the entrepreneurial logic of neoliberalism.  
          Women are involved in this entrepreneurializing attempt to reshape the Chinese 
masculinity as well. In her studies of female sex workers in the red light districts in 
Northern China, Tiantian Zheng (2009) reveals how female’s body provides an important 
site for domestic and transnational businessmen to build mutual trust and develop 
economic relationship by consuming women’s sexuality together. As Zheng (2009) sees 
it, their “entrepreneurial masculinity” is thus recreated at the expense of women. 
Compared with the body of the sex workers, women on the stage use their lights/votes to 
valorize the entrepreneurializing spirits as the essential marker of normative masculinity. 
As we can see, contestants with an established business record buttressed by a clearly 
defined development plan usually get more applause and recognition from the women. 
Different from their mother and grandmother cultured in the Socialist doctrine of equality 
and social justice, these women are embracing entrepreneurship and market-driven un-
scruple as the core values of their ideal dates. In the episode of September 12, 2010, the 
success of a “fu er dai” (the affluent second generation)—a dandyish dawdler typical of 
the wealthy youth kept three lights till the end—triggered a fierce debate over what is the 
defining attribute of a “good” man. After several rounds of rhetorical swordplay, women 
on the stage agreed that only who could put their entrepreneurial ambition into practice 
                                                            
68 In the Western societies, it is often used as a metaphor to describe the neoliberal 
ideology that people need to fully rely on themselves for social mobility and achievement, 
rather than questioning the systemic social inequalities.   
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would be qualified for this title. Besides this core value, they would also add “tall and 
handsome” to the list. The mediated moments of this ilk inter-reference with and 
reinforce the popular discourses of normative manhood as “gao fu shuai.” In other words, 
gender is invoked and deployed as disciplinary and pedagogical resources to reconstruct 
and normalize middle class lifestyle without overriding the Party line—the Socialist 
claim to “the classless society,” even only as an ideological shibboleth to conceal the 
tightened Communist-capital complicity.   
          As Evelyn Nakano Glenn (1999) suggests, the constitution of gender is always 
relational and reciprocal. Even ensconced in the judging platform, women have never 
been saved from the voyeuristic male gaze, in both social and individual sense. In this 
show, every round is started with a man selecting his “attraction lady.” In this scenario, 
the men could fully enjoy their male chauvinistic power (like the ancient emperors) to 
classify, stratify and objectify women. Sometimes this process only cost a few seconds, 
but sometimes it could turn into a humiliating and excruciating long gaze. It is not rare to 
see that the women would complain about how insulting it could be as they are judged 
and evaluated as an object with no humanly attributes. Different from the normative 
manhood plummeted in monetary/materialistic terms, the most popular women 
(unsurprisingly) seldom fail in corporeal measurements: a delicate, porcelain face plus a 
well-shaped curvaceous body. Though they are aware of these sexist and essentializing 
codifications of their femininity, sometimes they even consciously mobilize these 
attributes in their own favor. If the heavy make-up that almost leaves no traces of their 
natural beauty (or plainness) and the well groomed elegant, sometimes exotic dressing 
could be interpreted as the aesthetic need for broadcasting, the covert flaunting of female 
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anatomic attributes (e.g. the size of breasts) by some women is a good footnote of their 
internalized male-centered guidelines of femininity. IF gives us another example to show 
how the contour of femininity is wobbling with China’s politico-economic waves as the 
essentializing and sexualizing conception of womanhood held at bay in Mao’s era is 
unleashed again in China’s reform era (Croll, 1995; Evans, 1997).  
          However, the reconstructed ideal of femininity is not just simple replication and 
duplication of the traditional womanhood delimited by the patriarch’s taste and harem, 
but laden with new values of neoliberal logic. In one episode, when a male contestant 
stated that he wanted to find a virtuous housewife and obliging mother to carry on his 
patrilineal line, he invited harsh criticisms from both women on the stage and Huang, the 
female psychologist and mentor. As they strongly renounced, women are not the machine 
of reproduction for men, but individuals fully enjoying their humanity and independence. 
This contestant’s voice is actually not “mainstream” at all. As for most male contestants, 
sexually appealing but intellectually uninformed women, like Ma Nuo, might be someone 
they can flirt with, but by no means the one they will bring home to see their mother. In 
the second round, “Love on the Second Thought,” as the videos often show, many men 
define their “dream lady” as a sweet and helpless canary whose feminine comfort can 
burnish their masculinist ego when tarnished, and meanwhile, a reliable business partner 
who can lend a useful hand when needed. In other words, only women with these 
seemingly contradictory qualifications would fulfill men’s envisioning of a bourgeois 
hetero-patriarchal family.  
          Liu Tingting, a general manager of a restaurant is a good example. Coming from an 
affluent family, Liu has good education and a high-paying job—a good model for a 
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qualified and competitive market subject. Meanwhile, she nicely embodies a combination 
of sensitiveness, delicacy and considerateness required of a good “housewife.” As one of 
the most lauded and popular female contestants, she has been called by viewers as “the 
three good girl”—good in physical, virtual and intellectual terms. Like the normative 
manhood, this ideal of Chinese femininity is generalized in a brisk triadic term, “bai fu 
mei” (white, rich and pretty). Different from the gendered, classed and (hetero)sexualized 
normative manhood, this ideal of femininity is also racialized as it embraces the 
transnational discourse of whiteness, or lighter skin as the laudable quality of 
womanhood (Glenn, 2008). In the Western societies, the racialized womanhood has been 
a central figure of the bourgeois hetero-patriarchal family.  
          This reconfiguration of Chinese femininity also needs to be unpacked in the global 
context. As Marchand and Runyan (2010) suggest, we need to interrogate gender as an 
analytical category in relation to the economic adjustment programs mandated by 
neoliberalism. As the group that has been historically relegated to the “private” sphere 
along the sexual division of labor, or what Harvey (2005) calls “extra-market” subjects, 
women’s labor constitutes a vast operative space for the reproduction of capital. Not 
surprisingly, the biopolitical technologies of gender, class and race usually target women 
of color (especially in the global South), seeking to involve them with the global labor 
market to serve the cruising capital. In India, another development powerhouse in Asia, a 
micro-credit program called Mahila Samakhya sponsored by both the state and NGOs, 
seeks to “empower” low-caste, rural Indian women into capable market subjects (Sharma 
2008). In the relatively developed Asian tiger economies, such as Singapore and Hong 
Kong, middle class housewives are the primary target of the disciplinary technologies of 
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gender—with the required professional and management knowledge and capacities, these 
women’s biopolitical values could translate into convenient and bountiful resources for 
the upgrading of the economies in the global industrial hierarchy (Ong, 2006). For 
Chinese women who were exhorted to work outside together with men to achieve gender 
equality in the Maoist era, they are now reproduced as less valued, more exploitable 
proletarian subjects through the gendered technologies inculcating their subordination to 
male supervisors (Pun, 2005). As Pun (2005) demonstrates, the non-conforming women 
workers would otherwise be labeled as not “feminine and qualified for a heterosexual 
relationship” to solicit their obedience.  
          Apart from the market subjectivity, a reinforced role of women in domestic and 
reproductive work is also proliferated to “compensate for state retreat, or for state failure 
to provide social infrastructure and support” (Pettman, 1999, p. 212), thus creating a very 
contradictory gender rule for women. As Bayes et. al. (2001) suggest, while globalization 
fundamentally challenges the public/private divide by recruiting women into the global 
system of labor, they are often confronted with contradicting gender ideologies locally. In 
other words, as designated by the neoliberal writ, women should simultaneously step up 
both their productive and reproductive labor to meet the dual goal of expanding the 
market rule to more (and finally all) social sectors and streamlining the overloaded state 
machinery. For instance, in the U.S., “women are caught between neoliberal rhetoric 
which casts women as the ‘new entrepreneurs’ by devaluing women’s traditional family 
roles and neoconservative views which emphasize ‘family values’ and cast women as 
selfish and irresponsible if they do not fulfill their mothering roles” (Marchand & Runyan,  
2010). In contemporary China, this contradictory subjectivity is configured and 
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orchestrated through the intersectional biopolitics of gender and class, as we can see in IF. 
Through the co-constitution of gender, class and race, the normative womanhood is 
congealed as the combination of the feminized ideal for a middle class family and the 
marketized subject engineered for the personal social mobility.  
          We need to be aware that these gendered and classed technologies are premised on 
an assumption of the hetero-patriarchal relationship. Contingent upon an imagery of the 
bourgeois nucleus family, the symbolic contours of the new norms for masculinity and 
femininity are delimited within an imperative heterosexual desire, prescribing the 
oppositional but complementary roles for Chinese men and women. As we can see in the 
program of IF, within the alluded possibility of a hetero-patriarchal family, through the 
signifying mechanisms of inter-referencing and crisscrossing, the entrepreneurialized 
manhood and the womanhood that straddles the tension between a housewife and a 
market subject reinforce each other as the normative subjects for the neoliberal social 
relationship. Enclosed by the hetero-patriarchal imperative, this co-constituting process 
of signification precludes other gender articulations of mass media to dampen the threat 
and challenge to this bourgeois hetero-patriarchal ideal, such as gender-crossing 
performances embodied by the popular icons, Li Yuchun and Liu Zhu,69 and the athletic, 
hyper-masculine national hero Liu Xiang (Zhang, 2013). These gendered, classed and 
                                                            
69 Li Yuchun, the champion of Super Girl’s Voice (SGV, a reality TV contest show by 
Hunan Star TV) and cover image of Time Asia (2005, October 3), was probably the most 
sensational Chinese figure in 2005. With her transgressive embodiment of masculinity, 
she not only blurred the compulsory-heterosexuality-premised boundaries of gender, but 
also challenged the dominance of manhood by men. Liu Zhu, a controversial contestant 
in Happy Boy’s Voice, the “boy” version of SGV, could have turned into the reversed 
version of Li Yuchun for his dazzling feminine beauty and performance without his 
forced drop-out of the show ordered by the state.  
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racialized discourses provide concrete parameters to police the boundary of the bourgeois 
nucleus family as the ultimate anchor of the market-driven neoliberal society. As we have 
seen in chapter two, gender is mobilized as a normalizing technology to mask the 
restored class inequalities and rejuvenate the splintered Chinese nation-state. In this 
chapter, with the example of IF, we have seen that gender provides both normalizing and 
disciplinary techniques to legitimize the class inequalities, and intersects with class to 
reproduce the neoliberal subjectivities. These classed and gendered subjects are unified 
by the heteronormative presumption into the ideal of the middle class hetero-patriarchal 
family as the basic unit of neoliberal China. Just as I have argued in chapter two, the 
shifting contours of the hetero-patriarchal family along the lines of gender and class 
provide the key anchor for China’s transition from Socialism to neoliberalism. We should 
also note that, in this process, transitionality has become an increasing aspect in the 
globally reintegrated China. If we all agree upon the feminist claim that identity 
categories co-constitute and shape each other, we should also keep in mind that some 
categories, such as race, might not be a salient biopolitical category in China, but is 
definitely the crucial component of social control and regulation in the Western societies. 
In the global era that has seen increasing transnational travel and exchange of cultural 
values, the category with the Western origin, such as race, is also accruing its global 
impact. In the next part, I will further problematize as a transnational cultural spectacle, 
how IF is also undergirded by race as another biopolitical technology.  
Troubling the Racialized Transnational Imagery of Chineseness  
          As China is expanding its economic prowess to act as the new growth locomotive, 
the party-state also tries to defy the U.S. hegemony in cultural spheres. In 2007, as the 
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report of the 17th CPC National Congress pronounced, the revitalization of “soft power” 
should match up with China’s economic vibrancy. As part of this strategic initiative, 
Xinhua News Agency took over one of the most prominent billboards on New York’s 
illustrious Times Square and launched a new round of propagation of China’s “new 
perspective” in 2011. 
          Though the bold propagating endeavors (such as Xinhua) reap hostile responses 
from the Western societies,70 the more covert strategy of “indoctriment” proves effective, 
at least among overseas Chinese. IF is a good example. Thanks to the digital 
communication technologies that have bridged the spatio-temporal gap, overseas viewers 
could now keep in line with the show’s most recent plots like their domestic counterparts. 
It is not uncommon to see that the discussions of IF dominate the hot topics of portal 
websites for overseas Chinese, such as www.huaren.us and www.mitbbs.com. To further 
boost its transnational influence, Jiangsu Star TV aired several episodes especially 
designed for Chinese diasporic love pursuers from the U.S., Canada, Australia, the U.K, 
France as well as South Korea. This programmatic agenda well reflects what Hong Liu 
(2005) calls the new demographic pattern of Chinese diaspora since China’s opening up. 
After halted for over 30 years, emigration from mainland China has witnessed a dazzling 
resurge since 1980. As for their distribution, the great majority of new immigrants go to 
North America, Australia, Europe, Japan, and Singapore, which is different from the old 
generations concentrated in Southeast Asia (Liu, 2005).  
                                                            
70 Haberman, C. (2012, January 10). Questioning a “new perspective” in Times Square. 
The New York Times. Retrieved from 
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/10/questioning-a-new-perspective-in-times-
square/ 
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          This new immigrant pattern is also part of the disarticulating and rearticulating 
initiatives of world populations under the aegis of neoliberalism. Since the 1960s, major 
industrialized countries that had turned their back on Asian immigrants have significantly 
liberalized their immigration policies. Starting with Canada in 1962, then the United 
States in 1965, Australia in 1973 and finally New Zealand in 1978, the restrictive 
immigration policies were abolished to allow the entry of new Asian immigrants (Stalker, 
2000). The prevalence of neoliberalism since the late 1970s further accelerated the 
transnational reshuffling of populations. For instance, according to the statistics released 
by the U.S. government, the number of China-born immigrants soared from 366,500 in 
1980 to 1,808,066 in 2010, an nearly 500 percent growth rate compared to the overall 
growth rate of immigration at 283 percent.71 As the “free market” ideology contends, not 
only flows of capital, but also movement of labor should be ordinated through an 
unencumbered market so as to optimize the allocation of resources (though it often 
proves otherwise in reality). In the case of the U.S., as Ong (2006) suggests, to boost the 
“knowledge economy,” the upper tier of the global division of labor that the U.S. 
prescribes for itself, favorable immigration policies are proffered to attract technological 
professionals, particularly from Asia, to brew and boil the red-hot “new economy.” For 
instance, in contrast to the maximum of twelve months for humanities and social sciences 
majors, talents with degrees in science and technologies would have up to twenty nine 
months to find a job and stay in the U.S. The bipartisan dispute over the green channel 
for “STEM” professionals (science, technology, engineering and mathematics majors) is 
                                                            
71 McCabe, C. (2012, January). Chinese immigrants in the United States. The Migration 
Information Source. Retrieved from 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/USFocus/display.cfm?id=876  
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a recent example of the U.S. government’s differential politico-economic investment in 
human bodies and populations. As a result, according to the 2010 data, immigrants from 
Asia, including India and Greater China (mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau) 
account for 53.9 percent of the high tech labor in the Silicon Valley.72  
          However, IF’s representation has largely distorted the demographics of Chinese 
diasporic communities in the Western societies. The programmatic rule of diversity 
mandated by the state is suspended in a transnational context: in the episodes for overseas 
Chinese, participants are unanimously represented as coming from the upper echelon. 
They are either medical, financial, law or technological professionals, or holding degrees 
from such elite schools as Harvard, Yale and Columbia, or owning a successful business. 
For example, in the first episode for the Chinese in the U.S., seventeen of the twenty four 
female participants have got or are getting a U.S. degree and more than half of them have 
a master’s degree or above. Compared with the women, the backgrounds of the four male 
contestants are no less glamorizing: a young business owner, a Ph.D from Columbia 
University, an employer for a world top 100 corporations and a financial professional 
working for the Wall Street. This concocted and homogenizing representative pattern 
largely misrepresents an otherwise heterogeneous population of Chinese diaspora. As Liu 
(2005) observes, Chinese immigration usually proceeds along four tracks: students-
turned-migrants, emigrating professionals, chain migrant and illegal immigrants, who can 
be further categorized into two types: those with “portable skills” (students-turned-
                                                            
72 Swift, M. (2010, February 13). Blacks, Latinos and women lose ground at Silicon 
Valley tech companies. San Hose Mercury News. Retrieved from 
http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_14383730  
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migrants and professionals) and menial laborers (the majority of chain migrants and 
almost all illegal immigrants). Though tacitly obliterated from the camera, the latter 
accounts for a no small portion of overseas Chinese. According to U.S. official sources, 
approximately 100,000 Chinese entered the country illegally every year in the 1990s. 
Other resources show that around 30,000 to 40,000 illegal immigrants enter the U.S. 
annually and the numbers to Europe are roughly the same (Liu 2005). The data from a 
survey on migrants from Qingtian in Zhejiang province shows that among the 40,000 
legal migrants leaving China between 1979 and 1995, workers and peasants accounted 
for over seventy-five percent. These people could only find jobs through the ethnic 
connections, and are concentrated in low value-added industries, such as restaurants and 
garment factories. In contrast to those with “portable skills,” they can only earn a meager 
wage (Liu 2005). Due to the huge internal economic gap within Chinese diaspora, as the 
statistics shows, the average poverty rate for immigrant families from mainland China is 
higher than imagined— thirteen percent compared to around ten percent for average 
American families (Zhou & Kim 2001). 
          Behind this biased representation of otherwise heterogeneous overseas Chinese (at 
least in economic terms) is the restorative attempt at glorifying the transnational 
formation of class inequalities by Chinese mass media. In IF, this attempt is couched in 
the competition about gender and conjugal politics. Contrary to the “rising water lifts all 
boats” neoliberal rhetoric, and Deng’s slogan that “the rich leads the poor, finally 
realizing the common prosperity,” the rich that has accumulated wealth through political 
power renting and abusive embezzlement now turn their back against Chinese people. 
According to The Report about Chinese Transnational Immigration, more than seventy 
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percent of the wealthy group with financial possessions over ten million Yuan (around 
1.7 million dollars) have already emigrated to other (mostly developed) countries or 
considering it.73 As Zhao writes, 
Many members of the Chinese political and business elite, meanwhile, 
have responded to state attempts to curb their excesses (through 
anticorruption campaigns, for example) by voting with their feet—
obtaining foreign passports and sending their wealth and families 
abroad...Transnationality has thus become an increasingly important 
aspect of class reconstitution in a globally reintegrated China, where the 
most important divisions are ‘not those of East or West, or Chinese and 
foreign, but new divisions along lines of generation, class, and region, 
with different access to power, wealth and knowledge, and different 
relationships to the forces of globalization (2008, p. 167).   
          Through its representation of gender politics and relationship, IF seeks to 
normalize this transnational formation of Chinese elites by embracing them as 
hotly pursued and highly coveted in the arena for love. Compared with other male 
contestants, the success rate of overseas Chinese is remarkably higher. On top of 
that, in general male contestants with an overseas background have got much 
more votes than their domestic counterparts. This selective representation also 
substantially enhances the charisma of overseas Chinese males by homogenizing 
                                                            
73 The People’s Web. (2013, January 24). Zi chan guo yi fu ren 27% yi yi min jin san nian 
chao 170 yi liu xiang guo wai (27 % of China’s billionaires already migrated with the 
flight of over 17 billion Yuan to foreign countries in recent three years). Retrieved from 
http://house.people.com.cn/n/2013/0124/c164331-20311381.html 
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them as well-educated and high-paid. For instance, two male contestants with a 
degree from Harvard soon become the center of Chinese media attention after 
their appearance in the show, and generated lots of discussions online and offline 
about their legendary stories, special talents and skills, and of course, supreme 
attractiveness to Chinese young women.  
          The flip side of the rosy picture of the transnational (middle) class 
formation is “the export of Chinese workers as ‘indentured labor abroad’ by 
government bureaucracies and the flight of tens of thousands of Chinese farmers 
to the West through dangerous international human trafficking networks and their 
enslavement in the sweatshops in New York, Los Angeles, and other global cities” 
(Zhao 2008, p. 167). As Tastsoglou and Alexandra note, globally male workers 
“constitute a higher proportion of migrants to ‘developing countries’ whereas 
women comprise a majority of migrants to many ‘developed’ countries” (2006, p. 
5). My findings through the interviews with Chinese workers largely support this 
argument. As I would discuss in the next chapter, Chinese male workers are often 
drawn by the infrastructure construction jobs in the global South (particularly 
Africa and Middle East), and women are often migrating to developed countries 
(e.g. Japan) to take the labor-intensive jobs despised by natives. Their stories will 
dismantle the glorifying and romanticizing misrepresentation of Chinese diaspora 
in general by IF.  
          The biased signifying economy of IF is embedded in the larger context of Chinese 
media’s restructuring for China’s neoliberal transition and integration with corporate 
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globalization. As Zhao (2003) notes, when China joined the WTO, the mass media 
unanimously embraced it as a cornerstone marking the watershed for China’s 
rejuvenation while remaining fully reticent on the compromises and sacrifice of national 
interests the Chinese government had to cede under the pressure of the U.S. In the three 
episodes about Chinese diaspora in the U.S. aired between Oct 9th and Oct 23rd, 2011, the 
show evaded the surging Occupy Wall Street Movement mounted during the same time. 
While endorsing the success stories of a small portion of Chinese Americans, the show 
turns a deaf ear to the uproar from the subaltern groups in the U.S. who are suffering 
from neoliberal adjustment and the concomitant widening social gap. Most ironically, 
one episode celebrated Yang Kai, a young professional working for the Wall Street, as a 
highly desirable and so to speak, competitive subject in the bazaar of love,74 while the 
national and transnational social movement was centralizing its barrage against the 
ruthless and avaricious financial capital that had capitalized on the global economy as its 
casino. The Chinese party-state is no doubt a winner in this game—it has successfully 
subjected a large swathe of its citizenries to the domestic and transnational capital to 
accrue its economic prowess, with which it turns the U.S., its most daunting rival in the 
global competition into a huge debtor-matrix as bargain for more shares of the globalized 
dividends of capital. 
          This representation of Chinese immigrants by IF needs to be further unpacked 
through the lens of race as another biopolitical vector of neoliberalism.  In the U.S., the 
                                                            
74 Though Yang did not find a date in his first participation, he was invited again by IF 
(which per se is a recognition of his popularity) and successfully took away a pretty 
woman.  
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alterable cultural contours of race, gender and class provide a convenient repository to 
reproduce new normalizing technologies to legitimize its neoliberal practices. For 
instance, the racial myth of “Model Minority” is constructed through the disarticulation 
and rearticulation of the gender and class facades. As Mari Matsuda (1996) indicates, the 
success of certain affluent Asian professionals is racialized as an essential feature of the 
whole group’s assimilation into whiteness, concealing the reality that neoliberal 
restructuring is unequally impacting blacks and Latinos. In Asia, the colonialist legacy of 
pan-Asianism has been appropriated to normalize neoliberal restructuring as well. For 
instance, former Singapore Premier, Lee Kuan Yew terms Singapore’s state-controlled 
neoliberal governance as a “Pan-Asian Humanitarian Model.” As this discourse posits, 
“Asians…value the ability to study hard and work hard to achieve a high level of saving 
and investment. They respect family ties, demonstrate a strong sense of discipline, and 
have a tendency to obey wise, strong leaders” (Oakley, 2002, p. 40). As Lee states, these 
“Asian” values are rooted in a Confucian tradition that has “demanded certain values, 
such as hard work, thrift, discipline, loyalty, obedience, and social coherence” (Li 1997, 
259). Circulating across the Pacific Rim, the racialized discourses about Asians’ success 
stories reinforce each other to consolidate the racial norm to perpetuate the neoliberal 
dominance. For example, Confucian values of Asian are now depicted as “the most 
recent incarnation of neoliberal enterprise values” in the United States (Ong, 2003, p. 14).  
          The selective and biased framing of new Chinese immigrants by IF not simply 
reproduces the racialized U.S. discourse of Asian as “Model Minority,” but also 
reinforces the racial hierarchy as a venue of neoliberal biopolitics. As Ong (1999) 
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suggests, new Chinese (mostly male) immigrants with good education and social 
networks could frequently travel across the Pacific Rim in pursuit of the opportunities 
opened up by the cruising capital, and turn these opportunities into tangible wealth and 
new capital. For instance, many Hong Kongese and Singaporean could draw upon their 
bi-cultural capacities (inherited from their colonial history) to act as “financial brokers” 
for transnational capital to locate, regulate and communicate with human resources in 
China (Pereira, 2004; Sum, 2002). As the racialized discourse of “Model Minority” 
suggests, these groups of new Asian immigrants could be promoted into the club of 
“whiteness” for their economic success. Antithetical to this story is the exacerbating 
living conditions of African Americans and Hispanics in the U.S. They are particularly 
hurt by the globalized economy as lots of low-paying and labor-intensive jobs are 
outsourced to Asia. The data shows that the median family income for whites outgrew 
that of blacks and Hispanics between 1975 and 2010, rising from 39,463 to 54,620 
dollars, in contrast with 23,691 to 32,068 for blacks and 28,350 to 37,759 for Hispanics.75 
The economic recession has also unequally impacted African Americans and Hispanics. 
As the statistics by Pew Research Center indicates, “from 2005 to 2009, inflation-
adjusted median wealth fell by sixty six percent among Hispanic households and fifty 
three percent among African American households, compared with just sixteen percent 
among white households.”76 This widening racialized economic inequality rooted in 
                                                            
75 Infoplease. (n. d.). Distribution of household income by race. Retrieved from 
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0104552.html 
76 Kochhar, R., Fry, R., & Taylor, P. (2011, July 26). Wealth gaps rise to record highs 
between whites, blacks, Hispanics. Pew Research Center. Retrieved 
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neoliberal restructuring is legitimized in tautological racial terms—African Americans 
and Hispanics are undeserving market subjects, not because of their skin color, but their 
“inferior” culture (Bonilla-Silva, 2010). The culture-based color blind racism is further 
corroborated by the success story of Asian as “Model Minority,” who are depicted as 
“having transcending the color for their superior culture.” The program of IF reinforces 
this racial hierarchy as it has invited a number of whites for participation so Chinese 
could now compete with (and even defeat) Caucasians in the arena for love. Meanwhile, 
other racial groups are even not allowed to join the game—almost no blacks or Hispanics 
have ever attended the show.   
          The ethno-racialized construction of Chinese diaspora is also important for the 
party-state as it well serves the state’s ethnicized policy of attracting foreign direct 
investment (FDI). As Harvey (2005) notes, China’s economic transition is different from 
other booming Asian economies (e.g. South Korea and Taiwan) in that it heavily relies on 
transitional capital. The ethnic network plays an important role here. As Ong (1999) 
indicates, the global economy is highly ethnicized, not only through the ethnic networks 
of labor trafficking, but also manifest in the avenues of capital flight built on the ethno-
racial relationship. The Chinese state is highly aware of this, and has been tempering with 
the ethno-racial connection as part of its opening up policies. As David Kang shows, in 
the last decade, approximately sixty percent of China’s FDI was brought in by the 
ethnic/diaspora Chinese, whose companies in the mainland account for about seventy 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
fromhttp://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/07/26/wealth-gaps-rise-to-record-highs-
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percent of the country’s foreign enterprises (2007, p. 6). Furthermore, the government is 
conscious of the important role of Chinese overseas in bridging the Chinese economy 
with the global network of capital. Many overseas students “are not only serving China 
from abroad or by returning, but after they return they play a leading role in many aspects 
of China’s ‘going out’ strategy. These returnee entrepreneurs present many advantages to 
the Chinese economy” (Wang, Zweig, & Lin 2011, p. 414). Different from the U.S. racial 
hegemony that constitutes Asian as “assimilable” for their superior-culture-based 
economic success, the Chinese state seeks to recnstruct overseas nationalism by 
reiterating the ethno-racial tie between Chinese diaspora and the homeland well-
preserved by the superior Confucian morality and ethics. This ethno-racial connection is 
often invoked by the state to attract investment from overseas Chinese. Furthermore, as 
many politicians have realized, an essential part of global economic competition is the 
contending over the biopolitical values of populations and human bodies,77 this ethno-
racial signifying economy is also mobilized by the Chinese state to garner the bountiful 
brain resources among overseas Chinese. As we can see, in the episodes for Chinese 
diaspora, the scenarios have been routinized in which overseas Chinese elites proclaim 
their allegiance to the motherland and determination to serve the country (be it in other 
countries or as a returnee), which is often summoned up by the unseverable ethno-racial 
relationship.  
                                                            
77 For instance, the recent legislating attempt to reform the U.S. immigration policies is a 
good example, which seeks to retain the international students in STEM to guarantee the 
U.S. dominance in the knowledge economy.  
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          As we have seen, the ethno-racial identity has been an important technology to 
reinforce China’s transnational competitiveness. However, the gendered, classed, 
heterosexualized and racialized biopolitical valuation of overseas Chinese elites is built 
on the biopolitical devaluation of domestic subaltern groups. Like the former, IF has 
produced and aired three episodes for domestic migrant workers, a particular group that 
has been disarticulated from the Chinese population by the gendered, classed and 
(hetero)sexualized biopolitics for China’s neoliberal transition as I will discuss in next 
two chapters. On the surface level, this design manifests the program’s “diversity” 
commitment—they are willing to open up their arena for all Chinese people, including 
this highly marginalized group. It might be read as a benevolent initiative to mitigate the 
media discrimination against Chinese working class, just as Dan Schiller (2008) contends, 
the working class and its subjectivity was for a long time a completely neglected topic in 
Chinese media. However, if the separate space for overseas Chinese is justified by their 
“diasporic” and “alien” status, it is problematic that these workers, as fully legal Chinese 
citizens, should be quarantined so as to be able to pursue their own love. Similar to 
China’s neoliberalization, the alienating treatment of the legal citizens was also applied 
by the U.S. in the process of industrialization. In Chicago in the early 20th century, many 
people worried that new working class immigrants would disrupt the heterosexual and 
gender normality, posing threat to the social stability and prosperity (Ferguson 2004). In 
this regard, as Robert Parker (1950) notes, the appropriate paradigm of heterosexual 
reproduction and gender relationship would provide an anchoring point to assimilate 
these groups and stabilize the social order, as many people hoped.  
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          In China’s bustling and hustling modernization, domestic migrant workers also 
need to be cordoned off for the edification of proper sexual and gender code by the 
program of IF. It is necessary to disseminate and indoctrinate the “correct” hetero-
patriarchal values among this “floating population” (Solinger, 1999) as a way to 
assimilate them into the Chinese neoliberal social order. Like the case of Chicago, 
liberalists are concerned that due to their “di su zhi” (low quality) — the popular 
discourse about the low biopolitical values of poor Chinese (Yan, 2003), the working 
class would destabilize the socio-economic equilibrium with their contagious sexual 
deviancy. In this regard, this program has relegated migrant workers to a paradoxical 
position—while they are involved with the hetero-patriarchal imagery, their participation 
is cordoned off in order not to disturb the bourgeois normativity. In other words, within 
the intersectional biopolitical structure, this particular segment of Chinese population 
needs to be rearticulated in the extraction of values for the neoliberal socio-economic 
relation through gender and sexuality, but at the same time, is excluded from the 
bourgeois normativity to control its subversive gender and sexual potentiality. In the next 
two chapters, I will center on the dynamics between the intersectional biopolitical system 
and the lived reality of this group to explore how they are reproduced as the voluntary 
servitude to China’s marketization and re-integration with the global economy on the one 
hand, and how their consciousness of resistance is informed and enhanced by the innate 
contradictions and conflicts of the neoliberal system on the other hand.  
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Chapter Four 
Love-Impelled Chinese Workers  
          On Nov 19, 2012, Guizhou, a province located in reclusive southwest China, 
shocked the whole country with this heartrending news: in the dusty and dirty corner of a 
dustbin, five boys were found dead on a chilly late fall morning. The investigation later 
showed that they were suffocated while making a fire for warmth. Before coming to the 
end of their lives, they were still cuddling with each other for hope and support. Among 
them—Tao Zhongjing, Tao Zhonghong, Tao Zhonglin, Tao Chong and Tao Bo—the 
oldest was thirteen and the youngest only nine.78 From their identical last name, we can 
see they come from the same family. Moreover, these boys share another important 
identity—they were suffering from economic difficulties at rural homes while their 
parents had migrated to cities for jobs and opportunities. As such, in death they 
encapsulate the misery and hardship of millions of “left-behind children” in today’s 
China. According to All-China Women’s Federation, there are approximately 58 million 
“left-behind children” now.79 Different from the tragic life of these boys, other 
unattended children still kept the hope of seeing their parents as it was getting close to the 
Spring Festival, the most important Chinese holiday for familial reunion and joyfulness.  
                                                            
78 Ifeng.com. (n. d.) Guizhou Bijie wu nan hai bei men si zai la ji xiang: Bu rang yi ge hai 
zi zai jie tou piao bo (Five boys suffocated to death in dustbin in Bijie Guizhou: Don’t let 
any children drift in the street). Retrieved from 
http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/gzllntms/  
 
79 Tatlow, D. K. (2012, June 1). China’s “left-behind children.” The New York Times. 
Retrieved from http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/chinas-left-behind-
children/ 
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          During the Spring Festival travel season every year, China keeps renewing the 
record of population migration in human history since its unreserved switch to market 
economy in the early 1990s. In 2006 the number of passengers exceeded China’s 
population, hitting over 2 billion.80 Among these travelers, migrant workers constitute a 
primary category. Attracted by the job opportunities in urban and coastal regions, 
millions of poor farmers leave their home in pursuit of wealth, fortune and change.81 As 
Lin (2011) states, the recent landmark transition of the population from rural to urban 
settlements underwrites China’s social transformation. According to 2010 census figures, 
there are as many as 221 million migrant workers, or 16.5 percent of the population.82 
This massive migration is reminiscent of other industrial revolutions around the world. In 
his study of the American industrial revolution, sociologist Daniel Bell raises a 
provocative question, “who created America’s economic miracle?” As he sees it, people 
who contributed to the economic development of the United States in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries were usually from the poor, less educated and “relatively 
uncivilized” part of the American society (cited in Li, 1997, p. 93). Like Bell, I argue that 
it is the poor migrant workers as a newly crafted segment of Chinese population that 
bolsters the backbone of China as “the world’s factory” and shores up China’s neoliberal 
transition. Meanwhile, having undertaken most of the dirty, dangerous and devalued 
                                                            
80 Clifford. C. (2006, January 28). Two billion journeys in China's own great migration. 
The Independent (Beijing). Retrieved from 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/two-billion-journeys-in-chinas-own-
great-migration-524853.html 
 
81 See the award-winning documentary, Last Train Home.  
 
82 Hays, J. (2012, March). Migrant workers in China. Facts and Details. 
http://factsanddetails.com/china.php?itemid=150 
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work, these workers have the very acute consciousness of how they have been 
manipulated and exploited for the benefits of state/capital, as will be discussed in this and 
next chapter.   
          Rather than a spontaneous movement, this migration, however, is to a large extent 
organized and designed by the state. As Wang Hui writes, “the creation of today’s market 
society was not the result of a sequence of spontaneous events, but rather of state 
interference and violence” (2003, p. 6). By constantly revamping its policies on migration, 
education, insurance, medical care, housing and other livelihood-related issues, the state 
has successfully reproduced and maintained these migrants “as floaters, as impermanent 
outsiders for whom the state was not responsible, in order to serve the state’s own fiscal 
and modernization needs” (Solinger, 1999, p. 225).  
          As a migrating subject, my previous experiences of dislocation and relocation 
across China enable me to easily identify with the sorrow-and-struggle-laden journey 
driven by the market logic of neoliberalism. In chapter one, I have discussed how the 
identity categories of gender, class and sexuality constitute the foundational structure for 
the regulation and management of Chinese people in the service of neoliberal 
restructuring, which I call “the intersectional biopolitics.” Since I am (luckily) assorted to 
a different social location from migrant workers by this structure, I hope to engage with 
the lived reality of how the migrant workers internalize, negotiate with and unsettle the 
biopolitical system to better understand the mechanism of neoliberal governmentality in 
contemporary China. In May, 2012, taking a flight from my hometown in the southwest 
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to Shanghai, I started another “migrating” journey across China in pursuit of clues for my 
question. 
        My final destinations are Hai’an, a small county to the northwest of Shanghai, and 
Wuxi, a metropolitan area about eighty miles west away from Shanghai. Though both 
areas neighbor on Shanghai, divided by the Yangtze River, the gap between them is not 
just geographic, but also has profound socio-economic consequences that have been 
shifting with China’s modernizing trajectory since its forced opening up after the Opium 
War in 1840. As Emily Honig (1992) points out, from the mid-nineteenth century, when 
Shanghai’s development as a commercial and industrial metropolis began, laborers, 
merchants and entrepreneurs from Guangdong, Jiangnan (the southern Yangtze Delta) 
and Subei (northern Jiangsu) flooded into the city. As part of the impoverished Subei area, 
Hai’an has been supplying laborers for Shanghai as it began to emerge as an international 
city since then (Honig, 1992). In contrast, as a core area of “Jiangnan,” the most affluent 
and resource-abundant territory since the mid Tang Dynasty (around 780 B.C.), Wuxi has 
been at China’s frontiers of urbanization and industrialization since the Westernization 
Movement in the 1860s. As the PRC resumed its grandiose marketization, Wuxi is going 
through a process of reconstruction, urbanization and gentrification like many other 
coastal cities. Hai’an and Wuxi thus provide great examples of laborer-sending and 
laborer-receiving areas for my research to investigate how biopolitical dissembling and 
reassembling of Chinese population is employed by the state to recreate a swathe of 
extractable laborers as the voluntary servitude for China’s socio-economic upheavals.  
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          From May 2012 to early August 2012, I visited several factories and family mills 
of apparel, textile and silk in Hai’an and construction fields in Wuxi, attempting to get an 
endoscopic view about how farmer-workers manage their life and work on a daily basis. 
Moreover, living in a local farmer’s family in Hai’an particularly provided me an 
opportunity to observe the peripherized groups’ daily life as an “outsider within.” 
Through formal interviews, casual conversations, group discussions and participant 
observation, I tried to understand how the intersectional biopolitics as the central 
mechanism of neoliberal governmentality helps the party-state disarticulate and 
rearticulate Chinese population to organize the labor market and extract labor values to 
sustain and propel China’s neoliberalization. As I will elaborate next, this process has 
been undergirded by the redefining of the hetero-patriarchal values through the vectors of 
gender, class and sexuality.  
Trussing the Market with the Bourgeois Hetero-Patriarchal Ideal 
          While staying in Hai’an, I found that despite the relatively underdeveloped local 
economy, people have maintained a surprisingly high monetary standard for conjugal 
relationship. Different from the Maoist praxis that values devotion and dedication to 
collective life and destroys the economic logic of family farms and businesses, the private 
nucleus family has been reconstructed as the basic unit of the post-Mao society (Davis & 
Harrell, 1993). As the essential signifier and legislating ritual of one’s transition into this 
fundamental societal sphere, marriage has been invested with the significant meanings 
often accentuated in economic terms. Among its neighbors, Hai’an is the only one that 
fails to reach the top 100 list of the Most Developed Chinese Counties. Accordingly, the 
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average income for working class people there is less than 2,500 Yuan (around 400 
dollars) a month. On this account, I was astonished to hear that it is now the common 
practice that a man should at least own a property (a house in the countryside or a condo 
in the town preferably) if he is looking for a serious date. In the current market, a 100-
square-meter condo (a little more than 1000 square feet) in the town would cost at least 
600,000 Yuan. On top of that, to seal the conjugal deal, he needs to buy “four gold” (gold 
ring, earring, necklace and bracelet) for his future wife and pay extra 120,000 Yuan to her 
parents as betrothal gifts. The premium is much lower for a woman, though. Her family 
could buy a car as the dowry—a voluntary offer as the token of good wishes for their 
daughter and her husband rather than a requirement. Though this practice is not new at 
all, gifts were offered only as exchange of courtesy and gratitude between the two 
families. The materialized evaluation is now routinized as a pre-screening process to 
verify a man’s qualifications for a heterosexual relationship to such an extent that it 
would probably impose a lifelong debt on a working class family. As a woman told me, 
“in the past, young women would send a match-maker to inquire about the material 
conditions of their date. Now they will ask themselves. Do you have a property? Where is 
it located? Do you have a car? What brand is it?”83 Any undesirable answer would 
eliminate the man from further contact. An illustrative paraphrasing of Badiou’s 
transcendental conception of love would help explicate how the otherwise abstract and 
elusive neoliberal market logic has concretized itself through the recasting of the 
mundane life of love, affect and marriage. “Love then moves beyond seduction and, 
through the instrumentalized (serious in the original) mediation of marriage, becomes a 
                                                            
83 An interview conducted in Hai’an, on May 30th, 2012.  
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way to accede to exchangeable market values (the super-human in the original)” (2003, p. 
14-15). In other words, through the social institution of marriage, love has been 
reconstituted as a site to reproduce and perpetuate the market exchange rule.  
          This consumption-grounded gauge of hetero-patriarchal relationship provides a 
powerful engine for the market economy. While China resumed its transition to market 
economy in the 1990s, land, “whose monetary value had been neglected since 1949, 
suddenly assumes a very important role in the overall Chinese economy” (Li, 1997, p. 3). 
As Harvey (2003) states, the thrusting of land as public resources into the market and 
private sphere underscores what he calls “accumulation by dispossession,” which 
essentially characterizes China’s neoliberal transition. Building on the Socialist legacy of 
the collective value, the Chinese government reasserts its monopoly over the land, but at 
the same time sells its use right to developing corporations and citizens for a limited 
period (usually 50-70 years)—an awkward marriage between state ownership and 
commercialized use rights. Thereafter housing was chosen as a new growth pole of the 
economy (Wu, 2002), having propelled the economic development for more than a 
decade. In 2011, real estate investment accounted for thirteen percent of China’s GDP, 
and the sector also feeds steel, concrete and dozens of other industries.84 With a 
nationwide fetish of buying and selling properties, a huge bubble has been created, which 
                                                            
84 Yang, J. L. (2012, October 2). As China’s economy slows, real estate bubble looms. 
The Washington Post. Retrieved from http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-
02/business/35500560_1_home-prices-real-estate-chinese-home-buyers 
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slightly deflated in 2011 but restarted to inflate in 2012.85 In contemporary China, 
owning and exhibiting a nicely furnished private home essentially signifies the 
(normative) middle class identity (Zhang, 2008). The cultural investment in properties is 
further translated into rigid and stable demand that saves the bubble from busting by 
titillating Chinese bachelors’ yearnings for gender and sexual normativity. Sometimes 
this agitation is pressured by their future wife, but more often than not is imposed by the 
social norm of the hetero-patriarchal value usually incarnated through the bride’s grim 
parents. One day, when a young female apparel worker at her early twenties told me that 
she did not care if her boyfriend had an apartment in the town or not as long as he truly 
loved her, her older co-worker interrupted her, “your parents would not think so, 
though.”86 Most of the older interviewees would agree with this jaded but realistic 
woman. Though many of them strongly denounce the materialistic conception of 
marriage, when it comes to their own daughter, their attitude is softened—they hope that 
their daughter could marry a rich man so she won’t suffer from economic difficulties (as 
they did). As this example shows, the impetus for capital to reproduce itself in an 
overloaded market is legitimated and realized by the paternalistic concern over the 
younger generation’s well-being in the heterosexual gender relationship. As the popular 
discourse indicates, China’s housing market has been supported by a “mother-in-law 
economy.” As a scholar points out, pressured by their “would-be” mother-in-law, 
Chinese bachelors are contributing to the growth of GDP by two percent through the 
                                                            
85 Rapoza, K. (2012 December 18). Chinese expect their housing bubble to continue. 
Forbes. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2012/12/18/chinese-
expect-their-housing-bubble-to-continue/ 
86 An interview conducted in Hai’an on June 6th, 2012.  
 
 
 
149 
 
purchase of commodities, such as condo, car and jewelry, as the socially sanctioned 
imperatives for the heterosexual conjugal relationship.87    
          The marketized touchstone for the conjugal relationship is imputed by many 
informants to the prevalence and proliferation of TV entertainment programs, such as IF. 
To them, this is a “younger generation thing.” As they recalled, this discourse emerged 
and became popularized in recent three to four years. “No matter she is pretty or not, a 
girl will require that her future spouse should have a property, a car, and some savings. 
This is a new tendency,” as one woman observed.88 In their opinion, TV that tirelessly 
propagates stories of pretty young women marrying “gao fu shuai” (tall, rich and 
handsome men) has opened the Pandora’s Box. IF in particular was mentioned again and 
again. As an older apparel worker angrily claimed, “it is like they are doing 
transactions!”89 The bourgeois value of the hetero-patriarchal family coded in gender and 
sexual relationship by IF has obviously irritated older workers who do not fit into this 
norm. This program is especially rejected by the male subjects. As many women 
confessed, their husbands do not like this program, and sometimes even forbid them to 
watch it, because it would “teach them to become bad.” For younger workers, programs 
like IF could interpellate them into the exchange-value-centered market subjectivity 
through the repetitive, identical and well-organized narrative tropes of romantic 
                                                            
87 Enorth.com.cn. (2013, February 23). Zhong guo dan shen han gong xian 2% GDP zeng 
fu (Chinese bachelors contribute to GDP growth by 2 %). Retrieved from  
http://news.enorth.com.cn/system/2013/02/23/010664710.shtml 
88 An interview conducted in Hai’an, on June 10, 2012.  
 
89 An interview conducted in Hai’an, on June 13, 2012.  
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relationship and marriage by mass media as the “culture industry” (Horkheimer & 
Adorno, 2002). A young female worker told me that, after watching IF, a good friend of 
hers started to complain about her boyfriend—“Gosh, my boyfriend is not good. He has 
no money. I want to find someone who could take care of all my needs. If I have one 
more chance, I want to find a rich man so I won’t have to worry about my life 
anymore.”90   
          The property-centered protocol of heterosexual relationship beckons male workers 
into the endless cycle of capital reproduction through an alluring invitation to join the 
bandwagon of a middle class nucleus family dream. For most working class bachelors 
that I interviewed, it is their biggest dream to make enough money to establish and 
provide for their own family. Buying a property premises this dream. For the married 
ones, upgrading their dingy and crowded cottage into a cozy and modernist home for 
their wife and children is their unswerving responsibility, incentivizing them into ever 
harder work. During America’s industrial revolution, the private property was normalized 
as the premise of citizenship for the emerging (white) American working class, 
effectively bounding them with the fast running gear of machines through an entitlement 
for political and civic participation (Glenn, 2002). In China’s neoliberal transition, the 
privatized notion of property works through gender and sexuality to make and remake 
workers for the feeding of the growing appetite of capital. To the contrary of these 
workers’ dream, the paycheck accrued by their sacrificed health and spiritual well-being 
can by no means match the skyrocketing housing price. In Wuxi, a construction worker 
                                                            
90 A focus group conducted in Hai’an, on June 20th, 2012.  
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could make around 100 Yuan a day in 2007 and 160 in 2012, a not-bad-at-all increase 
rate. During the same period, the average urban housing price in China, however, soared 
from 3445 to 5791 Yuan at a rate of sixty eight percent.91 The increase of labor value 
should not outpace the reproduction of capital—otherwise there would be “a crisis of 
capital.” In this regard, the booming housing industry and the swelling bubble of real 
estate have obliterated the prospect of their property-founded hetero-patriarchal dream. 
As cogs wedged into the fully running machine of capital, their menial work is not geared 
towards breaking down this deadlock of capital-labor race, but rather pushes it to a higher 
level and perpetuates their docility as its willing servitude via a gentrified hetero-
patriarchal mirage. For many poor workers uprooted from their impoverished hometowns, 
such as Anhui and Sichuan, a viable alternative is to buy a bride from less developed 
regions, such as Xinjiang and Yunnan. Ironically, by replicating the transnational mail 
bride order in the Chinese context, the market logic of love and marriage is rejected by 
embracing it.  
          The inter-generational linkage further congeals the bourgeois hetero-patriarchal 
ideal into a nucleus family model to boost the labor market. As Foucault (1990) indicates, 
in the ascending era of European capitalism, by constructing a homosexual other as well 
as constricting the inappropriate heterosexual desire (e.g. children’s sexuality), gender 
relationship is normalized as oppositional but complimentary, through which the nucleus 
family was consolidated to provide and foster more capable bodies for the market. In the 
                                                            
91 Zhao, Y. & Yang, Z. (2013, February 15). Mei ti cheng Beijing fang jia shi nian zhang 
365% Shanghai zhang fu 341% (Media reports show that housing price in Beijing rose by 
365% and 341% in Shanghai in the past ten years). Yangcheng Evening News. Retrieved 
from http://news.qq.com/a/20130225/001713.htm 
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U.S., based on the gendered model of “Self-Made Man” and his dependent wife as well 
as children, the nucleus family was valorized as the basic social unit to stabilize and 
sustain the market economy since the early nineteenth century (Kimmel, 1996). In 
contemporary China, the nucleus family as a disciplinary technology works differently. 
With a centralized role of children, it efficaciously disciplines and energizes the other two 
parties of this private space—parents—into voluntary subjects who are willingly 
sacrificing themselves for the family and children in particular, either working for 
extremely long hours or in super dehumanizing conditions. This conversation between 
me and two women workers would well illustrate this point.92 Wang and Xu were at their 
early thirties, and had been in the industry of apparel and textile for over ten years. 
Different from most of the rural residents in Hai’an, Wang has two children to support. 
As they told me: 
Me: “What is the plan for your future?” 
Wang: “I really don’t have any hope for myself.”  
Zou: “Children are all her hope. Children are her sky.”  
Wang: “Well, as long as my children are good, I will be OK.” 
          These simple words express the hearty feelings of most workers. When I stayed in 
Hai’an, a male construction worker came to talk to me again and again after our first 
conversation. He repeatedly confided with me his long suppressed agony of seeing the 
alienated relationship between him and his son after working for years in cities. During 
                                                            
92 An interview conducted in Hai’an, on June 15th, 2012.  
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his 25-year experience as a migrant worker, it had been hard for him to find a listener as 
patient as me. Most of his co-workers had similar problems and it became too 
traumatizing to talk about these experiences with each other. As the masculine 
breadwinner for the family, these men’s gendered role requires that they should save tears, 
sweat and sometimes blood all to themselves.  
          For poor rural people hoping for social mobility, leaving home for prosperous 
urban and coastal areas, or foreign countries, is an important way to change their life. In 
so doing, men hope to increase their economic capital to be qualified for a middle class 
nucleus family, and women want to enhance their marketable values to shoot for a better 
man. As I have discussed in chapter two and three, the redefining of the hetero-
patriarchal family through the intersection of gender, class and sexuality anchors China’s 
transition from Socialism to neoliberalism. In the next parts, I would illustrate how the 
intersection of multiple categories helps restructure Chinese population and reproduce a 
new social group for the profit carnival of capital and state, and shores up China’s role of 
“the world’s factory” as well as a “neo” neoliberal juggernaut poised to compete for 
resources, raw materials and opportunities in the global context. This process is pivoted 
on a politics of subjection and subject-making (Ong, 2006), which as I will demonstrate 
next, is enabled and supported through the bourgeois hetero-patriarchal norm. 
Rearticulating Chinese Workers through the Intersectional Biopolitics 
          When China initiated the urban reform in 1984, together with other social policies, 
the party-state revamped and manipulated the Maoist Hukou system to reassemble the 
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class inequalities between urbanities and rural residents, attempting to direct the 
population flow from rural to urban regions required by the new market economy. As a 
result of the favorable policies provided to boost the coastal and urban economy after 
1984, lots of job opportunities popped up there. Meanwhile, the income gap between 
urban and rural residents restarted to yawn. Since Mao’s era, the state has played the 
critical role in (re)creating and maintaining this inequality for the politico-economic 
needs, as what Solinger (1999) calls “domestic colonialism,” which still remarkably 
impacts rural people’s life today. As a construction worker told me, though crop tax has 
been abrogated by Wen’s administration, the expenses of fertilizers, equipment and other 
materials remarkably rise as a result of marketization. “After deducting the expenses of 
fertilizers and labor, you will only make several hundred Yuan per square acre. For my 
family, we can only make a couple of thousand Yuan a year. You know, it is far from 
enough to support my family,” as a construction worker complained.93 From 1984, the 
state started to lift the restriction of migration, allowing farmers to “freely” move to cities 
for the first time since Mao’s implementation of Hukou system in 1958 to satisfy the need 
of the unleashed market force.  
          When the rural/urban and coastal/inland differences further widened with the 
accelerated pace of marketization after 1992, the state began to systematically permit or 
even encourage substantial labor mobility, so a continual supply of laborers could be 
maintained for the surging demand of capital. Therefore, “instead of only being allowed 
to operate in the nearest free-market pocket, individuals have increasingly been able to 
                                                            
93 An interview conducted in Wuxi, on July 15, 2012.  
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move long distances and dramatically change their status and occupation” (Naughton 
1999, 40). As a result of these socio-economic policies, different “pull” and “push” 
factors were created to direct the flow of laborers through the deliberate drawing and 
redrawing of scopes of actions, as what Foucault calls “governance” (2011). For instance, 
such “push” factors as the decrease of farmland as a result of improper use, the inflated 
living expenses, the effect of agricultural modernization, and the household contract 
responsibility system adopted in 1978, as well as “pull” factors that included the 
widening income disparity, the increased demand of construction projects and the non-
state sectors in urban areas highly delimited the scope of possible choices for the “freed” 
migrant workers. When I asked the construction workers why they left their home to 
work in cities, they unanimously responded that they did not have many choices because 
there were no jobs in their hometown, and they needed to support their family. On this 
account, by granting the “freedom” of moving to these workers, the state also slots them 
into a restricted recipe of possible actions under the directive of the oscillating needs of 
market.   
          By retaining and even strengthening discriminative policies against rural migrants 
through Hukou system while allowing them to stay in cities, the state further undermines 
the negotiating capacities of migrant workers and places them in the brutal complicit 
control by Communist bureaucrats and capital. Many construction workers complained to 
me that in cities they have no access to state-sponsored medical care allocated through 
Hukou system. When they get sick, they could only “hold it.” As a worker lamented, 
because their job prospect is highly unstable (in terms of time, location and income), 
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employers refuse to buy endowment insurance for them, leaving them particularly 
insecure and vulnerable. Unlike their urban counterparts, as rural residents, they are not 
entitled to pension, either. The anxiety and worry over their future life have turned many 
workers into self-responsible “money-making machines.” In order to save enough money 
as their own “pension,” several workers once tried to work for eighteen hours a day (from 
3:30 am to 11:30 pm). If they had not quit it, this intense amount of work could have 
claimed their life, as they said. The elongated working hours could also turn into lifelong 
toiling. In the construction fields that I visited, it is not rare to see workers over sixty still 
undertaking dangerous work such as building scaffold and wood frame at a daunting 
height. At the same time, urbanities of the same age are probably enjoying their 
retirement life and playing with their grandchildren.94 These workers’ value is not just 
extracted through the direct enslavement by capital, but also via the state’s totalizing 
power. “Workers are required to pay for the temporary resident permit and the work 
permit in one lump sum” by the government of the receiving place (Chan, 2001, p. 8) and 
are often treated as cash cows by their home government. As a worker from Anhui 
grumbled, because he is working outside, his family needs to pay the local government 
“security fees.” Despite their legal citizenship, through an array of policies, the migrant 
workers are actually deprived of legal protection and turned into what Agamben calls 
“bare life” (2000) as the highly exploitable and vulnerable subjects for the benefits of 
state/capital.  
                                                            
94 In China, the legal retirement age for male workers is fifty five and female workers 
fifty.  
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          Among other factors, Hukou-based education opportunities especially constrain the 
choices of rural residents, pre-embarking many of them on a trajectory for migration in 
the foreseeable future. Since the mid-1990s, the privatization and streamlining of 
education mandated by neoliberal restructuring has unequally impacted rural schools, not 
only shutting down a large number of them, but also reducing their educational quality by 
withdrawing investment (Goldman & Macfarquhar, 1999; Whyte, 2010). As a result, the 
percentage of rural students in key universities keeps dropping. During 1978-1998, about 
thirty percent of students at Peiking University, China’s leading higher education 
institution, were from the rural area. In 2010, this figure decreased to ten. The case is 
similar for Tsinghua University, another leading school in China.95 In our conversations, 
many workers expressed their regret that they had not studied hard enough at school, so 
they had to swallow the bitter fruit of which they sowed the seed. This self-blaming 
narrative echoes with the neoliberal ideology that individuals should be accountable for 
their own life rather than questioning the systemic injustice and inequalities. In this case, 
having internalized the neoliberal “bootstrap” logic, they do not see how class as a 
biopolitical category has been mobilized and manipulated by the state to narrow down 
their prospect of social mobility, and largely pre-determine their current ordeal. As part 
of China’s neoliberal restructuring, education is now opened to both rural and urban 
residents through the market—ironically, by Hukou again. In Hai’an, if a rural family can 
                                                            
95 Pan, X. (2011, August 5). Nei di nong cun xue sheng nan ru ming xiao bei da xue 
sheng zhan bi cong san cheng die zhi yi cheng (It is gettering harder for rural students to 
go to key universities in mainland China and their percentage of Peiking University 
students drops from 30% to 10%). Retrieved from 
http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/detail_2011_08/05/8201640_0.shtml 
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buy a property in the town, they would acquire an urban Hukou, so their children can go 
to public primary and junior high schools there.  
          The disciplinary power anchored in state-imposed-and-organized class identity 
further reshapes the body of migrant workers, perpetuating their secondary citizenship 
and legislating their exploitation by the state-capital complicity through the corporealized 
stigma. Not surprisingly, all of my informants share experiences of being discriminated 
against in cities, in particular if they don’t conform to the urban dressing code. Because 
of their rustic clothing, they are often derided by urbanities, asked to pay extra fees while 
taking a bus, and sometimes not allowed to enter a department store. Moreover, as their 
body has been reconfigured and inscribed with derogatory symbols through the daily 
toiling, more often than not, the well-groomed appearance and dressing cannot remove 
the etched mark on their body, just as a conversation between me and a woodworker 
shows.96 In my third visit of one workers’ temporary dwelling in Wuxi, I found that a 
worker did not go to work because he had vomited several times that day. Called “Lao 
Wei” by his co-workers, this man left his home in Anhui a few months ago to look for 
jobs in Wuxi. After running a street vending business with his wife for several years, Lao 
Wei became a construction worker. Mostly, he would take jobs that were to his home, but 
recently his hometown, Chaohu had been merged into another bigger city in Anhui and 
many jobs were thus suspended. When I asked how he felt as an alien in the urban space 
of Wuxi, and whether the local people could tell his working class identity, he told me: 
                                                            
96 An interview conducted in Wuxi, July 12, 2012.  
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Wei: “Definitely, especially for woodworker and bricklayer. They 
particularly despise us. For those working in the factories, it is not as this 
bad.”  
Me: “Is it because you have to work in the sunshine all day?” 
Wei: “Yes. They can tell that we are woodworker and bricklayer at the 
first sight.”  
Me: “At the first sight？ 
Wei: “Dark! You are too dark! When you get off work and go to the street 
together with clean clothes…” 
Me: “Even clean clothes won’t work for you?” 
Wei: “When we go to the street, they can immediately tell our 
(construction workers’) identity from the way we talk and behave.” 
Me: “No matter how nicely you dress yourself?” 
Wei: “It won’t work that way. We are so dark, and they would look at us 
very differently. When we want to buy some clothes in the department 
store, the shop assistants just despise us, particularly if the clothes are 
expensive. If we ask about the price, they often ignore us.”  
Me: “Ignore you?” 
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Wei: “They told us, you migrant workers could never afford them, so why 
bother to ask?”  
          In this example, we can see that the market’s freedom and equality are suspended 
when encountering the class boundary. Far from a domain of free and equal exchange, 
market is in actuality fragmented and segregated through identities such as class, gender 
and race (Somers, 2008). With the imposition by the state, class as a biopolitical vector is 
employed and manipulated to thrust those labeled as such into the predatory “invisible 
hand.” As the value is extracted from their body, a stigmatizing symbol is simultaneously 
corporealized as the perpetual stamp of inferiority, denial, margin and malignity, further 
legitimizing and reinforcing their enslavement by capital and the state. A segment of 
secondary citizens as what Solinger (1995) calls “floating population” is thus 
disarticulated from Chinese population via this tautology of identity-ordinated market 
logic, who have been both included in and excluded from China’s marketizing process. 
As Whyte (2010) notes, this manipulative treatment of China’s floating population for the 
politico-economic purposes through the state-sanctioned violence share striking parallels 
with illegal immigrants in the United States and the former apartheid system in South 
Africa.  
          Similar to Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s conception of race (2007), class is also 
the state-sanctioned and/or extralegal production and exploitation of group-
differentiated vulnerability to premature death for the welfare of the market. In 
different modes of value extraction, capital predetermines the differential 
embodiment of workers’ “bare body”: most construction workers have developed 
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“professional” health problems with their waist, lung and stomach for the long-
lasting heavy and dirty work; many apparel workers are struggling with neck, 
shoulder and waist pain as they have to sit beside the sewing machine all day long; 
silk workers’ listening is often damaged by the thundering noise from the machine. 
As a woman joked, when she went to see the doctor for her neck problem, he 
immediately found out her apparel worker identity.97 Without performing any 
exams or checking, the doctor already knew what the problem was and how to 
treat it on the basis of his past (and rich) experience (of dealing with apparel 
workers). Also based on the past experience, a construction worker told me that, 
their job would reduce their life expectancy by at least five years. Thus as Jasbir 
Puar (2007) suggests, neoliberal governmentality not only relies on biopolitics to 
organize who to live and how to live, but also tempers with necropolitics to 
mandate who to die and when to die for the market.  
         Besides class, gender is another biopolitical category for the state to cast and recast 
Chinese working class with the pulsation of the market. In 1978, with China’s economic 
reform, the “one child policy” was designated to “enhance the population quality” as part 
of China’s modernizing initiative. As a result, eugenics was written into China’s 
Constitution in 1980 as a fundamental national policy, attempting to control and regulate 
women’s body in accordance with the state’s politico-economic agenda. The draconian 
birth control policies, thereafter, successfully transformed the overflowing population 
from the burden into a bountiful reservoir of labor resources to ground China’s ambitious 
                                                            
97 An interview conducted in Hai’an, on June 5, 2012.  
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plan to become “the world’s factory.” As Naughton (1999) contends, this resource 
constitutes China’s core competitiveness in the restructured global division of labor, as 
the party-state consciously repositions itself to the lower niche of the industrial hierarchy. 
As he writes: 
There are few elderly—since life expectancies were low until recently—
but also few children—because of strict limits on births. As a result, the 
share of the population in the young adult age bracket is quite high. 
China’s population is usually adaptable, active, and resilient, because it is 
so young yet lacking a huge population of dependent children…The 
median age of the Chinese work force is now only thirty-two (it will 
increase steadily to forty in 2025). That means it is well positioned to cope 
with the dramatic social and economic changes occurring all around (1999, 
p. 43). 
          At the core of China’s neoliberal restructuring, welfare provision has been stripped 
from the state side by side with the restored market-oriented family farming system. 
Meanwhile, because of the sediment of patrilocal marriage system, which had never been 
truly destabilized by Mao’s gender egalitarianism policy, the birth control policy gave 
massive rise to infanticide of female babies across China (Honig & Hershatter, 1988; 
Perry & Selden, 2000; Zhan & Montgomery, 2003), at least in its early years of 
implementation. Ideally, the responsibility of nursing and supporting old people by the 
state (as the Maoist state discourse and Deng’s earlier propaganda so claimed) should be 
transferred back to the family as the basic social unit. In practice, this responsibility was 
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usually placed on the shoulder of men as the head of the family, reproducing a socio-
economic ground to increase men’s values. This value was further accrued through men’s 
comparative physical advantages in the restored family farming system, rendering 
women undesirable and negligible by both the state and family.  
          In the new market system, the undesirability and undervaluation of women 
translate into a sexually hierarchized stratum of labor value. According to the data of 
China Labor Bulletin, among over one million online job ads, around ten percent 
explicitly demonstrate a gendered interest for men, and for lower-end jobs, sexism 
against women is even worse—this number rises to twenty three percent.98 After 1992, 
while the opening up of Pudong area in Shanghai marked China’s full embracing of 
market economy, the city started to shed the labor-intensive and “sunset” manufacturing 
industries such as textiles and apparels—its former growth pole—to adjacent areas (Chen, 
2009). In Hai’an, the small county with a population slightly less than one million, there 
are over 1,000 apparel, or textile medium-size factories (with at least fifteen workers). 
Most of their products will be sold to developed countries, such as Japan, the United 
States and Europe. In this multi-tiered industrial transference (from industrialized 
countries to metropolis in developing countries such as Shanghai, and then to 
underdeveloped rural areas), women in the Third World are unsurprisingly always placed 
at the very bottom of the global biopolitical structure of labor valuation. Of the fifty six 
apparel workers that I interviewed, only four are men. In this highly feminized domain, 
sexual hierarchy is further entrenched through the unequal division and pay of labor: the 
                                                            
98 China Labor Bulletin. (n. d.). Employment discrimination in China. Retrieved from 
http://www.clb.org.hk/en/view-resource-centre-content/110167#gender 
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higher rank, the more likely that the person would be a man with a better wage. 
Surprisingly, most women workers seemed to be fine with this issue. When I tried to hint 
at the topic of sexual segregation of labor, a number of them drew upon the naturalized 
conception of gender to justify it. As they claimed, lower paid floor work in an export-
processing apparel factory is women’s “natural” job because they are more attentive to 
details than men, and their husbands should undertake higher-paid but coarse work, such 
as construction and decoration, to provide for the family. Some women workers even told 
me that the men working in apparel factories are very “pathetic” because they cannot 
make enough money to support their family by doing this. When I further pressed the 
issue about the sexual division of labor and wage in their factory, they shifted to the 
societal rhetoric of gender difference for support. As they repeated, men usually have 
more education and so to speak, better qualifications for better jobs and pay. This natural-
societal mutual construction of gender difference also effectively disciplines the male 
construction workers into willing subjects. As men, they are supposed to sell their 
“natural” strength in return of better life for their wife and children. As men, they would 
suffer from “masculinity in crisis” if they could not fulfill their gendered responsibility 
for the family. In stark contrast to this gendered polarization of job and pay, not too long 
ago, in Maoist China, men and women were exhorted to equally contribute to the 
construction of a classless society by the discourse of gender equality.  
          As China’s economic reform has been initiated and accelerated, in multiple sites 
such as science, popular rhetoric, education and intimate relationship, the natural and 
societal discourses are proliferated as the inter-referential tropes to reconstruct and 
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reinforce the gender difference to sustain the diversified market needs. As early as in 
primary schools, young women are told that they should pursue subjects that are “fit” for 
them because of their scientifically-verified natural difference from men (Honig & 
Hershatter, 1988). When women start to work, they are advised, and sometimes coerced 
to accept the unequal sexual division of labor and wage, and obey their male 
supervisors—any resistance to this rule would vitiate their feminine attractiveness and 
value in the marriage market (Pun, 2005). As we have seen in the earlier example, the 
gendered occupational and economic differences as a result of these “naturalized” 
gendered consultations, exhortations, and coercing leave women in a vulnerable position 
in the socio-economic system, who are often pressured to invoke their “natural” 
difference to seek for support from their husbands.  
          Xiao Wang, an intruder in a men’s domain, scaffold building, is an interesting 
example of the gendered biopolitical disciplinary and normalizing technologies.99 She 
came with her husband to Wuxi several years ago. Like most of the migrants, she had left 
her son with the care by her husband’s parents at home in Guizhou. As the minority in the 
construction industry, though the number of women has been on the rise recently, they 
are usually relegated to a less important and paid position, often as the assistant to their 
husband, called “junior worker” (xiao gong). Different from them, Xiao Wang is one of 
the only two female scaffold builders—a  hardcore field of men. As an alien to this 
highly masculinized domain with an austere requirement of strength, endurance and 
energy, though Xiao Wang does very well in her job (as verified by her supervisor), she 
                                                            
99 An interview conducted in Wuxi, July 6, 2012.  
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is often subject to gender-inflected slurs and backlashes from her male co-workers. 
Oblivious to her excellent performance, they often question her value as a qualified co-
worker because of her female identity—“How can a woman be a scaffold builder? Can’t 
your husband support you? Are you a real woman?” as she told me. Her husband also 
feels that he has lost his face by allowing his wife to do so, even though Xiao Wang can 
make more money and relieve his financial burden with her work. The young couple thus 
often run into quarrel because of the man’s tarnished gender dignity. But Xiao Wang 
never gives in, “I am willing to do this. Don’t belittle us (women). We can do an equally 
good job (as men)!” Though she successfully transcends the sexualized boundary of labor 
division and takes great pride in this achievement with a feminist gesture, she is paid less 
than her co-workers by doing the same job. To my great surprise, she nonetheless 
willingly accepts this unequal treatment, “you know, this is a men’s job after all, so it is 
normal that they pay me less.” By accepting the naturalized conception of gender as the 
legitimate foundation of wage differences, Xiao Wang’s adamant subversion of the 
gendered societal arrangement of labor division is neutralized, and she is subsumed into 
the gendered biopolitical architect in its service of the endless cycle of capital 
reproduction. Just as Pun argues, “[t]he biopower…is not only interested in molding a 
general [proletarian] body but also a particular sexed body, a feminine body to fit the 
factory discipline” (2005, p. 136). In this sense, the remaking of Chinese proletarian is 
undergirded by gender (Yan, 2008).  
          However, as feminists of color keep reminding us, biopolitical categories such as 
class and gender never proceed in a paralleled mode, but intersect with each other for 
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mutual construction and consolidation for social control and subjugation. Though this 
claim is embedded in U.S. history of racial, gender and class domination, if we use it as a 
toolkit to craft contextually contingent analytical instruments than a tool for universal 
solutions, it would help tease out the interwoven relationship between China’s neoliberal 
transition, reconstituted labor market and the shifting contours of class and gender. For 
instance, different from urban residents that have more economic resources and 
educational opportunities, in poor rural families, the education of young women is often 
suspended to support their brothers’ schooling. After quitting schools, young women 
often choose to, and sometimes are even forced by their parents to migrate to urban and 
coastal areas for jobs. It is quite common for them to work in sweatshops of electronics, 
apparels, socks and other consumption items for fourteen to sixteen hours a day. During 
my interviews, I frequently got saddened by some older women workers’ stories: at the 
age of 15 (just finishing junior high school), they had to leave home and move to alien 
metropolises to make a living. Except for a small portion for subsistence, they would 
send the bulk of their income back home to support their families. The intersection of 
Hukou-based class inequality and gender difference has thus generated disparate effects 
on rural men and women, particularly impacting the life track of poor rural women. 
Moreover, the intersection of class and gender also delimits different possibilities of 
action choices for urban and rural women. Compared with urbanities (especially those 
working for the government) who still have access to certain forms of welfare, rural 
residents rely on the filial relationship for support when they grow old. Moreover, the 
reestablished family-based farming system increases the value of labor, particularly male 
laborers in the rural region. Therefore it is OK for urban couples to have only one child 
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(even if it is a daughter), but many rural families would struggle to avoid the forced 
abortion and draconian punishment by the local government, hoping to procreate at least 
one male baby. In this case, many rural women are forced to escape to other areas and 
join the “floating population.”  
          Actually, the biopolitical differentiation of human bodies through the overlapped 
categories underlines the global pattern of labor division and movement as required by 
neoliberal restructuring, and needless to say, China’s socio-economic transition as well. 
As discussed in chapter three, in global cities like Hong Kong and Singapore, native 
middle class housewives are the major target of biopolitical reassembling technologies 
for the industrial upgrading—through proper education and training, these women could 
become management and financial professionals to recreate the two cities as the “hubs” 
for transnational capital after their relative competitive edge of cheap labors was 
exhausted in the mid-1980s. The domestic work shed by the professionalized middle 
class women are then transferred to poor female immigrants from less developed 
neighbors, such as Philippines and Indonesia (Ong, 2006). Similarly, when the Chinese 
state tries to upgrade Shanghai into another hub city in the Asia-Pacific area as the 
interface between transnational capital and raw materials and labor resources in interior 
China, many well-educated urban women are slotted into advanced economic sectors, 
leaving less valued jobs to their biopolitical others—rural migrant women (Sassen, 2009). 
For example, rural women from Anhui account for over eighty percent of domestic 
workers in Shanghai (Yan, 2008). For poor rural migrant women, labor-intensive 
industries such as electronics and apparel making would be another position suiting their 
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biopolitical value in the globalized industrial hierarchy. For instance, in the export-
processing factories in southern China, eighty percent of the workers are rural women 
(Davin, 2004). For male migrant workers, the growing demand of dirty, dangerous and 
heavy construction/decoration work by China’s urbanization would be an “appropriate” 
choice for them.   
          Building on the intersection of gender, class and sexuality, the hetero-patriarchal 
norm is congealed as the central biopolitical norm to control and exploit migrant workers. 
To them, heterosexual marriage is not just the ends of their hard work, but also the means 
through which they could transition from a biological being into a societal being. As a 
bachelor at his early forties recollected, he often falls prey to the ostracizing, 
marginalization and derision by his co-workers because of his poverty-foisted celibacy, 
which has also invited the questioning of his gender and sexual identities.100 This man’s 
misery well reflects the frigid reality of marriage market for poor migrants—the 
compounded effects of the Hukou-based class inequalities and gender ideology highly 
restricts their scope of marriage, and makes “marrying within the group” almost their 
only choice. For male migrants, their working class identity and gendered role of 
breadwinner makes it almost impossible to marry a worldly urban woman. As they said, 
this chance is less than one percent. For migrant women, their rural Hukou as well as 
despised jobs runs counter to the normative discourse of gentrified feminine delicacy and 
fragility, producing a nearly insurmountable barrier for them to “marry outside.” In this 
regard, IF’s much criticized special episodes for migrant workers actually reveal the 
                                                            
100 An interview conducted in Wuxi, on July 8th, 2012.  
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harsh reality for poor workers. The media products also recreate this gendered and 
classed inequality by treating the migrants as the bracketed-off participants who should 
emulate the middle class gender and sexual protocols to become the qualified neoliberal 
subjects.  
          The hetero-patriarchal norm is further intensified into the nucleus familial 
paradigm, in which children become the center to calibrate the life choices for poor 
workers (Connelly, Roberts & Zheng, 2012). For migrant women, having no access to 
state-provided medical and care service, they have to move back home for help when 
getting pregnant. Leaving their children under the care by grandparents, many of them 
then go back to cities for work, but have to move back home again when their children 
grow up to six years old, an age for school. As they are concerned, their aged parents will 
not be capable enough to educate and culture their children. But when I asked them why 
they did not take their children with them to cities, they told me that the urban public 
education resources are restricted and super expensive for children without the urban 
Hukou. In addition, schools for migrant children are scarcely funded by the state, and 
what’s more, often slashed by the local governments for the gentrification of the urban 
horizon.101 For rural children living in cities, they usually have to go back home for 
school with their mother when growing up to the age for school. The vacancies left by 
these women would soon be replaced by younger women—China’s huge population is 
providing a seemingly inexhaustible reservoir of laborers for the insatiable capital that is 
                                                            
101 Ma, H. (2011, August 16). Beijing ding dian “qu di” nong min gong zi di xue xiao 
(Beijing government clamped down scholars for migrant children). 21st Century Business 
Herald. Retrieved from http://finance.ifeng.com/news/20110816/4396190.shtml 
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in constant need of young, nimble and adroit fingers to run the machine (Mies, 1999). As 
Janet Collins notes, many people have documented “ the strategies that firms instituted, 
beginning in the 1970s, of recruiting mostly young, unmarried women without children 
and firing them when they married, gave birth, or simply reached a certain age” in the 
Western societies (2003, p. 13-14). In contrast, the reproduction of healthy and able-
bodied laborers seems more “humane” in China—through the intersection of class and 
gender, a pool of “young, docile [female] labor force that can be worked hard with 
minimal health problems” is being (re)produced for labor-intensive industries (Davin, 
2004, p. 78). When migrant women workers move back home, they usually take jobs in 
their hometown so they could take care of their children and contribute to the familial 
finance simultaneously. One day when I was doing the field research in a factory, a group 
of children jubilated into the workshop. A worker perceived my confusion and told me 
that they were the workers’ children. After school, they would come to the factory and do 
their homework here until their mother finish work and take them home. Younger 
mothers would also take their toddlers to the work place. During my visit, it was very 
common to see that a child was taking a nap beside his/her mother, who was busy with 
operating the sewing machine.   
          This contradictory role for women as both capable market actor and caring 
housewife/mother is produced and circulated by and for neoliberal restructuring through 
the politics of subjection and subject-making. In an afternoon when I was interviewing a 
female worker in a grocery store outside a silk factory, our discussion about women 
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workers intrigued the male owner so he joined our conversation.102 He was quite baffled 
by women’s increasing economic independence. Invoking a zero sum game theory, he 
contended that women have taken over the dominance of family at the expense of men. 
After he finished his shift, his wife (hereafter Li) came to manage the store. As an over 
fifty year old woman, Li had worked in the silk factory beside the store for over fifteen 
years, and then contracted this store and ran it with her husband. She was very interested 
in our topic about gender relationship and began to ventilate her subdued experiences by 
her husband’s patriarchal control. As she said, when she was young, because of her 
distinguishing performance in the silk factory, the manager wanted to promote her to an 
important position and gave her more opportunities to develop and tap her talents for 
business. This opportune watershed for her career, however, met with strong opposition 
from her husband, who insisted that a virtuous woman should not keep such a high 
profile in the business world (for men), and should let their husband take care of them. 
After rounds of debate, quarrel and sometimes even fight, she finally quitted her job and 
chose to contract this small store. When I asked why she did so, she answered, “people 
like me would sacrifice us for the harmony of the family and happiness of our children. 
When my sons date girls, their girlfriend’s families would say our family was not very 
harmonious…” Prioritizing the well-being of the family, particularly the children over 
her professional ambition, she made this decision, “actually I did everything for my sons. 
I am a woman. My husband is so sexist and can say anything (negative). Sometimes I am 
concerned about my face, so I just try to suppress myself.”  
                                                            
102 An interview conducted in Hai’an, June 10, 2012.  
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          This intense discussion over gender relationship, family and work attracted several 
female workers and shoppers passing by the store, and they joined in our conversation. 
Like Li, they all shared similar experiences about struggling with the dilemma between 
their gendered and marketized role. While reconstituted as independent, self-accountable 
subjects for social mobility, they also internalize the gender discourse about women’s 
prioritized liability to family. It is right through the seemingly paradoxical biopolitical 
logic of gender and class that women’s value is double extracted and appropriated by 
capital and the streamlined state-as-capital-facilitator. As discussed in chapter three, with 
the seductive and coercive advocacy of the U.S., neoliberal restructuring in the global 
context has actually reshaped the life of many women across the world through this 
biopolitical paradox. However, it is not an easy job to unpack and dismantle this specious 
biopolitics of the globalizing process. Knowing that this interview would be included in 
my dissertation, Li insisted that I should write these words of her into my work—“We 
Chinese women are different from American women. We have big love (da ai) for our 
family, but they only prioritize small love (xiao ai) for themselves.” This is a sweeping 
over-generalization of Chinese and American womanhood without seeing their 
connectivity by globalization, well demonstrating the necessity of joint efforts and a 
sincere dialogue for all the groups marginalized by and through this process. Only with 
this can critical scholars and progressive people really understand the nuanced, 
contingent, variegated biopolitics as the common ground for the subjugation of the 
majority of the world population to the benefits of transnational capital (Mohanty, 2003).  
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          Like the male owner of the grocery store, many male rural migrants also internalize 
their gendered role for the familial social mobility, so they often choose to stay in cities 
and continue to work while their wife and children move back home. As part of their 
masculine ethics, they usually save a small portion of their income for daily expenses, 
and send the bulk to the family. Among all the expenditures, education for children 
constitutes the primary category. Generally, a construction worker will spend half to two 
thirds of their income on their children’s education—as they believe, this is a reliable and 
sometimes the only way for social mobility of their children and family. As Lao Wei 
showed me, he could make around fifty to sixty thousand Yuan a year, but would spend 
thirty five thousand on his two boys’ schooling. Like him, many male workers have 
internalized the neoliberal meritocratic narratives. However, different from the Western 
stories of self-made success, for Chinese working class, it is their subjection fully 
motivated for the well-being and prosperity of the whole family rather than the personal 
fortune that constitutes the central incentive for poor male working class to tolerate the 
dehumanizing super exploitation and survive the unabashed discrimination in cities. This 
neoliberal subjection of Chinese working class is anchored in the intersectional contours 
of gender, class and (hetero)sexuality, ensuring an incessant supply of laborers for the 
hustles and bustles of China’s industrialization-urbanization.  
          Though gender, class and sexuality constitute the primary categories for the 
biopolitical structure in China’s neoliberal transition, sometimes other categories are also 
articulated with this intersectional system to further fragment Chinese workers for the 
diversified needs of capital, such as age. Every year, thousands of rural women leave 
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Hai’an for Japan to take jobs in apparel and textile factories. As they told me, these jobs 
are usually despised by Japanese natives, except for thoe women over fifty, and so to 
speak, not quite employable for industrial capital. Compared with the older age pool of 
the Japanese workers, Chinese women are much younger— only those under thirty 
(extended to thirty five after the 2011 earthquake) would get the work permit. On this 
account, Chinese immigrant workers need to compensate their less valued biopolitical 
labels of nationality, class and ethnicity by their age advantage, so they can be elevated to 
the same level with their older, Japanese counterparts to compete for the attention of 
capital in the globalized chart of labor division. Chinese male agricultural workers in 
Japan provide another example. Like women, in Hai’an numerous young rural men go to 
Japan every year, but they are usually concentrated in agricultural economy. While they 
are working in higher-paying agricultural sectors in Japan, their less valued but state-
stipulated farming work at home is usually transferred to their aged biopolitical others—
their parents.   
          Regional difference is another parameter for the labor division and migration. Of 
the four male apparel workers that I interviewed, one is from Anhui. Different from other 
native male workers who feel distressed and alienated in this feminized industry, this man 
does not feel much pressure. As he contended, in his hometown, it is normal for men to 
work in apparel factories. His words were later verified by other people from Anhui. 
Regional difference also mediates the labor market for the construction industry. As a 
major laborer-sending area, it is ironic that Hai’an’s construction fields are mostly 
populated by workers from other areas. Regional difference also characterizes labor 
 
 
176 
 
division within the industry. In the construction fields that I visited, the types of work (e.g. 
woodwork, scaffold building and bricklaying) are usually divided by the origin of 
workers. Workers from relatively developed areas usually take higher-paying jobs that 
require more skills. Some people might take a reductive view, seeing regional difference 
as only the “natural” distribution of location for the people, however, it is also “the 
principle most often invoked as grounds for affiliation and assistance by men who left 
their homes to work in an alien environment” (Naquin & Rawski, 1987, p. 47). Places are 
constituted not only by their location and physical features, but also by the specific, often 
regulated forms of bodies that inhabit them (Sun ,2009).On this account, regional 
difference is an important biopolitical category to classify, manage and stratify the 
Chinese population.  
          In Creating Chinese Ethnicity (1992), Emily Honig’s theorization of Chinese 
ethnic formation provides us a theoretical tool to understand how local origins become 
one of the important factors shaping Chinese ethnic identities, in similar ways as 
Chicano/a, Polish and Italian identities have been considered ethnic in the United States. 
American historian, Susan Jones Mann conceptualizes ethnic formation as historical 
process, and contends that it involves “the creation, invocation, and manipulation of 
notions of cultural distinctiveness to establish self/other dichotomies among people in a 
shared political and economic system”(1974, p. 9). Building on Mann’s framework, 
Honig tries to elucidate that since the late nineteenth century, class and ethnicity have 
been co-constituting with each other in the formation and reformation of laborers for the 
differential economic needs. Through a historical review of the modern history of the 
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Subei people in Shanghai, Honig argues that people’s origins intersect with social class, 
creating a new ethnicity-like identity for Chinese people. As she writes, “Class…was 
constituted through native place identities, and the construction of native place identities 
was part of a discourse about class. Furthermore, it was precisely because those identities 
were so inextricably linked to class that they assumed ethnic dimensions” (1992, p. 4).  
          Building on Honig’s (1992) conception, we could see how origin-based ethnic 
identity intersects with other categories, such as class, to facilitate the diversification of 
the labor market for China’s socio-economic transition. It is quite common to employ 
workers from other regions for the better control of labor in the local construction 
industry (as is the case of Hai’an). For migrant workers in the alien urban space where 
they lack a stable social network, the origin-based ethnic tie becomes an important 
relation for mutual support. Because they all come from rural areas, their Hukou-imposed 
class identity further reinforces this ethnic commonality, creating solidarity for them to 
survive the ruthless exploitation by capital and the state. During my visit in Wuxi, it was 
quite common to see that workers from the same place would watch TV, play Mahjong or 
cards and have other forms of entertainment during their limited and precious leisure time. 
They also share the same dormitory, and would take care of each other if someone gets 
sick. In this regard, multiple “ethnic enclaves” are created in the cities during China’s 
process of economic transition (Zhang, 2001). As I have discussed earlier, construction 
work is highly unstable, so these workers have to constantly look for new jobs. The 
ethnic relation thus becomes the most reliable site to share the job information. As a 
result, the jobs in the construction fields are often divided along the ethnic lines. For 
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capital, this relationship provides a convenient and costless channel to locate and renew 
labor for its reproduction.  
          However, the origin-based ethnicity also creates a contingent space for the 
resistance and subversion of the complicity of capital and the state. Taking the side with 
capital to better facilitate China’s transition to market economy, the party-state removed 
the constitutional clause granting workers the right to strike in 1979 (Meisner, 1996). In 
other words, as the historical foundation for workers to negotiate with capital, class 
solidarity has been delegalized by the state. On this account, the ethnicized coalition is 
often mobilized by construction workers to challenge the super exploitation by capital. 
As one worker said, “it does not matter how skillful a worker is. The key is the number. 
The more people you have, the better price you can get.”103 Lao Zhang, a rural migrant 
from Anhui who has been working in Wuxi for over fifteen years, is the foreman of the 
woodworkers. Under his leadership, they have formed a stable team of about twenty 
workers who all come from the same area in Anhui. His team could often get a better 
price from the boss than other individual workers. In this regard, these workers invoke 
one identity (ethnicity) to unsettle the domination and exploitation based on another 
identity (class), creating a counter-biopolitical space to turn the biopolitical logic of 
neoliberal governmentality on its head. It thus enables what H. L. T. Quan (2012) calls 
“ungovernability.”   
          In China, ethnicity is, however, a fluid and unstable category, whose meanings 
might vary with occasions. Besides one’s origin of location, it might also denote 
                                                            
103 An interview conducted in Wuxi, on July 26th, 2012.  
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“nationalities,” “minorities” that often refer to non-Han peoples, or 
phenotypical/genotypical differences (e.g. Russian and Uighur people in northwest 
China). For instance, in a transnational context, ethnicity (min zu) usually marks one’s 
Chinese national descendant. Approaching ethnicity on this semantic level, we will see 
that it is deeply intertwined with the transnational movement of Chinese labor as China 
reintegrates with the global economy. 
          In the global hierarchy of economy, China’s core competitive edge is its huge pool 
of docile and flexible labor (Naughton, 1995). Different from other industrialized 
countries that often hinge on technologies, capital and/or militant power for expansion, 
China’s penetration into the global economy is distinguished by the transnational 
movement of legions of Chinese workers. This process is often facilitated through the 
ethnic relationship. Lao Qiu, a construction worker from a poor rural area in Sichuan who 
has been working in Angola for eight years is a good case in point.104 After working for 
an Angolan general for quite a while, Lao Qiu has worked his way up to the management 
level to help his boss regulate and control workers from China. Moreover, he has built a 
social network there and commanded fairly good Portuguese proficiency. Relying on 
these social and cultural capitals, Lao Qiu has successfully introduced eighteen relatives, 
friends and acquaintances from his hometown to work in Angola and made “a good sum 
of money.” This private type of ethnic network of job information has developed into a 
hugely lucrative public industry of transnational labor trafficking in China. Only in 
Hai’an, there are around twenty agencies specializing in this. Owners of these agencies 
                                                            
104 An interview conducted in Chengdu, Sichuan, on August 5th, 2012.  
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are usually former workers who have stayed in certain countries for quite a while like 
Lao Liu, and their major clientele body is usually the poor rural people in their hometown. 
To introduce a person to work in a foreign country, they would charge a service fee, 
ranging from 20,000 to 180,000 Yuan—the more developed the destination, the more you 
have to pay. Under the directive of the neoliberal market tenor, the ethnic ties with 
relatives, friends, fellow-villagers, or Chinese people in general thus become a conduit to 
their enterprising subjectivity. The state also actively capitalizes on the ethnicized 
relationship to facilitate the transnational migration of Chinese people for profits. 
Recently, sponsored by the Education Ministry, a program called Summer Work and 
Travel has been popularized among many Chinese universities. After paying 20,000 
Yuan as the service fee to the state-run agencies, college students could get a chance to 
work in the U.S. during the summer, in a fast food restaurant, hotel, bar or theme park to 
enrich their “professional” experiences.    
          The transnational migration of Chinese working class is not just ethnicized, but 
also gendered and classed. As many workers who used to work in foreign countries told 
me, rural men are usually introduced to the Middle East or Africa for their sizzling 
infrastructure constructions while women would often usually go to developed countries, 
such as Japan, and take jobs in the “sunset” industries despised by the local people. For 
example, as Lao Qiu told me, about ninety-five percent of Chinese in Angola are men 
from rural areas, and most of them are concentrated in the construction industry. It again 
verifies Tastsoglou and Alexandra’s observation that male workers “constitute a higher 
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proportion of migrants to ‘developing countries’ whereas women comprise a majority of 
migrants to many ‘developed’ countries” (2006, p. 5).  
          Ethnic relationship also becomes a fundamental mechanism to control these 
diasporic workers. Though it might sound ironic, actually when many Chinese workers 
arrive in a new country, they would be surprised to find that they have to work for a 
Chinese boss. As a result, workers might find their exploitation no less ruthless and 
unbearable than in the domestic context. In my interviews, many workers expressed the 
willingness to work for a foreign boss than a Chinese boss, because the former usually 
treat them much better. As Chan (2001) writes, “the majority of foreign investors are 
actually ethnically Chinese and they are largely the ones who mistreat mainland Chinese 
workers” (2001, p. 13). Many workers ascribe this form of exploitation to the ethnic 
relationship, “they are so familiar with Chinese people, so they know how to manipulate 
us in a much worse way than foreigners.”105 For example, “paying by piece” as a trick of 
exploiting workers and controlling labor cost with Chinese characteristics (as I will 
further discuss in the next part) has been introduced to a transnational context to further 
squeeze the values of Chinese diasporic laborers.  
          In this part, I have focused on the intersection of gender, class and sexuality to 
illustrate how the middle class hetero-patriarchal relation has been consolidated as the 
central disciplinary technology to recreate Chinese working class as self-reliant and 
voluntary neoliberal subjects for socio-economic transition. Also, focusing on the 
contingent meanings of ethnicity, I try to reveal the situated and variant nature of identity 
                                                            
105 A focus group conducted in Hai’an, on June 22nd, 2012.  
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categories. In this regard, it is impossible to produce an exhausted list of the categories 
that are articulated with the intersectional biopolitical system in the China’s 
neoliberalization in particular, and global restructuring in general—this is not the goal of 
this project, either. Using these examples, I want to give readers a flavor about the critical 
role of the wobbling intersectional biopolitics in the diversification, structuration and 
organization of labor market for neoliberal globalization, which begs the joint efforts of 
scholars from diverse cultures and backgrounds to further unfold and unpack its inherent 
mechanism. Moreover, it would be highly misleading to assume that this system only 
relies on disciplinary power in its daily exercising. In the next part, I will elaborate on 
how totalizing sovereign power is also articulated in this process to recast and regulate 
Chinese workers to increase China’s clout in the global politico-economic chart.  
Boosting China’s Global Clout with Totalizing Power 
          In her book Neoliberalism as Exception (2006), Aihwa Ong challenges the 
assumption that because neoliberalism has taken the reign at present, the ruling by the 
state has shifted from a blatant and oppressive totality to a liberal and softening paradigm. 
In another article that she co-authors with Zhang (2008), building on the criticism of 
Hardt and Negri’s homogenizing theorization of neoliberalism, Ong reasserts this 
standpoint. As they write: 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri maintain that in this capitalist ‘Empire’ 
[neoliberal globalization] the ‘carceral logics’ of disciplinary institutions 
and technologies are being left behind as ‘mechanisms of command 
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become ever more ‘democratic’ regulatory forms acting upon the minds 
and bodies of citizens.’ Such claims, of course, are not sustainable in the 
Chinese context, where, as we have argued, neoliberal practices of 
regulation coexist with illiberal forms of industrial and state controls 
(2008, p. 9). 
          The work by Joseph E. Stiglitz (2002), the Nobel laureate of economics, would 
help us extend this China-embedded argument to the global context, as he suggests that 
neoliberalism as an ideology often diverges from neoliberalism as practices. As the 
former vice president and chief economist of the World Bank, Stiglitz has witnessed 
numerous examples about how developed countries break the rule of free competition 
and use their politico-economic advantages to coerce less developed countries into 
accepting proposals highly detrimental to their national economy. As an ideology, 
neoliberalism is deeply rooted in the philosophical tradition of instrumental reason which 
sees self-serving-and-preserving motivated choices and actions as ethically justified and 
warranted. In this regard, to put this ideology into practice, it already presupposes a 
subject activated for maximizing its own benefits. Despite his universal interpretation of 
neoliberalism, Hardt (2011) astutely points out that there are multiple subjects of 
neoliberalism—individual, institutional, corporate, statist as well as supranational, 
competing to protect and increase their benefits in the globalized context. For example, to 
sharpen their competitiveness in the global market, neoliberal states such as the U.S. 
often suspend the rule of democratic participation for its citizens and enforce the despotic 
totalizing control in the service of the benefits of a small elite group (Brown 2005). The 
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recent Iraq War is a good case in point. China’s example would further verify these 
insightful and perspicuous observations.  
          The reconstitution of sovereign power to foster and boost market mechanism is one 
of the central initiatives in China’s neoliberal transition. As Wu et al. (2007) suggest, at 
the core of China’s marketizing process is the rule that the state should be transformed 
from an omnipresent resource distributor to regulator of market, and then gradually to 
market actor. As the centralized function of planning and organizing of the Socialist state 
has been disintegrated, the state’s novel role as both regulator and actor of the market is 
actualized and implemented through a two-tiered system of state structure. At the central 
level, the government seeks to promote the overall economic development while 
maintaining the political stability, which is unified through a nationalist developmental 
agenda. At the local level, provincial, municipal and county governments are restructured 
into direct market competitors, attempting to transform Chinese economy from backwater 
into vitality, longevity and sustainability, which is called “local state corporatism” by Wu 
et al. (2007).  
          To achieve this goal, the introduction of Tax-Assignment Reform (fen shui zhi gai 
ge) in 1994 played a crucial role, in which fiscal decentralization was designed to induce 
localities to cope with fiscal and economic affairs in ways propitious to market-oriented 
reform. In this new fiscal system, after the central state has captured a great share of 
fiscal revenues, local governments can keep the rest to their own use (Hsu, 2004). In this 
regard, “fiscal reform, especially the separation between central and local taxes, has 
defined the boundary of local revenue, and thus given a greater incentive for the local 
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government to mobilize the revenue, leading eventually to local corporatism” (Wu et al., 
2007, p. 14). Activated as the entities fully charged for self interests and profits, local 
states strive to mobilize various resources and policies to foster their own enterprises to 
increase revenues (Huang, 2008), and attract foreign direct investment for further 
development (Gallagher, 2005), engendering the fierce competition with each other. In 
2012, Foxconn, the major contractor of Apple headquartered in Taiwan, felt the 
overwhelming hospitality and cordiality from its ethnic fellows—after the labor cost 
soared in coastal areas, it was invited for relocations by several interior provinces, which 
were vying with each other to get the attention of Foxconn with tax break, better 
infrastructure facilities, and even free use of land and facilities.106 In this regard, China’s 
example well evidences Foucault’s conclusion (2008) that the central tenet of neoliberal 
governmentality is the creation and maintenance of market competition.   
          Labor is the essential creator of values and commodities, and controlling labor cost 
is the most important factor on the to-do list of industrial capital. Even in countries like 
China with rich resources of labor, particular endeavors are required to restrain the labor 
cost. The totalizing sovereign power would provide the direct aide to reduce and control 
the labor cost to a minimum level. As mentioned earlier, the constitutional clause 
granting workers the right to strike was removed with China’s opening up in 1979 
(Meisner, 1996). Since 1984, part of the sovereign power was withdrawn from the special 
economic zones like Shenzhen and Zhuhai, granting multinationals the right to ban 
                                                            
106 Jinan Daily. (2013, January 30). Tan ban jing li shu ci bo zhi: Fu shi kang yu Jinan 
mei yuan fen? (Negotiation encountered problems: Jinan has no chemistry with 
Foxconn?). Retrieved from   
http://www.ce.cn/cysc/newmain/yc/jsxw/201301/30/t20130130_21329062.shtml 
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workers’ unions and disrupt their negotiating capacities (Perry, 1995). To increase their 
attractiveness to the footloose transnational capital, local Chinese governments 
manipulate their grip over the totalizing power in multifarious ways to police workers 
and reduce labor cost for capital. Breach of duty on purpose is an important way. Though 
the Labor Law of the PRC stipulates that the daily amount of work should not exceed 
eight hours, as the workers in export-processing apparel, electronics and silk factories 
told me, their routine is seldom less than eleven hours a day (usually from 7:30 am to 
6:30 pm). In some factories, it is even normal to work for fourteen hours a day. These 
workers cannot enjoy the legal holidays, let alone weekends. In most of the apparel 
factories that I visited, workers will take a day after working for two weeks on ends—in 
so doing, they could get a reward of 100 Yuan. In a silk factory in Hai’an, workers even 
have to toil throughout the whole year, with only three days off during the Spring Festival. 
To my great surprise, the compensation for this enormous amount of overwork is almost 
close to none, if any—two Yuan per hour after the ten-hour shift. When I asked them 
why they did not try to report this illegitimate manipulation to the government, some of 
them told me they had actually tried many times with no results—the government would 
tell them to wait, wait and wait, and then never got back to them. Actually, taking the 
side with workers and righting the wrongdoings by capital runs counter to the neoliberal 
logic of the local state as the active market entity. On this account, “while the central 
government is more willing to enforce the law than local governments, in practice, it has 
allowed the law to be eroded” (Chan, 2001, p. 13). The local state would also take an 
interventionist role to disrupt any threat from workers that might unsettle its complicity 
with capital. As a worker told me, if someone keeps complaining about the state-
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sanctioned exploitation of workers and exposing its misbehaving to the public, they will 
probably be subject to some forms of suppression, such as incarceration, physical abuse, 
or even murder.  
          With the sanctioning by the state, “paying by piece” is a shrewd trick with “the 
Chinese characteristics” to sidestep the stipulations about working hours and work the 
extraction of labor values to its full capacity. As many workers told me, as a common 
practice in Chinese enterprises, paying by piece is scarcely heard of in other countries 
until Chinese investors start their businesses there. “You will only see “paying by piece 
in China. Even in Vietnam and Cambodia, workers are paid by time,” a male apparel 
worker said.107 Leaving the decision about when to work and how to work up to workers, 
this strategy not only circumvents the legal responsibility stipulated by the state, but also 
effectively engineers workers into self-accountable neoliberal subjects—“the more you 
produce, the more you can earn, so don’t blame us.” However, even this super 
exploitative trick would often be suspended for a better deal for capital. Ling has been 
working in a multinational corporation of electronics for over five years, and she has had 
encountered numerous experiences of this ilk.108 “Last month we finished 12,000 pieces, 
they paid us 1,500 Yuan. We finished 15,000 pieces this month, but they still paid us 
1,500 Yuan. They told us that the more we made, the poorer the quality would be.” 
What’s more, since the ration of workload depends on the amount finished previously, 
the perpetual reproduction of more profits—the essential logic of capital— has placed 
                                                            
107 An interview conducted in Hai’an, on June 9th, 2012.  
 
108 An interview conducted in Hai’an, on June 16th, 2012.  
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workers in a dilemma of “to starve or wear out.” As Ling said, “it is very cruel that at 
some point you won’t be able to sustain the increasingly intensified workload, and then 
you will have to quit it. But we have already devoted our youth and health to the 
factory…” Sanctioned by the state, this coerced turnover of labor force with no economic 
and legal liabilities effectively helps attract more transnational capital, and augment the 
profits for the local state.  
          As self-independent-and-responsible entities for market competition, local 
governments would also abuse the totalizing sovereign power (of the central government) 
to boost their own competitiveness in the market and increase their fiscal revenues. 
Recently, the enforced land grabs by local governments has increased the tension 
between government officials and immiserized farmer households to an unparalleled 
level, having triggered thousands of massive revolts by the marginalized groups. The use 
right of confiscated land then will be sold to developing corporations for commercial 
purpose—more often than not, corporations in close relationship with local government 
officials. With the tacit permission from the local government, these corporations could 
turn to violence, such as hiring hooligans, to coerce workers into enslavement. As many 
construction workers told me, in many inner areas, such as northeast China and Xinjiang, 
this practice is not uncommon. As Lao Zhang who had just come back from Hai’erbin 
told me, in the construction field where he had worked, the developer hired a group of 
gangsters to patrol the sites every day to ensure that everyone was doing their job.109   
                                                            
109 An interview conducted in Hai’an, on June 15th, 2012.   
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          On the global level, assuming a more dominant position in the world economy, 
particularly after the accession into the WTO, the party-state is taking its new role as an 
avaricious competitor in the global politico-economic contest. For its rich raw materials 
and natural resources, Africa has become a highly coveted territory for global 
competitors, including China. As H. L. T. Quan (2012) notes, through the co-optation and 
manipulation of a discourse of the Third World solidarity and non-interference, the 
Chinese state is advancing and supporting a neoliberal economic program in Africa. 
What the Chinese government, Chinese companies and individual entrepreneurs are 
doing today in Africa is an externalization of China’s own neoliberal practices in the past 
three decades (Jiang, 2009). As Chan (2001) argues, tight surveillance and deceptive 
propagation are the oft-employed strategies by the state to control the cost of Chinese 
laborers in the domestic context. In extreme cases, when migrants are lured to an isolated 
area with the promise of a job, then they are made to work in slave-like conditions and 
risked being shot if they try to escape. Underlying these dehumanizing practices is the 
abusing of totalizing sovereign power by the local states.  
          In the foreign context, this totalizing power is often employed by state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) as the corporate incarnation of the state. These enterprises are run like 
an independent kingdom with partial sovereign power over its own space. As Lao Qiu 
told me, these corporations usually have their own security guards to make sure that the 
workers will not leave their territory. With the excuse of protecting workers’ personal 
safety, these Chinese SOEs would take away workers’ passports to fully ground them to 
their territory. Millions of rural workers are attracted by the promise of a high wage and 
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leave China to work in Africa for these state-corporations. However, many of them 
would often find that their actual wage is much lower than the one promised, sometimes 
even lower than what they can make in China. Through multiple coercive practices, such 
as pecuniary penalty, starvation and physical abuse, workers are often forced to work, 
and enslaved for the benefits of the Chinese state.  
          However and as suggested earlier, the intersectional biopolitical system of Chinese 
neoliberal governmentality is far from seamless, and its multi-dimensional-and-
directional structure actually provides many possibilities for challenge and defiance. 
Moreover, the contestation and competition between different neoliberal entities also 
create many fissures and ruptures of the neoliberal system. As I have illustrated, many 
workers are acutely conscious of the state-sanctioned-and-organized exploitation. The 
next chapter focuses on how this consciousness is embedded in the interstices between 
the different parameters of the intersectional structure of biopolitics.  I will also try to 
explore how these marginalized groups mobilize their emerging experiential perceptions 
and subjectivities that cannot be subsumed and contained by the neoliberal biopolitics to 
create contingent space of ungovernability (Quan, 2013).  
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Chapter Five 
 Gauging the Ruptures and Fissures of Neoliberal Apparatus 
          After the debut in the 2011 Spring Festival Gala, Xu Ri Yang Gang (meaning 
macho men in the rising sun in Chinese), a migrant worker vocal duo by Wang Xu and 
Liu Gang, reached their fame apogee. Half a year prior, they uploaded a homemade video 
online of their performance of a saddening song in a disheveled makeshift dwelling, in 
which they relied on their rendition to challenge the widening social inequalities. This 
venturous move proved a watershed in their life, turning them from obscurity into an 
Internet sensation—within three months, the video had registered tens of millions of 
clicks.110 The repercussion reverberated from the cyberspace into the real world, and even 
aroused the attention of Communist bureaucrats. After viewing this video, the Secretary 
of Hunan provincial committee of the CPC recommended that Party cadres should watch 
it and pay more attention to poor workers.111 In this crudely shot video, the two men’s 
toil-hardened masculinity constitutes the central symbolic device. As the self-chosen 
band name indicates, their masculinity means to carve out a livable space for them in the 
phantasmagoria of China’s social upheavals. The furtherance of this message is activated 
by their hoarse voice, spontaneous, hollering rendition and shirtless working class bodies. 
                                                            
110 Wei, Y. (2011, February 27). Xu Ri Yang Gang “chun tian li” wei he zou hong, ta 
men you zen yang cai neng li yu bu bai zhi di? (Why Xu Ri Yang Gang’s In the Spring 
becomes popular and how can they sustain their success?). New Workers. Retrieved from   
http://www.dashengchang.org.cn/Article/ShowInfo.asp?ID=342  
 
111 Xie, L. & Geng, H. (2010, November 11). Hunan sheng wu shu ji cheng ting nong min 
gong chang “chun tian li” re lei ying kuang (Secretary of Hunan provincial committee of 
the CPC claimed to be move into tears by the migrant peasant vocal duo). Retrieved from  
http://news.163.com/10/1111/01/6L6119FA00014AED.html 
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This masculinized audiovisual trope efficaciously captures popular attention. When 
shown to interviewees, it was the band’s embodied masculinity that usually captivated 
them. As a construction worker commented, they admirably indexed the quintessence of 
the contemporary Chinese masculinity.112  
          If gender occasions a liminal attentive space for the two vagrant workers, it is the 
lyrics of their song that agitates ripples of empathy, grabbing and holding people’s 
attention to the misery and ordeal that they went through. Titled In the Spring, the song 
seeks to uncloak the helplessness and despair of the subordinate groups covered up by the 
bustling and hustling process of industrialization. As the lyrics writes, “I still remember 
the spring years ago when I haven’t cut short my hair. Without credit cards or girlfriend, 
without hot water at home, my only possession was a wooden guitar. But I was so happy, 
singing in the street and under the overpass, though no one else cared about my songs. If 
one day, I grow old in loneliness, please keep that old memory. If one day I die, please 
bury me in the spring, in the spring.” For the rural migrants having left home for urban 
space, these words accurately capture their deeply-seated worries, anxieties and nostalgia 
vacillating with China’s social transformations. In an afternoon when a worker and I were 
watching this video, the music caught the attention of his co-workers who happened to 
walk by. They stopped and asked about the song’s name, and requested repetition so they 
could better enjoy it. Mesmerized by the melancholic and entrancing music, they soon 
got lost in nostalgic meditation, which temporarily freed them from the monetary and 
consumerist logic of the market and returned them to the spontaneous and genuine bliss.  
                                                            
112 A focus group conducted in Wuxi, on July 12th, 2012.  
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          Gender provides a viable conduit for the two workers to ventilate their outcry 
against the social injustice thickened with China’s marketization. It is particularly 
valuable because the public sphere for the discussion of class inequalities and struggle 
has been constricted as part of the state’s conservative policies, as we have previously 
discussed. The sway sparked by this cultural endeavor kept fermenting to such an extent 
that the Chinese authority could no longer remain nonchalant and indifferent. As Dick 
Hebdige (2006) notes, one important strategy to subdue the subversive potentiality of 
subcultural practices is to redefine its “deviant” contours by the dominant ideology. By 
incorporating this grassroots band into the Spring Festival Gala—a central “ideological 
state apparatus” (Althusser, 2001), the party-state seeks to re-territorialize the challenges 
from subaltern groups within its ideological radar. Not surprisingly, almost all the 
interviewees expressed their preference of the original version to the one meticulously 
reframed for the festive fete. Even so, in the online voting for the most popular program 
of the Gala, this grassroots band left far behind other well trained professionals. 
Pressured by the collective clamor for social justice revealed by the far-flung support of 
the band, the state ordered that their name should be removed from the candidate list. 
Commercialization becomes another strategy to neutralize the band’s unsettling potential 
(Hebdige, 2006). After their performance in the Gala, negative news was proliferated, 
highlighting either their disproportional commercial gains or bloated consumerist desire 
to dilute their subversive potency.  
          From this example, it is not difficult to see that the intersectional biopolitics is far 
from seamless and absolutely secured, and the multi-dimensional-and-directional 
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structure leaves a plentitude of possibilities of ruptures and fissures for social changes. 
Navigating through the interstices of different parameters, peripherized people are able to 
locate and tease out contingent space for subsistence and survival. For instance, Xu Ri 
Yang Gang bears on gender to challenge the social domination based on class hierarchy, 
and generates an accumulative voice to compel the bureaucrats aloft to rethink about the 
social inequalities. In this regard, aside from exploring how the intersectional biopolitics 
operates in contemporary China, I also want to scrutinize how the marginalized groups 
live through this system and create an embedded territory of alternative being against the 
state-sponsored neoliberal biopolitics—or to borrow H. L. T. Quan’s term (2013), a space 
of “ungovernability.” Rather than reiterating the transcendental discourse of universal 
resistance to neoliberalism, I want to unmask its internal contradictions and conflicts and 
in so doing, construe a vantage point for the subjugated groups to build coalition across 
identity-based boundaries and make substantive changes. As we have discussed in the 
previous chapters, the intersectional biopolitics grounds the nexus of neoliberal material 
and cultural practices, informing and enabling multifarious disciplinary and normalizing 
technologies for China’s social changes. In this chapter, I will explicate that the innate 
contradictions and conflicts are right rooted in the disparities between variant disciplinary 
and normalizing technologies, which, after years of practices, have deeply reshaped the 
Chinese population and labor market, actualizing new possibilities for democratic 
participation and political agency.   
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Rethinking China’s Labor Crisis  
          A vital welfare that neoliberal globalization proffers to multinational corporations 
is the unfolded transnational territory for capital to cruise for cheap and subordinate labor 
while it is unbridled from the geopolitical particularity. As Manuel Castells (2004) 
suggests by the trailblazing notion of “Network Society,” the compression of time and the 
substitution of real place by flows of information are realized with new communication 
technologies. On the one hand, digital technologies enormously accelerate the flows of 
information, removing the spatial gap and rendering the physical place ontologically 
untenable. On the other hand, due to the hyper-fast speed of information exchange, 
people across the world can share the information almost simultaneously, thus 
egregiously compressing the time and making possible an “ahistorical” era. Enabled by 
these technologies, multinationals could dexterously extend their operative scope to 
wherever they can find the most favorable hotbed for the reproduction of capital. In 
contrast to the hyper mobility of capital, labor is more bounded with the place for the 
individual and collective affective, cultural investment and needless to say, the control of 
im/migration by sovereignties. As Jane Collins (2003) suggests, the context of 
globalization has enabled and enacted a “new economy,” whose essential feature is the 
capacity of capital to pit its spatial mobility against the geographic solidarity of labor to 
make positive use, in a way labor cannot, of distance and differentiation. In so doing, 
capital could reduce costs and augment profits by effectively disrupting the negotiating 
capacity of labor (Harvey, 2005; Ong, 2006).  
 
 
196 
 
          The liberatory effect of globalization and technological breakthroughs not only 
energizes high technology enterprises, but also revives and restructures traditional 
“sunset” industries such as apparel making. As Collins (2003) illustrates, with high labor 
intensity and low capital requirements, apparel industries that first originated in the 
Western societies have been broadly distributed across the globe by particularizing and 
outsourcing different aspects of production. For instance, Liz Claiborne, a “branded 
marketer” of clothing headquartered in New York, provides an exemplar of this “new 
economy.” While holding the control over marketing and branding, the corporation 
outsources other dimensions of production to different countries, such as designing, 
sewing and packaging, creating a horizontalized transnational business pipeline glued 
through the company’s promotion capacity. With a portfolio of more than twenty-six 
brand names, it has successfully recreated and generated new profits from the “low value-
added” traditional industry and developed itself into a global retail juggernaut.   
          Compared with the Western counterparts that are voluntarily mutating themselves 
to better reap the benefits of the globalized “new economy,” as a primary capital-
receiving destination, China’s apparel industry is also going through a process of 
restructuring— not as much an autonomous choice as an expedient, ad hoc measure. 
After three decades, the flexible labor pool with few dependents disarticulated from the 
Chinese population by the birth control policy (Naughton, 1995) has taken on a new 
outlook: most of the “fatigueless” workers have reached their 40’s or early 50’s. As the 
neoliberal state has few provisions for their families, including children attending school 
and aged parents/parents-in-law in need of support and caring, they have to find new 
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ways to balance their jobs and familial responsibilities. In 2008, the financial crisis 
witnessed an exodus of migrant workers, and thereafter many of them chose to stay at 
home permanently. Like many people from the rural area, Xiao Li used to work for an 
international apparel trade corporation in Shanghai. In 2010, he returned to Hai’an and 
started his own family-based mill of apparel. As this young entrepreneur told me,113 
middle aged native women now comprise the bulk of the workers in the labor-intensive 
factories in Hai’an. Most of them quitted their higher-paying jobs in coastal and urban 
areas and moved back home so they can take care of their families. Meanwhile, because 
their parents/parents-in-law are growing older, they need to lend a hand during the busy 
farming season. In this regard, these women workers want a job allowing them enough 
freedom to fulfill the doubled responsibilities. During my visit in Hai’an, many factory 
owners kept complaining that it was getting harder and harder to hire workers, so quite 
often they had to decline some international clients to avoid the penalty for the failure of 
fulfilling orders. Moreover, as the global market is still vacillating, it would be very 
costly and risky to maintain and support a laboring team while the demand varies from 
day to day. On this account, many large and medium sized factories would rather 
outsource some jobs to small workshops or family mills. Having no fixated location and 
factory buildings to manage, these workshops and mills are flexible to handle the 
unpredictability of the market without the risk of bankruptcy for high maintenance 
                                                            
113 I had multiple conversations with Xiao Li while I stayed at his home during my visit 
in Hai’an from May to early July, 2012.  
 
 
 
198 
 
fees.114 Meanwhile, due to their smaller size, these workshops and mills usually 
specialize in one aspect of the production process, such as clothing proofing, sewing, or 
fixating buttons. Only in Dagong, a small town in Hai’an County, there are over 1,000 
small businesses of this kind. As a result of the new demographics of Chinese laborers, 
the compartmentalization and horizontalization are becoming the new defining features 
of many export-processing industries in China—though on a different track from their 
Western counterparts.  
          After the 2008 global crisis, in contrast to the Western countries troubled by the 
flight of capital and bursting of financial bubbles, China’s primary concern is the 
hovering labor crisis that would shake its foundation as “the world’s factory.” In 2012, 
Foxconn, the major contractor of Apple, announced that they would replace workers with 
robots for some floor work.115 Like many other export-processing enterprises, the 
productivity of Foxconn is noticeably hampered by the labor shortage, which has 
impacted the quality and availability of Apple’s new flagship product, Iphone 5. Despite 
many local governments’ efforts to boost labor recruitment for Foxconn,116 it is still hard 
                                                            
114 Many large and medium sized factories usually buy or rent a land property to build 
their own workshops and offices, which would be a large sum of investment. As these 
factories mainly rely on foreign orders, when the international market is slowing down, 
these extra fees would foist heavy financial burdens on the owners.  
115 China Broadcasting Web. (2013, Feburary 12). Fu shi kang xuan bo zai nei di quan 
mian zhan ting zhao gong jia kuai ji qi ren shang gang (Foxconn announced the halt of 
labor recruiting in China with its replacement by robots). Retrieved from  
http://tech.ifeng.com/it/detail_2013_02/21/22355759_0.shtml 
 
116 To attract Foxconn for relocation after the labor cost rises in coastal regions, many 
inner provinces proffer favorable labor recruitment policies for this company. For 
instance, the Sichuan government mandates that senior college students need to do the 
internship work in Foxconn in order to get their degree. The Beijing News. (2012, 
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to hire and stabilize a team to keep the machines fully running to the pace of the 
footloose transnational capital. In nutshell, Foxconn’s hardship reflects China’s 
impending problem in general, the so-called labor crisis. In as early as 1954, the Nobel 
laureate of economics, Arthur Lewis already foresaw this problem as the Gordian knot of 
industrialization. In his groundbreaking article, Economic Development with Unlimited 
Supplies of Labor (1954), Lewis proposes the highly influential concept of “Lewis 
Turning Point,” and suggests that in the early stage of industrialization an economy will 
grow fast with foreign technologies and capital as well as plentiful, cheap, unskilled labor 
from the rural area. After the extra value of agricultural labor has been extracted, wages 
will start to rise and labor-intensive industries will become less profitable. Thus the 
national economy needs to transition to technology-intensive focus to sustain its 
development.   
          My field work has gathered more empirical evidence from China for “Lewis 
Turning Point.” As I explicate in chapter four, the wage of blue-collar workers has been 
on noticeable increase in the past several years. In both Hai’an and Wuxi, the workers 
told me that after 2007 many bosses began to change their arrogant attitude and sought 
around for skillful people to work for them. Different from the old days when legions of 
migrants begged for jobs and were desperate to take any offers, bosses now have to 
compete with each other and provide the best terms to attract and keep the skilled 
workers. As a result, blue-collar jobs that are despised by urbanities can easily secure a 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
September 7). Da xue sheng bei bo qu fu shi kang shi xi, bu can yu wu fa bi ye (College 
students forced to do internship for Foxconn, and otherwise cannot get the degree). 
Retrieved from http://sc.sina.com.cn/edu/cd/zypx/2012-09-07/095223343.html 
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monthly paycheck of over 6,000 Yuan, almost doubling that of a new college graduate.117 
Many people ascribe this trend to China’s slowing rate of population growth. As some 
Chinese scholars aver, China’s “population dividend” from the surplus labor will have 
drained up by the end of 2013, and the arrival of “Lewis Turning Point” would definitely 
slow down China’s economic machinery.118 According to National Informatics Center 
and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the number of laborers in China will reach its 
peak in 2013, amounting to over one billion, and then will drop thereafter.119 Some 
foreign sources nonetheless estimate the peak to come later, in between 2020 and 
2025.120 Moreover, laborers in the age group of 16 to 35 have dropped from 220.3 million 
in 2012 to 210 million in 2013.121 The decelerating population growth and the 
concomitant decreased labor supply, as many people contend, are the root of China’s 
current economic conundrum. To these people, lifting the restriction of birth control (at 
                                                            
117 Zhao, Y. (2013, February 25). Wai lai wu gong zhe ping jun xin zi gao yu ying jie bi ye 
sheng qi xin (Migrant workers make more than new college graduates on average). 
Eastern Broadcasting Station. Retrieved from http://sh.sina.com.cn/news/b/2013-02-
25/081535471.html 
118 Chang, H. (2012, August 24). Zhuan jia: 2013 nian zhong guo ren kou hong li huo 
jiang xiao shi ren kou hong li ke neng zai lai (Expert: China’s population dividend would 
end in 2013, but will be regaid). The People’s Web. Retrieved from 
http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2012/0824/c1001-18820528.html 
 
119 Guangzhou Daily. (2012, December 24). China’s labor will exceed 1 billion and reach 
the peak next year. Retrieved from 
http://finance.people.com.cn/money/n/2012/1224/c218900-19993387.html 
 
120 Free Exchange Economics. (2013, January 31). China approaching the turning point. 
Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/01/growth-and-
china 
 
121 Guangzhou Daily. (2012, December 24). China’s labor will exceed 1 billion and reach 
the peak next year. Retrieved from 
http://finance.people.com.cn/money/n/2012/1224/c218900-19993387.html 
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least for well-educated urbanities) seems a viable solution to cope with China’s new 
socio-economic situation.  
          However, the rise of labor cost obviously predates the decrease of labor supply 
(since 2013 in its earliest terms) by several years. Actually, the number of migrant 
workers broke the record, reaching 262 million in 2012.122 In contrast to the “shortage” of 
this segment of labor, new college graduates has been in over-supply for quite a few 
years. By June 2013, only about thirty five percent of undergraduates have found a job, 
and this number is even lower for graduate students at twenty six percent.123 According to 
Chinese media, 2013 is the toughest year of employment for college graduates.124 Not 
surprisingly, their wage has not seen an equally remarkable increase as that of blue-collar 
workers. In this regard, there is no direct causal relationship between the increasing wage 
and the decrease of labor supply—at least it is not the exclusive and decisive contributing 
factor. The so-called labor crisis, if any, is relative at best, only pertaining to the 
traditional lower niche of the labor market. Despite its simplistic overgeneralization, this 
hypothetical causal relationship nonetheless foregrounds the inter-relationship between 
                                                            
122 Enorth.com.cn. (2013, February 23). Zhong guo ji xu ling pao zhu yao jing ji ti GDP 
shou ci chao guo 50 wan yi yuan (China continues to take the lead among the major 
economies with GDP surpassing 50 trillion). Retrieved from 
http://news.enorth.com.cn/system/2013/02/23/010664867.shtml 
 
123 The Xinhua Web. (2013 June 10). 2013 nian da xue sheng jiu ye bao gao: ben ke 
sheng qian yue lv bu zu si cheng (2013 report of employment for college graduate: the 
rate is under 40 % among undergraduate students). Retrieved from 
http://news.eastday.com/society/2013-06-10/316582.html 
 
124 Nanfang Daily. (2013, June 19). “The most difficult year for employment”: Listening 
to the stories of the senior students. Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/edu/2013-
06/19/c_124875107.htm 
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national economy and the state’s biopolitical management of population, which calls for 
more rigorous critical scrutiny.  
          As I have found in my field work, contrary to the neoliberal canon of “Homo 
Economicus” that sees all human beings as rational subjects poised to optimize their 
economic returns, for many Chinese rural youth, the pursuit of leisure and freedom 
nonetheless outweighs the monetary concern. In the factories and construction fields that 
I frequented, it is very rare to see people under thirty working there. As many workers 
told me, very few young people are willing to take these jobs nowadays and they are 
concentrated in positions that would give them more leisure time, for instance, 
supermarket/department store salesperson, accountant, receptionist, corporation staff or 
engine assembler. Compared with factory and construction workers, however, these jobs 
are much less paid. For instance, a female salesperson for an “international” brand of 
consumer goods, such as P&G and Unilever, in a supermarket (working for eight hours a 
day), can only make around 1,500 Yuan a month, a little over half of what she can earn in 
an apparel factory (for twelve hours a day). Working on an engine or electronic 
components would earn a male worker approximately 3,000 Yuan a month, about half of 
a construction worker’s wage. For these people, the calculation of their values is not 
exclusively determined by market logic, but also infiltrated through other considerations. 
As Lao Li, a farmer/construction worker who accommodated my visit in Hai’an told me, 
it is really difficult for people to discipline their children now because they are getting 
cannier than before, and in many cases, they know much more than their parents. As the 
new generation cultured in a liberal environment, the young people can no longer “eat 
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bitter” like their parents/grandparents. Lao Li’s words, though quite plain and 
straightforward, pose an important theoretical question: what makes a neoliberal subject 
on earth in today’s China?   
          Thorstein Veblen’s (1979) insight that leisure would become an essential marker of 
the bourgeois lifestyle proved to be very accurate of the nature of the capitalist societies 
at the turn of the twentieth century. When China has transitioned from Socialism to 
neoliberalism, as discussed in the previous chapters, the bourgeois lifestyle has also been 
validated as the new social norm. In this regard, Veblen’s contribution would be 
instrumental to the analysis of the contemporary Chinese society. As the state still claims 
its Socialist heritage, this ideological transformation has to be inadvertently implemented 
in less politically tumultuous and pernicious terms—through gender and sexuality 
particularly. Via the manipulation and alteration of gender and heteronormative contours, 
the reconfigured imagery of the middle class nucleus family has been laden with 
consumerist and hedonist values, conveying to Chinese people a message of what is 
normal in the neoliberal society. A job in a fancy department store or corporation, though 
not necessarily rewarding a person with much economic capital, will nonetheless amplify 
his/her cultural and social capital associated with the bourgeois norm. As some people 
ventilated to me, working in an extravagantly furnished, modernized department store 
would make them feel really “good and confident.” This psychological saturation, as I 
see it, derives not from their command over economic capital, but from the perceived 
approximation to the normalized neoliberal personhood—even only as a tangential and 
evanescent broker who panders to others’ bourgeois familial dream with an inventory of 
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items to engender and (hetero)sexualize them as the qualified candidates. In other words, 
the loss of economic capital is over-compensated by the supplement of the gendered and 
sexualized cultural/ social capital, so the surplus value would inflate one’s credentials as 
a core member of the neoliberal society. To the contrary, the worker’s identity, no matter 
how handsomely rewarded in economic terms, would eliminate one from the symbolic 
and social network of the normalized neoliberal citizens. In this regard, the labor market, 
which is supposed to be solely determined and refereed by the “invisible hand” according 
to the neoliberal ideology, is also constituted through yearnings for other values. In 
contemporary China, these gendered and (hetero)sexualized desires have redirected the 
flow of labor from clusters with high economic returns to the ones more culturally and 
socially validated, which has contributed to the relative labor crisis to no small extent.   
          The gendered, classed and heterosexualized normalizing technologies as mentioned 
above, however, run counter to the disciplinary technologies that are also rooted in 
neoliberal biopolitics. As the central mechanism of Chinese neoliberal governmentality, 
biopolitics has helped (re)produce these technologies to facilitate and legitimate the 
socio-economic transformation, in such forms as ideologies, imageries, rules, laws, 
policies, administrations, social institutions and apparatuses. Different from the canonical 
Marxist construal that infrastructure/economic base pre-determines 
superstructure/ideology, as Stiglitz (2003), Harvey (2005) and Brown (2005) remind us, 
these neoliberal practices and ideologies do not necessarily converge with, but more often 
than not diverge from each other. In other words, there is an inherent schism between 
neoliberal normalizing and disciplinary technologies, regardless of their mutual 
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biopolitical root. As we have discussed earlier, the state’s disciplinary endeavor to 
reproduce and perpetuate rural migrant workers as expendable subjects for domestic and 
transnational capital, such as Hukou system, propagation and validation of 
heteronormativity and essential gender differences, is contradictory to its normalizing 
initiative centered on the promotion of the bourgeois nucleus family value. In this regard, 
the seemingly inexhaustible labor supply supposed to be guaranteed by the intersectional 
biopolitics of gender, class and heteronormativity according to the designation of 
neoliberal governmentality has been frustrated from within rather than without.  
          The contradictions and conflicts inherent in the intersectional biopolitics have also 
created new spaces of survival and subsistence for subaltern groups. One of the 
(unexpected) benefits of the relative labor crisis is the mitigation of the exploitation of 
rural workers by capital. As we have discussed in chapter four, many workers have to 
work for extremely long hours but cannot enjoy benefits, such as overtime payment, 
health insurance and pension. Sanctioned by the state, this super exploitation by capital 
has tremendously impacted their health, both physical and mental. In contrast, pressured 
by the continuing exodus of workers, many employers now have to proffer incentives to 
keep them down. For instance, though China’s Labor Law stipulating overtime payment 
was passed in as early as 1994, it was not really implemented by employers until recently. 
With the implicit sanctioning by the local government, complaints from workers had 
remained futile, and sometimes would even incur brutal suppression by the police, as 
many interviewees told me. However, bosses are now compelled to offer overtime 
payment to incentivize workers for more and longer work to keep the assembly line going. 
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In Hai’an, a worker can make extra two Yuan per hour after a ten-hour shift in addition to 
the wage for the piece that he/she makes. Though it is still well underpaid according to 
the law, to many people, it is better than none. Moreover, as their negotiating capacity 
accrues with the increasing labor shortage, construction workers could request a month 
by month paycheck and do not have to wait till the end of the year to get fully paid.125 
This was completely unimaginable a few years ago, when many of them could not get 
their deferred wage back in full, and had to press for it with an act of suicide.   
          Becoming pensioner is another benefit of the labor crisis for rural workers. As the 
secondary citizens in the Maoist era, rural residents never had access to the state provided 
pension. To retain skilled workers, many large sized factories agree to contribute to the 
pension plan for their “formal” employees. In Hai’an, to become a “formal” employee, a 
worker needs to sign a contract with the factory boss that mandates a fixed work schedule. 
According to this schedule, the worker needs to work for at least eleven hours a day and 
twenty eight days a month. In other words, the welfare that any citizen is entitled to is 
abused as the exchange rate for the worker’s enslavement by capital. To many of them, 
this is already a big advancement though. However, there are still many others holding a 
different view, dismissing it as only a strategy by the state to cope with China’s aging 
population and labor crisis. As a study by the IMF indicates, the median age of the 
Chinese population will increase from thirty two years in 2005 to forty eight years in 
                                                            
125 As many workers told me, Wen Jiabao’s administration also played an important role 
in promoting workers’ negotiating capacity, which had been stringent with any arrears of 
workers’ wage by employers. After the 2008 financial crisis, many workers also required 
the monthly payment in case of the vanishing of bankrupt factory bosses.    
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2050.126 This problem will tremendously aggravate the burden on the pension system, 
with the number of pensioners soaring rapidly while the number of contributors grows 
more slowly. As some workers poignantly remarked, incorporating millions of rural 
residents would help the state produce a much larger pool of contributors to save the 
pension system from bankruptcy. During my interviews, this “conspiracy theory” 
interpretation of the state policy is very common, and many workers are unreserved with 
their criticism of the party-state.  
          In this part, we have seen that regardless of their mutual root in the intersectional 
biopolitics, disciplinary and normalizing technologies often run counter to each other, 
thus creating new spaces of subsistence and survival for the working class people. With 
China’s swerve to market economy, many people’s critical thinking has also been 
sharpened, not through formal education, but enlightened by the unfolded enormity and 
brutality of neoliberalism, as I will explicate in the next session.  
Reformulating Chinese Proletarian 
          It was the busy farming season when I arrived at Hai’an. Besides harvesting crops, 
reaping cocoons especially makes it a busy time for the local farmers. Blessed by the 
favorable climatic and geographic conditions, the highly developed sericulture has 
established this small county a reputation as “China’s Hometown of Cocoon Silk.” 
                                                            
126 Dunaway, S. & Arora, V. (2007, May). Pension reform in China: The need for a new 
approach. IMF Working Paper. Retrieved from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=995615 
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Compared with other farmers relying on crops as the sole income source in many places, 
thanks to this industry, Hai’an peasants enjoy a relatively better off life. For instance, the 
GDP of Hai’an reached 42.9 billion Yuan in 2011,127 over half of that of Xining, the 
capital of an interior province Qinghai.128 Lao Li’s family is a good case in point.129 
During my stay at their home, they not only provided me with hospitable and cozy 
accommodation, but were also eager to share the exciting changes in their life with “the 
guest from the U.S.” Breeding silkworms twice a year, they can earn about 12,000 Yuan 
(depending on the government purchase price), enough for basic expenses throughout the 
year. As each round only takes approximately one month, they have plenty of time for 
other earnings. With his wife undertaking most of the farm work, like many local men, 
Lao Li will do some construction work in cities. The revitalized market has emancipated 
people from the stringent control by the Maoist state, so they can motivate their 
intelligence and diligence to the full capacity for personal gains, as Lao Li suggested. As 
a result, the Li’s now live in a modernly furnished two-story house, in stark contrast to 
their old stingy thatched shed, as shown in a faded picture. The Li’s case is not unusual in 
Hai’an at all, where rows upon rows of modernized houses of generous style seldom fail 
to leave a dazzling impression on first-time visitors, including those from the 
                                                            
127 China’s Statistical Information Web. (2012, May 13). Nantong shi hai’an xian 2011 
nian guo min jing ji he she hui fa zhan tong ji gong bao (The 2011 report on the national 
economy and social development of Hai’an County, Nantong). Retrieved from   
http://www.tjcn.org/tjgb/201205/24740.html  
 
128 Xining Evening. (2012, February 1). 2011 nian, Xining shi wan cheng di qu sheng 
chan zong zhi 770.70 yi yuan (Xining’s 2011 GDP reaches 77 billion Yuan). Retrieved 
from http://qh.people.com.cn/n/2012/0201/c182775-16711679.html  
 
129 I stayed at Xiao Li’s home from May to early July, 2012. He and his families provided 
great accommodation and much information for me.  
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industrialized countries. As one of the areas first opened up to transnational capital, 
Hai’an’s new look attests to the transformative capacity of neoliberal economy. 
According to the data of the government, in the past thirty years, the double digit growth 
rate has magnified China’s GDP from 364.5 billion Yuan in 1978,130 to 51932.2 billion in 
2012,131 and reduced the population under the poverty line from 250 million in 1978 to 
15 million in 2008.132 As part of this socio-economic progression, Li’s family seems a 
suited footnote for the “rising water lifting all boats” capacity of neoliberalism. 
          The “liberal, open and fair” tenet of the market, however, is frequently suspended 
and violated, which has exposed the brutality and enormity of neoliberalism and 
enhanced people’s consciousness of resistance. One day Lao Li and his wife came home 
angrily. With the especially good weather, they had expected to make extra money from 
the high yield of cocoons. To their dismay, the price offered by the local government was 
so low that they even made less than the previous year. It further excruciated them that 
the price in Dong Tai, a town nearby, was much higher. Irrespective of the free exchange 
rule, the local government forbade farmers to sell their produce to private parties or 
outside Hai’an, and ordered the police to patrol the border day and night. If anyone was 
                                                            
130 China Financialyst. (2009, November 24). 1978 nian yi lai wo guo GDP zeng zhang 
lv de li nian shu ju (China’s yearly GDP growth rate since 1978). Retrieved from 
http://www.chinafinancialyst.com/html/jrwz/09112416112853878.html 
 
131 National Bureau of Statistics of China. (2013, January 18). 2012 guo min jing ji fa 
zhan wen zhong you jin (China’s national economy developed with stability in 2012). 
Retrieved from http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/jdfx/t20130118_402867146.htm 
132 People’s Daily Overseas Edition. (2008, November 5). Gai ge kai fang 30 nian: Jue 
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caught on site, the items would be confiscated in total plus the heavy penalty for the 
owner. To add to their furor, the government-appointed vender embezzled part of their 
produce because he “needed to deduct the overweight of the soaked ones.” In Li’s words, 
this was utterly “the violation of farmers’ human rights.” It was the first time that I had 
ever heard the negative comment on the state from Li, a humble and satisfied Chinese 
farmer/worker who always smiles at others. It is more interesting to see that someone 
with an education of the fifth grade like Li would adeptly invoke the transnational 
discourse of human rights to buttress his point. I could completely understand their agony. 
For the prior week, Li and his wife had got up at 4 a.m. and stayed up till 1 a.m. to take 
care of the silkworms and cocoons, leaving almost no time for sleep and eating. The 
money earned by such toil was nonetheless easily usurped by the government. With 
numerous futile protests, they had got used to the abusive treatment, but my arrival—as a 
U.S.-trained scholar—kindled new hope for them. As Li kept imploring, I should do 
something to help the farmers because my “U.S. identity” endowed me with the power 
that the local officials would pay attention to. However, he did not know that as a 
diasporic graduate student with no established social networks, I might be as equally 
vulnerable as them, if not more so.  
          Like Lao Li, many Chinese believe that beyond an enfranchising and juristic 
entitlement, the “U.S. identity” indexes the most formidable competitor for the Chinese 
government in the geostrategic rivalry that has the moral, militant, technological, 
diplomatic and economic restraints over the latter. In a focus group with the construction 
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workers,133 when they got to know that there might be possibility of publication for my 
dissertation, they all hoped that I could publish it in the U.S. because “it is no use 
publishing it in China.” In other words, the imperial deterrence of the U.S. would help 
aggrandize the influence of my work over the Communist autocrats to the extent that it 
could translate into tangible changes for them. To my surprise, the workers are not the 
only group endorsing this proposition, so are the bosses who have been benefiting at their 
expenses. For my field work, my embodiment of the “U.S. identity” has also brought 
some unexpected conveniences. During my visit in Wuxi, through my friend and host 
Daniel, I was invited for lunch/dinner by quite a few local businessmen who wanted to 
“make friends with the educated people from the U.S.” To hear more alternative voice 
(other than the poor workers’), I accepted some of these offers.  
          One day, during a lunch with some entrepreneurs from the housing industry, after 
several rounds of toasting, two development corporation bosses started to divulge 
complaints about the government. Evasive of their complicit relationship with the local 
state to the detriment of poor workers, they harshly criticized the abuse of people’s 
human rights by and rampant corruption in the government, and wished that my research 
could generate some pressuring reverberation on the Communist bureaucrats in the global 
community. To help with my research, they encouraged Yuan, a labor contractor with an 
experience of over twenty years in the industry to share with me more stories of poor 
workers. As someone mediating between capitalists and labor, Yuan had a perspicuous 
insight of the bloody and dehumanizing reality of the so-called Chinese economic pillar; 
                                                            
133 A focus group conducted in Hai’an, on June 20th, 2012.  
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as someone having worked all his way up from a menial bricklayer and built a strong 
solidarity with the workers, he was anxious to disclose the horrendous stories tabooed in 
Chinese media for the international audience, such as the corrupted officials, nepotistic 
multi-tiered outsourcing of construction projects and violent grab of farmers’ land by the 
state. The lively and horrifying examples much agonized me. Like the other people, Yuan 
imputed these problems to the freckled humanity of certain Communist bureaucrats, and 
believed that the sustained and balanced surveillance of their power, particularly from the 
Western societies, would suffice to find a solution.  
          Contrary to the assumption of these people, the social problems concomitant with 
China’s social transformation are far from merely individualized maleficence, external 
and epiphenomenal deviances, but inherent in the logic of neoliberal governmentality per 
se. As Foucault (2008a) puts forward, at the core of neoliberal governmentality lie the 
creation and sustenance of market competition to maximize the politico-economic 
benefits of the society. In this sense, multiple entities must be produced and motivated as 
competing agents to uphold the game. To recreate and rejuvenate market economy 
without drastic conversion of the political regime, one essential initiative by the central 
government is to restructure local states into self-responsible market actors, as what 
Mariana Mazzucato (2013) calls “entrepreneurial state.” Guided by this rubric, economic 
performance becomes the most important criterion to evaluate the political achievements 
of local leaderships, and its quantification through GDP growth rate has invigorated the 
inter-local-state competition into a battle without gun smoke. “Accumulation by 
dispossession,” as Harvey (2003) argues, characterizes China’s neoliberal restructuring 
 
 
213 
 
process, in which many extra-market entities are integrated for value production and 
assessing. As in many industrialized countries, land becomes an item critical for the 
Chinese housing industry, and needless to say, the most desirable, convenient but scarce 
resource for local officials to escalate their performances within a short term. To claim 
more and optimize the price value of the limited land property, enforced seizure and 
suppression of people’s resistance become a common practice for the local states, defiant 
of the acrimonious admonition from the central government.  
          Developing a complicit relationship with the enterprises within the precinct, or 
“local state corporatism” in Wu et. al.’s term (2007), is another crucial strategy by the 
local governments to sharpen their edge for the GDP competition. Actually, many of 
these enterprises took their origin in the collectivistic Township and Village Enterprises 
(TVE) (Whyte, 1999; Huang, 2008), and have maintained tight connections with their 
former supervisors after privatization. For instance, having developed from several TVEs, 
the major silk enterprises in Hai’an could build on their amicable relationship with the 
local officials to acquire the raw materials, cocoons, at extremely low price to beat their 
competitors in the market. Accordingly, driven by the pressure to improve the annual 
report of tax revenues and growth rate, the local leaders would take every endeavor to 
promote the local enterprises, even by suspending the free exchange rule with 
administrative and even enforced means. In this regard, anything but simply 
individualized immorality and vices, these “un-liberal” endeavors are in actuality 
immanent to the logic of neoliberal governmentality, and would continue to haunt 
China’s long march of modernization. As a result, diverse patterns of conflict and 
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resistance have exploded on a massive scale, from labor strikes, pro-democracy 
demonstrations, anticorruption protests, local electoral challenges, to even mass suicides 
(Perry & Selden, 2000).  
          In the global context, in contradiction to the contention that the nation-state 
boundaries have been rendered obsolete for the unencumbered migration of capital, the 
state has been restructured as powerful neoliberal agents for market competition. 
Centering on the creation and sustenance of competition, neoliberal governmentality can 
take variant forms, and there could be multiple subjects of governance as well (Hardt, 
2011). As Hardt and Negri (2004) contend, the state is taking a central role along with 
multinationals and supranational organizations, such as the WTO and the IMF, in 
comprising the transnational ruling body in neoliberal globalization. In this light, the 
former primary expert of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz (2003) enumerates a handful of 
examples about the interventionist role of the Western states in the global market. For 
instance, to help increase the market share of Walmart in the global South, the U.S. 
government provided generous offerings to help it reduce its price and become “more 
competitive.” The ban of Huawei, the China-based high-tech corporation and major 
competitor for Cisco, by the U.S. government for its alleged “threat to the U.S. national 
security” is a more recent example. As Stiglitz sees it, these are the divergences of 
neoliberal practices from its ideology. However, as a concept grounded in the 
Enlightenment concept of instrumental reason, neoliberalism embraces the self-serving 
subject  with no heeding to others’ well-being and the public good, who would strive for 
the accomplishment of a goal with any available means (Horkheimer, 1946). In these 
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examples, as the primary advocate of neoliberalism, like the entrepreneurialized Chinese 
local states, the U.S. government is enacting the rule of neoliberalism by sponsoring the 
interests of its “own” enterprises and amplifying its competitiveness in the global context 
through the financial and imperial clout. As the competition is intensified, particularly 
after the 2008 global crisis, the states driven by disparate self-interests have inevitably 
run into more head-on clashes.  
         As discussed earlier, there are also mutations and contingencies of the actualization 
of neoliberal governmentality in different contexts. The Chinese trajectory or the “Asian 
Model” distinguishes itself from the Western market fundamentalism in technical (rather 
than ontological) terms: the former has witnessed the encroachment of jurisprudence and 
polities by market values while the latter emphasizes the state-coordinated capital 
accumulation and labor market (Stiglitz, 2003; Cheah, 2007; Ong, 2006). After the 2008 
global crisis, the competition between these two models has been heightened to a new 
level, as can be verified by the Obama administration’s new diplomatic focus on “Return 
to the Asia-Pacific.” In the geostrategic arena, this contestation is often congealed as the 
lash of China, Singapore and Malaysia (which are the major advocates of the “Asian 
Model”) for the “bad human rights records” by the Western states. Just as Cheah (2007) 
maintains, the discourse of human rights is often invoked for the statist interests by 
Western politicians rather than the real concern over the impoverished Asian people.  
          However, the rivalry between states-qua-neoliberal-agents does hammer out new 
spaces of resistance for the subordinate groups, and proffers new rhetorical forays for 
Chinese working class to reformulate their proletarian identity in the context of 
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globalization. During my stay in Wuxi and Hai’an, I could see that the U.S.-centric 
notion of human rights is highly popularized among Chinese workers as their critical 
artillery to prod the Communist bureaucrats for social justice. Many workers, particularly 
those who worked in other countries before, celebrate the industrialized countries as 
paradigmatic models to foreground the downtrodden human rights of workers by the 
party-state. Da Liu, a middle aged Hai’an native told me that he always watched TV and 
followed online news reports to see how the U.S. government criticized the Communist 
bureaucrats for their abuse of workers when working in the Middle East.134 As he said, 
“people can enjoy human rights and freedom in the U.S, but there are no human rights 
and freedom in China. There is no election. I want to select the leadership but the 
government will not give me the opportunity. I want to elect a government that is really 
concerned about the people!” Building on his multiple drifting experiences, he also 
suggested to me, “don’t ever come back to China unless you have a strong social network 
here. The U.S. society is open to free competition. When employers hire somebody [in 
China], they will check your background to make the decision.” After he came back to 
China where most of the “toxic” online information has been screened off, international 
radio stations, such as German Wave and Voice of America become the new source of 
information for him. Just like Da Liu, nourished and informed by the transnational 
discourse of personal freedom and rights, many Chinese workers have formed a belief 
that all proletariats should coalesce around the common struggle about human rights to 
fight for social equality.  
                                                            
134 A focus group conducted in Hai’an, on June 20th, 2012.  
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          Liu’s argument also lays bare how Chinese working class position themselves 
oppositional to the party-state, which asserts the exclusive legitimate leadership to 
unionize and represent Chinese workers as their Avant Guard. Drawing on Marxist 
historical materialism, the Party adamantly rejects the discourse of human rights as 
liberal, Western, colonial and incompatible with “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” 
and holds that in its distinction to the decadent and laggard capitalist society, only 
Chinese Socialism could portend the futurist avenue for human beings. As the 
propagation reiterates, this prophetic construal derives its “scientificity” from the CCP’s 
role as the vanguard of proletariat—the most advanced group in human history that 
derive the “correct consciousness” from workers’ disadvantaged position in the social 
production system. Contrary to this claim, however, as my field work shows, it is right 
through the “liberal and bourgeois discourse” that many Chinese workers are reclaiming 
their marginalized proletarian identity and struggling with the state control for social 
justice.  
          British theorist E. P. Thompson’s (1964) reconceptualization of class is particularly 
useful for us to understand the paradox of Chinese working class and the Communist 
leadership. Drawing upon Raymond Williams’s critical reading of the Marxist canon of 
“hegemony,” Thompson (1964) argues that class is a social and cultural formation 
constituted from dimensions that start with, but move beyond social relations at the point 
of production. Class formation and reformation are always infiltrated and coordinated 
through heterogeneous, multifarious and conflicting ideologies, which as Williams (2006) 
theorizes, are by no means predetermined by economic base. To explicate the complexity 
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and multiplicity of ideology, Williams proposes a model “which allows for this kind of 
variation and contradiction, its sets of alternatives and its processes of change” (2006, p. 
135). Building on Williams, in his classic research of the British working class, 
Thompson also challenges the Marxist conception that the proletarian identity (and the 
“correct consciousness”) is predetermined by workers’ exploited position, and adroitly 
elucidates how a multitude of ideas, concepts and arguments also shapes its formation. 
For instance, the British workers’ struggle for the freedom of press, a political 
proposition deemed essentially capitalistic and bourgeois by the Marxist classics, was 
central to the formation of their working class identity. As Thompson writes, “the degree 
to which the fight for press liberties was a central formative influence upon the shaping 
movement [of British proletariat]” (1964, p. 729). In China’s case, if the contestation 
over the freedom of press is a prioritized theme for liberalists as Zhao (2008) suggests, 
the fight for human rights characterizes many workers’ daily struggle with capitalistic 
exploitation and statist suppression.    
          In China today, despite the state’s persistent denouncement of the liberal discourse 
of human right, it is unable to forestall its permeation as adequately as the Maoist regime 
because China’s socio-economic transition is deeply intertwined with and cannot be 
separated from neoliberal globalization, not only for their chronological confluence, but 
also the intrinsic inter-dependence. On the one hand, the market needs to be expanded 
substantively and globally for the super productivity yielded by China’s “seemingly 
inexhaustible labor supply.” On the other hand, the cruising capital cannot find a better 
destination than China that has an excess of manipulable cheap labor. As the ruler (of 
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labor) and the facilitator (of capital), the Chinese government and its Western 
counterparts are wed with each other in a precarious profit marriage—conspiring in the 
mutual extraction of labor values, but skirmishing and even conflicting as the competing 
agents driven by specific interests. To be rewired with the global market, China has 
opened its door not just for migrating capital, but also the Western discourses, such as 
personal freedom and human rights. As Harvey (2005) suggests, in the Western context, 
these discourses are recycled and re-wrought by neoliberal ideologues to legitimize and 
enact the “Jungle Rule” of market economy. The recent legislative attempt to grant 
“personhood” to corporations in the U.S. with its full-scale “natural” rights is a good 
example. As the global competition for raw materials and market escalates, it also 
becomes an important rhetorical arsenal for Western politicians to contrive moral and 
economic advantages over their geostrategic rivals. As the spotlighted executive of this 
complicit relationship of the transnational carnival for profits, the Chinese party-state has 
reaped criticisms for its “bad record of human rights” from both without and within, but 
with disparate meanings. For Western politicians, it is part of their “Carrot and Sticks” 
tactics to run the game with their Communist ally/rival. For Chinese workers, it is an 
empowering instrument to reformulate their proletarian identity displaced by the state 
control and recreate counter-narratives to the Marxist doctrines, which have been 
appropriated and manipulated by the Communist bureaucrats to perpetuate their role as 
the connecting tube (and beneficiary for sure) of the exploitative siphoning relationship 
between capital and labor. On this account, any reductive rejection or celebration of 
human rights would not be conducive to understand the complicated labor-Communist-
capital relationship in the neoliberal and globalized China.  
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          China’s suis genris neoliberal governance has rendered other forms of 
contradictions and conflicts as well, wrenching out more possibilities to disband the 
Communist-capital conspiracy. To uphold its role as the market arbitrator and guarantor, 
the Party tempers with its Socialist legacy to reassert its monopoly over the society, as 
indicated by the term “Socialism with Chinese characteristics.” In her studies of the 
migrant rural maids in Shanghai, as Yan Hairong (2008) avers, this expedient 
repackaging of China’s neoliberal governance in the Socialist terms provides the 
rhetorical forays for the dispossessed workers and farmers to augment their appeal for 
social equality. The public performance of “red songs” (the revolutionary songs marked 
by the Maoist imprint) in urban areas across China recently would drive home this point. 
As I have seen, though the workers who self-identify as Socialist are noticeably 
outnumbered by the liberal-leaning ones, their criticism of neoliberalism and outcry for 
social justice are by no means any weaker. As one of the three self-identifying Socialists 
that I interviewed, Lao Wu and I had a conversation for nearly two hours—one of the 
longest during my visit in Wuxi—and I have learned much from this weather-beaten and 
sagacious worker.135 Lao Wu had served in the Central Guard Unit for quite a few years, 
then retired and became a construction worker. As a victim of the rampant bureaucratic 
nepotism, he did not get the job that the government should allocate to veterans. 
Meanwhile, his field was reassigned to others after he joined the army. Thus he had to 
leave home for survival. When I met him, he just turned fifty eight and had worked in 
numerous construction fields for almost thirty years. Different from other workers tied to 
the grassroots background, he once got very close to the core of China’s political 
                                                            
135 An interview conducted in Wuxi, July 26, 2012.  
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apparatus as a guard to senior Communist leaders. This special experience explains why 
he has a particularly insightful understanding of China’s socio-economic structure. 
Rejecting the polarized conception of China as either Socialism or capitalism, he not only 
debunks the dominant discourse of “Harmonious Society” propagated to mask the 
surging social antagonism, but also dismantles the conjugation between the Communists 
and capital. As he said,  
China is a capitalistic society in terms of administration, fiscal system, and 
social structure. It is Socialist in terms of political bureaucracy. Though it 
is called ‘harmonious,’ it is not harmonious at all. It is only a rhetorical 
device to mitigate social antagonism, and tell the general people not to 
revolt…The income gap between the rich and the poor is over hundreds of 
times. Bosses are having banquet in luxurious hotels while migrant 
workers are eating brined vegetables. How could it be a harmonious 
society? 
          Building on the Maoist discourse, 136 Lao Wu distills China’s neoliberal 
governance as the result of “the restoration of capitalism.” Comparing the skyrocketing 
gap between the rich and the poor to “the slave-master relationship characterizing the 
capitalist society,” he lamented that it is even worse than the exploitation of farmhands 
by landlords in the old society. However, different from some frenzied Maoists who 
                                                            
136 During the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong harshly condemned his major rivals in 
the Politburo, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping as the leadership of capitalistic restoration. 
After coming back to power in 1978, Deng became the chief architect of China’s 
neoliberal transition.   
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insist on initiating a new round of the “Cultural Revolution” and class struggle to purge 
the corrupted parts of and restore the Socialist tradition of the Dictatorship of the 
Proletarian,137 he is unequivocal with the criticism of the statist Socialism during Mao’s 
reign. As he mentioned, with the focus laid on collectivism and share of responsibilities, 
some people would inevitably milk the system, and stymie the efficiency of the national 
economy. Acknowledging the benefits from the liberalized economy, he argues that the 
market has successfully motivated people for their own benefits, granted them more 
freedom, thus having amplified the social productivity and bettered people’s living 
standard.  
          Wu’s argument encapsulates the central point of New Leftists, another camp at the 
critical forefront of neoliberalism in China. Welcoming the positive effects from the 
liberalized and revitalized market economy, New Leftists cast more attention to the 
structural problem and the exacerbated social gap between different echelons, and ascribe 
these issues to the domineering market values. Rather than a simplistic call for the return 
to the statist monopoly, their primary contestation with neoliberalism lies in how to bear 
on the Socialist legacy of the state to make the economic progress more inclusive, and 
how to shift its gear more towards the people rather than capital. As Wang Hui, the 
leading New Leftist scholar suggests,  
The characteristics shared by all members of this critical group is a 
determination to reveal the links between politics and economics, as well 
                                                            
137 For this information, please check some racial Maoist websites, such as 
http://www.wyzxsx.com/ and http://www.mzdsx.net/.  
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as to reveal the internal relationship between the forms of thought and 
ideas of the intellectuals and the unequal process of development. This is 
undertaken in order to extend political demands for democracy to the 
realms of economics and other areas of society—to seek out a path of 
reform that is more fair, more democratic, and more humanitarian (2003, p. 
112-113).  
          We can see that different from many workers’ appeal for the coalesced fight with 
the statist control for their human rights, New Leftists endeavor to tackle the Socialist 
tradition of the state to unwind its alliance with capital and prod it to take the 
responsibility to address the widening social gap. Though these two camps strike a 
common ground of debunking neoliberal governance for a better, more livable and equal 
China, their different approaches are often polarized and opposed, turning into harsh 
criticism and even virulent attack of each other. As Mark Leonard (2008) argues, the 
contestation between New Right (liberalists) and New Left comprises the primary debate 
in the Chinese society since the 1990s.138 In this regard, an important question arises: 
how to save the energy from internal fight and bridge these two camps for solidarity to 
create a louder voice for social justice when the Communist-capital conjugation has been 
renewed and strengthened?  
                                                            
138 Here by liberalists I mean the camp that calls for the values such as intellectual 
freedom, the separation of powers, civil society and the rule of law, to address the social 
problems concomitant with China’s neoliberalization. With the focus laid on the political 
values of liberalism for political change, this camp is different neoliberalists that 
emphasize more deregulation, privatization and state abdication of welfare provisions to 
push forward economic reform.  
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          Moreover, as Harvey reminds us, “no matter how universal the process of 
proletarianization [of neoliberal globalization], the result is not the creation of a 
homogenous proletariat” (2003, p. 147). As Lao Wu told me, though he believes that the 
egregious exploitation of workers by the state and capital would lead to larger scales and 
higher levels of resistances and revolts, he does not think there would be any grounds to 
build coalition to subvert the system because of the (re)created differences among the 
workers. Wu’s comment is very insightful because the proletarianizing process in China 
has been undergirded by many identity categories, such as gender, sexuality and region, 
as I have illustrated. For example, as discussed in chapter four, the case of the female 
scaffold builder, Xiao Wang indicates that gender not only reproduces hierarchy within 
the working class to further reduce the labor cost (of women), but also disrupts the 
connections between the workers to sabotage the potential collaboration to fight for 
communal benefits. Therefore, it poses another question: how to build coalition across 
these (re)produced differences to make substantive changes against the neoliberal 
dominance?  
          As I argue, the understanding of the central role of the intersectional biopolitics in 
China’s neoliberal transformation would be pivotal to the building of solidarity among 
the groups marginalized by and for this process, who have been commonly but differently 
shaped and interconnected with each other by the multi-dimensional and multi-directional 
system of biopolitics. With years of practices, the control and management of the 
population through these interconnected categories and the concomitant policies have 
profoundly reshaped the Chinese society and created new possibilities for social change. 
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In the next part, centering on the gender relationship that shifts with the familial 
paradigms in the rural area, I will further explicate my point. As I argue, the hetero-
patriarchal family privides both a site for biopolitical control and a contingent space of 
ungovernability.  
Reconstructing Rural Chinese Family and Gender Relationship 
          In the early 1950s, the restructuring of family in rural areas became a critical project 
to reorganize the people’s living and livability in the service of the newly-established 
Socialist regime and economy. In the planned economy, through what Solinger (1999) 
calls “circular resource allocation system,” the central government would play a pivotal 
role in directing the supply of subsistence and raw materials from rural to urban areas, 
and then use the generated profits to support the former. In so doing, the state needed to 
replace family as the primary organizer of the rural public life, and fortify its monopoly 
over the society. As Yan Yunxiang (2003) notes, during the first three decades of the 
PRC, rural collectivization and other Socialist practices brought an end to many of the 
public functions previously performed by family. Family was therefore privatized and 
ceased to be the hinge of public activities in rural China, and these functions then 
transferred to the state.  
          However, as Yan (2003) also contends, contrary to the intension of the Communist 
leadership, the practice of radical Socialism did not construct a new type of Socialist 
family. Though having lost most of its public functions, family kept its basic framework 
in the private sphere via the patrilocal tradition unaddressed by the state policies (Stacey, 
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1983; Andors, 1983; Wolf, 1985). As Davis and Harrell suggest, between 1950 and 1976, 
this conjugal paradigm was formed and reproduced in a paradoxical environment—“the 
often repressive egalitarianism of Communism permitted more Chinese parents and 
children than ever before to realize core ideals of traditional Chinese familism, while at 
the same time the revolution eliminated many of the original incentives for wanting to 
realize those ideals” (1993, pp. 1-2). In other words, despite the favorable policies by the 
state, many rural families were reluctant to have more children to accrue and inherit their 
familial wealth, which was demoralized and even demonized in Socialist China.   
          Led by the nascent Socialist regime, the family reform was also closely related 
with the reformulation of the gender relationship. On the one hand, in the 1950s the state 
encouraged every couple to have more children with the ambition to increase the family 
size for the economic construction. Meanwhile, it mandated all people to participate in 
social production and share the output equally, and the massive inclusion of women in 
the public work was part of this initiative. On the other hand, as discussed in previous 
chapters, the family reform did not touch upon its private functions, and left the 
patriolocal residential tradition intact. In this arrangement, the relocation to one’s 
husband’s kin group would often cut a woman off her established social network, and 
subject her to a subordinate role for survival in the new environment. In this sense, the 
paradoxical family paradigm had contributed to and increased women’s doubled 
responsibilities as caring mother/wife and (men-like) worker, farmer and soldier in Mao’s 
China. Contrary to the popular idea that women enjoyed more freedom and equality at 
that time, when I asked some senior female workers, they told me it was not true and only 
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made up for propaganda. As they said, when women got back home very tired after a 
whole day of toiling in the field, they had to finish all the housework with no space for 
negotiation with their husband.  
          Different from women’s marriage-induced relocation, as many people recalled, 
“dao cha men” (marrying into the wife’s family) was rarely heard of during Mao’s reign. 
As a tacit rule, this arrangement has survived in Socialist China and persists till today. In 
both Wuxi and Hai’an, as many male workers avowed, they would never move into their 
wife’s kin group, which would be an ultimate humiliation and denigration of their 
masculinity. To them, the patrilocal residence not only grounds a socio-economic 
leverage for the patriarchal dividends, but also signifies their superior status in the gender 
relationship. To further clarify this point, I will draw upon the case of Li and her husband 
(the couple running the grocery store discussed in chapter four) as an example. 
          In regard to the constant fight between Li and her husband, the seed of antagonism 
had already been planted when the man married into his wife’s family. The conflict, 
however, did not fully explode until their first son was born, who was named after his 
mother’s surname as the common practice in the matrilocal residence. As she said, “every 
time when my husband heard others calling his son by the last name, the smile on his face 
would immediately freeze into an angry look. He felt that he had no face at all.” For Li’s 
husband, as the quintessential patrilineal ritual, losing the right of naming the descendant 
has deprived him of the symbolic dominance over the family. On top of that, it is also 
hard for him, an outsider, to maintain the control over the important family issues, such 
as finance and decision making. As he repeated, he really hates to see that “nowadays 
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more and more women are holding control of their familial finance.” Quite obviously, 
this emotion takes its root in his personal experience of the defeated patriarchal ego. The 
doubled disruption of his patriarchal status, both material and symbolic, has therefore 
translated into the excessive curbing of his wife’s public activities as the psychological 
compensation, having entailed constant family fights. A long time witness of this 
gendered politics and tragedy, Li’s son has grown into an adamant supporter of his 
mother and other women’s rights, as Li proudly told me. However, when it comes to the 
matrilocal residence, this “feminist” man becomes very conservative and would leave no 
space for negotiation—he already broke up with one of his girlfriends on this matter. 
           Li’s son was born and grew up with China’s neoliberal transition, when the 
patrilocal family continued from Mao’s reign into the new era, and some of its private 
functions were reinforced through the restored family farming system. To experiment 
with the market mechanism in the rural areas, family was reconstituted as the basic unit 
for agricultural production and market activities in the late 1970s. Within the patrilocal 
residence, this family-based initiative to boost the agricultural productivity, however, 
reinforced the socio-economic foundation of the gender inequality. It shored up men’s 
superior status for their naturalized image as the mighty laborer and natural inheritor of 
the familial wealth. In contrast, “rural women married ‘out’ of their natal villages, and 
daughters could not easily substitute for a son either economically or in rituals of honor 
or mourning.” (Davis 1995, p. 5). Moreover, the absence of the state in welfare provision 
added to the prejudice for sons, who were supposed to provide support and care for the 
parents when they grow old. In nutshell, China’s early neoliberal practices strengthened 
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the patrilocal paradigm and aggravated sexism against rural women, and their inferior 
status further legitimized the gender inequality between men and women.   
          The patrilocal residence also refracted the impact of the birth control policy, and 
the compounded effects have profoundly reshaped the demographics of Chinese 
population. As suggested by Davis (1995), compared with city families, it was harder for 
rural residents to tolerate the consequences of having only a daughter. As a result, the X-
ray guided abortion of female fetuses became prevalent in many rural areas, creating a 
man-made gender imbalance of the demographics. According to CNN, in 2011 men 
accounted for 51.9 percent of the population, and the number for women was 48.1 
percent.139 Or simply put, 122 boys are born for every 100 girls, while in the natural 
conditions this ratio would usually be around 105-106 to 100. As estimated by some 
people, by 2020, there would be approximately 35 million Chinese men who cannot find 
female partners, a number slightly more than the population of Canada.140 The gendered 
supply and demand imbalance further worsens the market competition for marriage, 
which has already been tilted against men as we have seen in chapter four. For hundreds 
of thousands of “non-qualified” working class bachelors, purchasing a wife in a less 
developed region or even country becomes a feasible option. For example, the economy 
of transnational bride hunting and trafficking thrives in Viet Nam recently, targeting 
                                                            
139 Brooks, R. (2013, March 4). China’s biggest problem? Too many men. CNN. 
Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/14/opinion/china-challenges-one-child-
brooks 
 
140 McLaughlin, K. E. (2013, January 3). China and the worst-ever, man-made gender 
gap. The Global Post. Retrieved from 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/110615/china-and-
the-worst-ever-man-made-gender-gap 
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Chinese workers as its primary clientele group.141 However, the transregional and 
transnational conjugal arrangement is often built at the cost of the women involved, 
placing them in constant psychological and emotional crisis (Chen, 2010).   
          When the economic restructuring escalates and the birth control policy takes 
tangible effects on demographics, the socio-economic and anthropogenic conditions of 
family structure have also been cast and recast, enabling a new familial form. Compared 
with the old tradition, this modality is more egalitarian in terms of gender because both 
men and women will move out of their kin group and clan to establish a dwelling of their 
own, and share with each other the responsibility to support their aging parents. On the 
one hand, when the only-child generation grows up and dominates the marriage market, 
the son-leaned filial support system loses its anthropogenic foundation. With no siblings 
available to fall back on, men and women would seek help from their spouse for parental 
care. On the other hand, since the housing industry becomes the growth pole of the 
economy, the familial paradigm is reconstituted to help explore its primary target 
market—households—for sustainable development. Taking this background into 
consideration, it is therefore not hard to understand why the middle class nucleus family 
with a private property as the independent dwelling has been valorized and circulated by 
media products, such as IF, as the new social norm in neoliberal China. As discussed 
earlier, the ownership of a property has become the touchstone to verify a man’s 
qualification for (heterosexual) marriage. Like the American youth, pressured by the 
                                                            
141 Yahoo.com. (2012, December 28). Yue nan xin niang jing ji jing tian tan mi: zhuan 
pian zhong guo ren (Investigation of the Vietnamese bride economy: Chinese bachelor as 
its primary cash car). Retrieved from 
http://overseas.cn.yahoo.com/ypen/20121228/1518064.html 
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market-induced anxiety to become independent and normal, many Chinese youth are 
striving to purchase their own property before taking the step for marriage, even though 
their parents have enough room for them at home. In rural areas like Hai’an, this trend is 
becoming more pronounced recently, as many young people are trying to catch up with 
their “modernized” urban peers. Many young couples choose not to live with their 
parents, and buy a new condo in the city, or at least in smaller towns like Dagong to 
create their own home before getting married. Usually their new home would not be too 
far from their parents’, making it for them to visit and help their parents when needed.  
           The new familial paradigm provides a prime example of how the intersectional 
biopolitics has created a contingent space of ungovernability for the marginalized groups 
(Quan, 2013). Abandoning the old patri/matrilocal frame, the new form has not only 
changed the way of habitation, but also shaken the socio-economic and symbolic 
foundation of patriarchy, creating a more livable space for women. As my interviews 
indicate, most of the people now do not care about the gender of their child. In addition, 
because of the fierce competition in the marriage market against men, it is not surprising 
to see that more people would prefer a daughter as a son could usually foist greater 
economic pressures on the parents. Some people even try to buttress this point with an 
essentialist argument—a woman will naturally be a better care-taker than a man. To 
testify whether my interviewees were induced to give me the “politically correct” answer, 
I reframed my way of inquiry. Rather than approaching the gender issue directly, I tried 
to gauge their opinion about education, the most important issue for children as perceived 
by many Chinese people. Since meritocracy has become the ruling ideology as 
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neoliberalism gets entrenched in China, many people believe that education is a reliable 
and even exclusive conduit to social mobility for children from the rural/working class 
background. Different from the early phase of the reform when many rural families had 
to spare the limited resources of education for sons, as I have seen, almost all the 
interviewees are now willing to generously invest in their children’s education, regardless 
of their gender. For instance, many people told me that they would buy the entrance to 
college if their daughter should fail in the exam. Others have spent large amounts of 
money sending their daughter to urban schools.142 In contrast, when many of the female 
interviewees were at the age for school, they had to quit school to support their brothers’ 
education. Besides education, the changed attitude towards abortion provides another 
“objective” evidence for the improved livability of girls/women. Though many young 
couples still want to have an X-ray exam performed to confirm the sex of their baby, it is 
usually for the satisfaction of their curiosity rather than the decision of abortion, as many 
people said. Thus the genderscape is exploited and deployed by the state/capital as a site 
for governing as discussed earlier, but itself also a contingent space of ungovernability.  
          However, like social class, the genderscape is often inflected by other categories, 
such as age and region. Overt sexism against women still persists among the older 
generation and in less developed areas. When the workers expressed their open attitude 
about gender, they would often add that this only applies to the younger generation like 
                                                            
142 As some people might argue, this narrowed gender gap of education is one effect of 
the “rising water” of the neoliberal economy. I would add that it is also engineered by the 
neoliberal ideology that sees all people as independent and self-reliant market subject.  
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them.143 As an apparel worker told me, “when my child was born, it was lying on its 
stomach. My mother-in-law turned it over and found it was a boy, and then she grinned 
from ear to ear.”144 Different from this woman, another female worker was not so 
lucky—pressured by her mother-in-law, her husband divorced her after the birth of their 
daughter. Furthermore, compared with coastal regions like Hai’an, in the interior parts of 
China that have been less tapped by the neoliberal economy, the unconcealed bias against 
women still remains a salient social problem. As several workers from Guizhou, a 
hinterland in southwest China, told me, “if you have a son, others will respect you. If you 
don’t have a son, other people will look down upon you and think you don’t have any 
descendants of your own.”145  
          As suggested here, the genderscape is always situated in and shifting with the 
larger socio-economic context, and closely bound with the organizational structure of 
family. However, I do not hope that my contextualized analysis of gender relationship 
and family would lead to a reductive conclusion that the gender inequality will 
automatically disappear as its old socio-economic foundation has been changed with the 
neoliberal practices. The uncritical celebration of the liberalizing effects of neoliberalism 
for gender inequality is definitely not my point. As Connell (2002) argues, as a parameter 
of the social system and power, gender is not only grounded in material relations, facts, 
realities, people’s mundane activities and corporeality, but also modulated by ideas, 
                                                            
143 My interviewees all range between mid-20s to early 50s.  
 
144 An interview conducted in Hai’an, on June 2nd, 2012.  
 
145 An interview conducted in Wuxi, on June 28th, 2012.  
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cultures, knowledge, discourses and ideologies. Gender inequality is capable of altering 
its morph to cope with the changing socio-cultural climate and avoid harming its unequal 
core value. For example, as discussed earlier, when the Maoist appropriation of the 
masculinized images of women has lost its reign, the essentialist discourse of gender 
difference is endorsed and circulated by mass media in reform China (Hiong & 
Hershatter, 1988; Croll, 1995; Evans, 1997). As a key component of the intersectional 
biopolitics to regulate and organize the neoliberal society, the gender-informed imageries 
have tangible effects on our daily life as well. For instance, as we have discussed in 
chapter three, the heterosexual gender relationship has been restructured by the dating 
game show, IF You Are the One, to uphold the middle class nucleus family as the new 
norm of the Chinese society. As Adorno (1991) contends, as a media spectacle, this norm 
exercises a fascination over the people through the ceaseless play of the presented 
imageries. When accepting this mediated fabrication as real or “hyperreal” (in Adorno’s 
term), and internalizing the invested values, people would lose their critical capacity to 
imagine and orchestrate an alternative sociality and are recreated as the soulless mass 
succumbing to the social domination by neoliberalism (Marcuse, 1964). Furthermore, as 
Ong and Zhang (2008) argue, in this process, people are reproduced as neoliberal 
subjects to implement and practice the market relationship to stabilize China’s transition 
to neoliberalism. In this regard, the phantasmagoric mediated gender landscape begs 
more rigorous and in-depth inquiries to plummet its actualized biopolitical effects on 
Chinese people.  
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         In contrast to the Frankfurters’ pessimistic view of the “overwhelming and 
impregnable” effects of mass media, the British cultural studies scholars are more 
optimistic of the audience’s active/participant role. As they contend, the general people 
can draw upon their daily experiences to negotiate with and subvert the media messages, 
and recreate their own meanings (see in Hall 1980; Fiske 1987, 1989; Morley 1983, 1992; 
Winship 1987; McRobbie 1991; Radway 1987). For instance, as I have found through the 
field work, despite the super popularity of If among the female workers, many of them do 
not endorse the social values laden with it, and dismiss the program as “propaganda.” As 
loyal viewers, most of these workers have been following the program since its 
inauguration. However, the more they watch, the more critical they become. In other 
words, the increasing exposure to the plots of IF has rendered many working class female 
viewers in a procedural transformation from the frenzied followers/admirers to the sober 
observers. As an electronics worker said, she really liked the show when it was first 
introduced, but then she increasingly felt that this “reality” show was actually very fake 
and deliberately scripted.146 Likewise, many other female workers contend that the 
program is only another site for self-promotion by certain participants. As one of them 
indicated, adding more “reality” stories to the prince-princess fairy tale collections to 
brainwash Chinese women, IF is not different from soap operas in nature.   
          As we can see, the debate over media and audience between the Frankfurters and 
the British cultural theorists helps us understand the central issue about China’s 
neoliberal governmentality—the dynamics between the mediated middle heterosexual 
                                                            
146 An interview conducted in Hai’an, on May 31st, 2012.  
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gender spectacle at the core of Chinese neoliberal governmentality and people’s daily 
encounter with it. In regard to IF and people’s responses to it, this dynamics is centering 
on the intersection of gender, class and heteronormativity as the interface between the 
biopolitical regulation and control and people’s emerging experiences. Far from the 
seamless, bounded and impregnable system, the multidimensional-and-multidirectional 
structure grounded in the overlapping categories is fraught with cleavages and crevices 
which would create contingent spaces for the marginalized groups, such as the poor rural 
women workers.  
          As discussed in chapter three, in the program of IF, predicated on a 
heteronormative framework, gender and class crisscrosses and inter-references with each 
other to constrict and delimit the symbolic possibilities of each other. As feminist 
intersectionality scholarship lays bare, the identity categories, such as gender, race, class 
and sexuality are never separate and paralleled, but co-constitute and overlap with each 
other. As sites of open and arbitrary meanings, what would be the normative gender and 
class relationship is always subject to differential articulations and interpretations. In the 
intertwined and interlocked relationship, the signifying attempt to define and normalize 
gender is pivoted on its inter-referencing and co-signification with class, and vice versa. 
For instance, by prioritizing and proliferating the images of the women adept at managing 
both business and home as the most desired subject for a heterosexual gender relationship, 
the program of IF also concretizes the meaning of social class in neoliberal China as 
“bourgeois” or “desiring to be bourgeois,” in distinction to the Maoist norm of 
proletarian/working class. Likewise, when a lavishly lived and sustained way of being is 
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reiterated to the audience for emulation, the women who can emulate “the caring 
guardian of and arduous contributor to this lifestyle” are authenticated as the crucial actor 
of this social relationship. In this regard, founded on the cross-symbolizing and mutual-
warranting relationship, the normalization of gender and class is thus stabilized and 
solidified in the service of China’s neoliberal transition.  
          However, the multiply layered social norm informed by the intersectional 
biopolitics is often presented as a monolithic and homogeneous standard for all social 
groups, and people’s emerging experience that cannot be fully contained by any 
parameter(s) of this norm could unsettle the system as a whole. For instance, as the 
poor/class working, though many women workers could find their identitarian 
experiences with the imager of the“caring and loving mother/housewife,” their daily 
experiences of struggling with survival, subsistence and statist oppression alienates them 
from the (middle) classed mandates for all women. Though this “partial” deviation from 
one of the multiple overlapped parameters of the neoliberal social norm might seem 
minor and trivial, it has actually led to the women workers’ outright rejection of the 
contradictory womanhood/market subject as the essential disciplinary technology of 
neoliberalism. In this regard, the intersectional biopolitical system seems well fortified 
and trussed by its interconnected parameters, the multi-dimensional and multi-directional 
structure is fraught with fissures and ruptures by and through the interstices. Minor 
though these cleavages might seem, they could turn into substantive changes with the 
transformative potential against the neoliberal dominance in the long run. In the 
conclusion chapter, building on the forerunning discursive analysis and empirical data, I 
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will reconceptualize intersectionality by the metaphor of network to help locate and 
articulate these crevices. Building on the novel understanding of intersectionality and 
neoliberal governance, I will ground a feminist utopia for the “post-neoliberal” society.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
239 
 
Conclusion 
Intersectionalizing a Grounded Post-Neoliberal Utopia 
          Since its popularization by Kimberle Crenshaw’s seminal works (1989; 1991), 
intersectionality has become the theoretical and (less so) methodological hallmark of U.S. 
academic feminism and increasingly influential in other areas, such as Europe (Yuval-
Davis, 2006) and East Asia (Choo 2012). Building on this heuristic device, scholars have 
been striving to disrupt the monolithic and single-axis treatment of identity categories and 
subjectivities, produce complex and detailed understandings of the overlapping social 
structures of domination, and build vantage points to ground coalition politics for social 
justice and democracy.  
          While intersectionality has been widely accepted and applied in a variety of 
disciplines, as noted in chapter one, its theoretical nebulosity, disparate applications as 
well as methodological difficulties have given rise to a wide range of concerns and 
controversies. In her recent review essay, as Jennifer Nash suggests, “while the 
interdisciplinary push towards intersectionality has led to rich scholarship on identity and 
power, it has also produced an uncritical notion of intersectionality as a theoretical 
constant rather than as a dynamic theoretical innovation within a terrain of struggle” 
(2010, 2). Reifying intersectionality as a panacean remedy, many people try to resolve the 
difference-induced tensions within the feminist attempt of theorizing equality and equity 
and produce an exhausted list attentive to all differences. As Nash (2010) puts it, not only 
contradictions/conflicts would continue to underpin women, gender and sexuality studies 
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as the ultimate source of intellectual innovation, but also naming as the politics of 
representation cannot replace daily struggle as the politics of  social change. 
          Alongside the problematics of its application are the proliferated critiques of 
intersectionality as this concept is generating more reverberation in both academia and 
activist politics. As I see it, these critiques can be roughly grouped as follows:  
          First, extant intersectionality scholarship has challenged identity categories as a 
priori by attending to the specific experiences of the multiply marginalized groups 
notwithstanding, this approach falls short of possibilities of social change for its static 
description of structural locations as the nexus of oppression. As Myra Marx Ferree 
argues, “I share the critical view of intersectionality as a static list of structural locations 
and as leading to a problematic form of identity politics” (2009, p. 85). Peter Kwan (2000) 
also agrees with this critique about the preoccupation with the structural problems. In 
response to this concern, Nash (2010) contends that intersectionality should be treated as 
metaphor rather than fact as Crenshaw’s own concession suggests. In this sense, Nash 
calls for more attention to the specific mechanism of intersection through which different 
forms of domination and oppression are replicated and reinforced, rather than using it as 
a pre-designed multi-functional tool to gauge all identity-related problems. With regard to 
Nash’s contention for the return to intersectionality-as-metaphor, Jerome Chang and 
Robert Culp (2002) even suggest we should interrogate the metaphor of intersectionality 
per se, and unleash an imagining of alternative vision that would shed more light on how 
identity categories and oppression operate together. Aligning myself with all these 
suggestions, I contend that the transformative capacity of intersectionality lies in the 
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ways it keeps refreshing and alerting our attentiveness to the specific patterns of how 
different forms of social control and subjugation are organized and managed through the 
manipulation of categories, rather than proffering a prescribed panacea to all social 
problems about identities. Thus intersectionality would help reveal the mechanisms of 
how the society is organized and regulated.   
          Second, with the focus laid on the systemic, exterior inequalities and domination, 
intersectionality lacks attention to individual’s interior psychic and subjective 
experiences. As Dorthe Staunaes (2003) avers, we need to bring the concept of 
subjectivity back to the investigation of intersectionality. Baukje Prins (2006) and Peter 
Kwan (2009) also express the similar concern that by foregrounding the social system of 
domination in ways that treat power as unilateral and absolute, this particular application 
of intersectionality would reinforce the assumption that the human subject is primarily 
determined by the social structure. While extending my endorsement to these critiques, I 
would also highlight that the social structure and personal subjectivity is not in an 
“either/or” relation, but co-constituting and interdependent on each other. While the 
system of inequalities might delimit various experiential and cognitive possibilities for 
different groups, it is also (re)created, altered, strengthened and subverted through the 
collectivized effects of the daily activities of the latter. In this regard, the reductive 
either/or logic would not be conducive to produce a comprehensive and grounded 
understanding of the specific mechanism of particular intersection and its actual social 
effects that are always conditioned by the structural/individual dynamics. In other words, 
the attempt to explore people’s multiply constituted and indexed subjectivity should 
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always be accompanied by the detailed charting of how the intersectional structure is 
operated and reproduced, and vice versa.   
          Third, as a U.S.-based notion, intersectionality is largely indebted to women of 
color and their struggle with the social injustice in the United States, which cannot be 
simplistically transplanted into a different context. As Mieke Verloo (2006) argues, 
different inequalities are dissimilar because they are differentially framed in different 
contexts. As the knowledge deriving from U.S. women of color’s daily, this particular 
way of knowledge production makes intersectionality “a difficult project” with no 
consensus yet around whether it is a theory, a method, and/or a politics (Nash, 2010). I 
concur with this point because “political practice and socioeconomic context are shifting 
metrics that require a historicization of the ‘event’ of intersectionality, its emergence, and 
the thought that it moved and generated” (Puar, 2012, p. 53). In contrast to the concern 
over the cross-cultural applicability of intersectionality for its intellectual root in certain 
socio-cultural particularity, transnational feminism is highlighting the linkage of 
marginalized groups across the world by globalization.  As Mohanty (2003) puts it, as 
neoliberal globalization is commonly but differently influencing the majority of the world 
population, feminist (and all critical) scholars should focus on the multiply manifested 
effects of globalization for social change. As noted by Tomlinson (2013), the different 
focus of intersectionality and transnational feminism has spawned contestations between 
each other. However, as I argue, these two feminist streams are not intellectually 
exclusive of each other, and should be combined with each other to fully understand how 
the neoliberal restructuring is proceeding by and through the intersectional structure of 
 
 
243 
 
categories on the global scale. As Puar asked, “what does an intersectional critique look 
like—or more to the point, what does it do—in an age of neoliberal pluralism, absorption, 
and accommodation of all kinds of differences” (2012, p. 53)?  
          In response to these concerns, debates and controversies over intersectionality, I 
want to reconceptualize intersectionality to make it a more robust and flexible metaphor 
to explore the primary mechanism that facilitates and stabilizes the global neoliberal 
restructuring, understand the dynamics between the overlapping social structures and 
personal subjectivities conditioned by this process, and enable a grounded feminist utopia 
of the “post-neoliberal” world. I argue that built on a network of the interlocked, socially 
constructed parameters of categories, such as gender, race, class and sexuality, 
intersectionality is the basic mechanism that informs, enables, and enacts personal 
subjectivities, interpersonal relationships and social institutions. On a micro level, by 
positioning individuals at specific nexus of the vectors, intersectionality induces and 
shapes their unique subjective and cognitive experiences. Who we are and how we 
perceive are largely grounded in the discursively mediated sensitivities informed by the 
particular positionality within the intersectional structure. On an intermediate level, a 
person’s epistemic and hermeneutic scope elicited and induced by the specific 
positionality would further influence and direct their interaction and communication with 
others, exercising remarkable influence over the interpersonal/intergroup relationships. 
On a macro level, in these regimented interpersonal/intergroup relationships, certain 
productive work and praxes would be routinized as the rules of regulation and operation 
that would be concretized into organizations and apparatuses to further guarantee their 
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implementation, exercising and the established social order. Meanwhile, by “mechanism,” 
I intend to emphasize the historicity and contexuality of intersectionality because it is 
always conditioned by the dialectical and dynamical relationship with individuals and 
social groups while exerting its influence over the latter. People are not simply the 
passive receptor of the collective categorizing effects of identities, and they are also 
active actors who can mobilize their emerging experiences that cannot be fully captured 
by the categories to reshape their contours and reconstitute the whole intersectional 
system. It is this perpetual dynamics that renders the intersectional system an unbounded 
and porous contour, and its fluidity, mutability and elasticity lie in the emerging nature of 
the component categories.   
          For further clarification, I draw upon the Foucauldian conception of power to 
elaborate on why “network” would be a more suited metaphor to elucidate 
intersectionality as a “mechanism.” Foucault’s theorization of power finds its intellectual 
roots in Friedrich Nietzsche’s construal of power as “social physics.” As Stephen Pfhol 
(2008) puts it, Nietzsche conceptualizes power as “a constitutive field of forces or 
‘dynamic quanta’ affecting everything we do,” conditioning human actions, social 
relations, and social structures. Building on Nietzsche’s work, Foucault (1990) challenges 
the binaristic understanding of power as “powerful/powerless,” and contends that power 
is neither hierarchical nor unidirectional, but capillary and proceeds in every direction at 
once. In this regard, power “sets the scene for social action and the interpretive 
construction of human meaning and morals” (Pfhol, 2008, p. 656). As Avery Gordon 
explicates, “the very tangled way people sense, intuit and experience the complexities of 
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modern power and personhood has everything to do with the [capillary] character of 
power itself” (2008, p. 194). In our daily life, the invisible power often takes shape as 
either multifarious discourses, people’s regimented activities, or instituted social rules 
and organization. Just as amorphous and shapeless water is channeled by streams, creeks 
and rivers in natural worlds, so caterpillar and nomadic power is regulated and managed 
through the constructed intersectional parameters in social worlds.  
          The category-comprised network is the central mechanism for the regulation and 
organization of power in human societies. Constituted as a multi-directional and multi-
dimensional structure, the network of power not only links individuals with each other as 
the scattered nodes, but also positions them in intersections of vectors with differential 
access to social resources, which mainly depends on the distance between the particular 
intersections and the center of the network. As the center of the network is multiply 
indexed and calibrated by a plethora of categories, the centralized members might be very 
few. For instance, in the current world, only “Anglo-Saxon, male, heterosexual, 
Protestant, physically robust, and economically comfortable” (Haraway1989, 42) and 
presumably American would be the qualified candidates for the club of power center. By 
contrast, the peripherized account for the majority in this system.  
          Unlike militant or coercive domination based on the polarized conception of 
powerful/powerless, the center-periphery network of power formulated through human 
interactions and associations is not impervious to alternative articulations, and the 
centralized elite few are often subject to negotiation, resistance and subversion from the 
periphery. As a result, the whole network is often rendered unstable and precarious as its 
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center shifts with the dynamics between the centralized and the peripherized. 
Consequently, those within and close to the center would manipulate and alter the 
parameters of the network, such as race, gender, social class and sexuality, to stabilize 
and sustain the network, cope with the changing social climate and surging challenges, 
and perpetuate the distinction between the centered/peripherized for the protection of the 
vested interests. Simply put, the essential frame of the network remains intact due less to 
its entrenched traditions than its elasticity, resilience and ability of mutation by morphing 
its multiple parameters to cope with the shifting social environment to avoid harming its 
center. Similar to virus that mutes itself to tackle the new technologies of antibiotics for 
survival, the network of power alters the contours of its parameters to enable 
metamorphosis for continuation and perpetuation. In this network, like a spider in a 
cobweb, the power center moves back and forth along the intersected threads to dodge 
the lethal attacks. Likewise, the social challenge on one parameter can be offset or 
minimized by the reconstitution and revamping of other (connected) parameter(s) to keep 
the basic structure intact.  
          As we have seen, the intersection of gender, class and sexuality grounds the basic 
frame of the network to stabilize China’s transition from Socialism to neoliberalism. This 
network also grounds the structure of biopolitics for the state to produce multifarious 
disciplinary and normalizing technologies to dissemble and reassemble the population for 
China’s marketization and re-integration with the global economy. By reconfiguring the 
parameters of gender, class and sexuality, a variety of discourses, policies, laws, 
administrative practices and institutions are (re)produced to facilitate and legitimize 
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China’s neoliberalization. As we have seen, founded on the heteronormative leverage, the 
rearticulation of the gender norm not only helps mitigate the social crisis deriving from 
the enlarging class inequalities, but also redefines and rejuvenates the nation-state entity 
that was anchored on the Maoist working class/peasant imagery. In addition, by 
recalibrating the interfaces of gender, class and sexuality, the triangulated network is 
reconstituted to create and valorize the middle class nucleus family as the new norm of 
the neoliberal Chinese society to reproduce market subjects, legitimate the widening 
social inequalities and China’s accession to the global network of capital. Furthermore, 
through the intersection of these categories, millions of cheap and flexible workers have 
been disarticulated and rearticulated from the population as the voluntary servitude to this 
ongoing process.  
          As part and parcel of the global restructuring, China’s socio-economic 
transformation sheds some light on the central role of the intersectional biopolitics in the 
neoliberal economy. Just as Mohanty says, “capital as it functions now depends on and 
exacerbates racist, patriarchal, and heterosexist relations of rule” (2003, p. 231). The 
notion of the intersectional biopolitics would help us further investigate the contingent 
and variant relationships between neoliberal restructuring and identity categories in 
different locations/contexts. Moreover, as discussed earlier, the intersectional biopolitical 
system is not seamless and impregnable, and its multi-dimensional and multi-directional 
structure is fraught with ruptures and fissures. Then it ushers in another question: how to 
locate and articulate the cracks within the intersectional system to effect concrete changes?  
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          In Economies of Abandonment, Elizabeth Povinelli (2011) suggests that there are 
always the shaped, carved and assembled beings as the desired materiality of biopolitics 
(or what she calls “corporeality”), and the unintegrated, errant aspects of materiality (or 
what she calls “carnivality”). Their difference, as Povinelli argues, “becomes the positive 
occasion for alternative forms of life” (2011, p. 109) to challenge the categories-grounded 
neoliberal governance. In this regard, becoming queer—by virtue of rejecting all forms of 
categorizations and categories—is a solution to the wedded neoliberal governance of 
economies and multicultural governance of differences. Here Povinelli’s invocation of 
queer theory to disrupt the social control and regulation in the neoliberal society echoes 
with the Deleuzian conception of assemblage that aims to debilitate the one and the same 
economy of capital and desire in contemporary societies. In Anit-Oedipus (1977), as 
Deleuze and Guattari argue, the flows and productions of desire are also the unconscious 
of the social productions of capital and capitalism. In other words, behind every 
investment of time and interest and capital, there is an investment of desire, and vice 
versa. On this account, they (1987) suggest that to disrupt the constant flow of capital and 
desire, we need to de-normalize and de-individualize ourselves from the labels and norms 
that are pre-established to so direct us through a multiplicity of new, collective 
arrangements against power. Among these arrangements, as they suggest, assemblage is 
achieved through a process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization along a vertical 
and horizontal axis. Building on Deleuze and Guattari, Puar (2012) argues that 
assemblage foregrounds no constants but rather “variation to variation,” and within this 
framework, identity is conceptualized not as a bounded and territorialized category but an 
event resulting from the intensification of one’s contingent relations with other social 
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actors. In this regard, she contends that the alternative notion of assemblage can 
unshackle us from the social conditioning by established identities, and enable a sense of 
potentiality, a becoming, “a moment of deterritorialization, a line of flight, something not 
available for immediate capture—‘everything is up in the air,’ and quite literally, the air 
is charged with possibility” (2012, p. 61).  
          The Deleuzian conception of assemblage epitomizes critical scholars and 
progressive activists’ agitated and constant craving for the subversion of domination and 
subjugation. In the global era, the concrete social change is premised on the dismantling 
and challenge of the domineering Enlightenment notion of instrumental reason, which 
has been translated into rampant neoliberal practices and ideologies. So does it mean that 
we should return to its intellectual parallel and alternative, critical reason? Will this 
epistemic change grant us the universal and transcendental capacity that would lead us to 
a society of equity, justice and democracy, as the Ancient Greek philosophers foresaw? 
Can the humanity informed by critical reason transcend the corrupted reality that 
occasions and conditions its (re)formulation and help recreate a world of absolute 
equality and justice?   
          For these grand questions, humanist scholars such as Ong (2006) and Cheah (2007) 
have offered a less optimistic answer. As Cheah avers, “[i]nstead of regulating 
instrumentality, the norms generated by public deliberation [through critical reason] can 
always be contaminated by it” (2007, p. 77). In this regard, as Horkheimer suggests, 
“[p]hilosophical theory itself cannot bring it about that either the barbarizing tendency or 
the humanistic outlook should prevail in the future. However, by doing justice to those 
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images and ideas that at given times dominated reality in the role of absolutes—e.g. the 
idea of the individual as it dominated the bourgeois era—and that that have been 
relegated in the course of history, philosophy can function as a corrective of history” 
(1947, p. 186). As I argue, as a political project, the transcendence of social realities for 
social justice and democracy is always conditioned by and grounded in the detailed 
charting and mapping of the mechanism of societal organization and regulation that holds 
the reign. In the corporate globalization structured by and through the intersectional 
biopolitics, the emancipation and liberty should always be preceded by the critical 
examination and understanding of the specific mechanism of categories that is at work 
for neoliberal economy and ideology in particular time and space. In other words, the 
utopian rearticulation of a “post-colonial” society should thus be grounded in the 
comprehensive articulation of the neoliberal society.  
          To enable a utopian project alternative to neoliberalism and corporate globalization, 
Puar (2007) argues for the combination of intersectionality (investigating the varying 
network of power) and assemblage (deterritorializing and reterritorializing the identity-
grounded social worlds). As she claims, “intersectionality attempts to comprehend 
political institutions and their attendant forms of social normativity and disciplinary 
administration, while assemblages, in an effort to reintroduce politics into the political, 
asks what is prior to and beyond what gets established” (2012, p. 63). Though I concur 
with Puar’s proposition here, I am still concerned about how to achieve this 
cognitive/political combination.  
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          I argue that the feminist concept of intersectionality proffers the essential 
instrument for this purpose. As an alternative knowledge, it is rooted in the contradictory 
consciousness deriving from the categories and categorizations as the interface between 
the intersectional biopolitics and people’s emerging experiences. The emancipatory 
potency of intersectionality lies in the various moments of the marginalized groups 
struggling with different forms of oppression and subjugation inter-connected for 
domination. For instance, the “outsider within” awareness of black housemaids working 
in white middle class families in the U.S. industrializing period (Collins, 2000), and “la 
mestiza” of Chicana on/across the U.S.-Mexico border fighting against the compounded 
effects of sexism, racism, colonialism and homophobism (Anzaldua, 1999). In this regard, 
intersectionality provides a heuristic device that keeping concentrating our attention on 
the shifting and overlapping contours of categories to locate and articulate the 
contradictions between the overlapping biopolitical structures and people’s lived reality. 
These various moments are also the quintessential intellectual and political source for 
intersectionality to continuously update its critical edge to grapple with the changing 
socio-cultural climate. As mentioned earlier, at the present moment of globalization, only 
by working with the various contradictory moments, can we locate and articulate the 
ruptures and fissures of the neoliberal system to orchestrate a grounded utopia for a better, 
more inclusive and democratic post-neoliberal world. 
          Focusing on China’s recent socio-economic upheavals, I hope that my dissertation 
would provide an example of how to rely on this conception of intersectionality to effect 
substantive changes. The detailed illustrations and explications of the biopolitical 
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mechanism, its multiplied subjectivizing effects, and inherent contradictions, as I believe, 
can help different groups, such as workers, peasants, scholars, activists and policy makers 
to rethink about and devise specific ways to create contingent “post-neoliberal” spaces 
within the neoliberal apparatus per se. To name a few, these spaces can be enabled by the 
articulation of alternative gender relationship, abolition of the Hukou system, as well as 
the coalesced activist movement between different workers. These pockets of changes, 
though seemingly minor, are concrete and robust enough to conflate into larger crises to 
overturn the neoliberal domination.  
          Finally, by reconceptualizing intersectionality for the transnational background of 
neoliberal globalization, I wish my work would push forward the intellectual boundaries 
of women, gender and sexuality studies to constantly address the emerging problems in 
the new context. Relying on this new conception of intersectionality, I have also 
constructed a materially and culturally integrative framework to grapple with the 
contestation between economic justice and cultural identities that has been haunting the 
domain of critical studies. Bringing feminism, queer theory and critical race theory to the 
forefront of the heated debates over such grand issues as neoliberalism and corporate 
globalization, I hope that my dissertation would make the voice of the critical theories 
rooted in marginalized groups’ experiences louder and wider within and beyond 
academia.  
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Date 
 
Dear Sir or Madame: 
 
I am a graduate student under the direction of Professor Lisa Anderson in the Program of 
Women and Gender Studies at Arizona State University.  I am conducting a research 
study to survey subaltern groups in a metropolitan area in China to see how they respond 
to the dominant gender ideology. It seeks to collect data of the daily experience of 
marginalized groups and explore how neoliberal globalization has reshaped the 
genderscape and caused new forms of social oppression in China. 
 
I am inviting your participation, which will involve an interview about 2 hours. You have 
the right not to answer any question, and to stop the interview at any time. Your 
participation in this study is voluntary. If you choose not to participate or to withdraw 
from the study at any time, there will be no penalty. You must be 18 or older to 
participate in the study. 
  
This research might not bring direct benefits for the participants. However, as part of a 
transnational dialogue to critique the neoliberal global oppression, this research will 
hopefully bring in policy changes that can benefit the Chinese subaltern groups in the 
future. There are no foreseeable risks or discomforts to your participation. 
 
Your responses will be confidential. The results of this study may be used in reports, 
presentations, or publications, but your name will be replaced with synonym.  
 
I would like to audiotape this interview. The interview will not be recorded without your 
permission. Please let me know if you do not want the interview to be taped; you can also 
change your mind after the interview starts, just let me know. After transcription, the 
audiotaped files will be deleted. The transcribed data of this interview will be kept in my 
personal computer. After ten years, it will be deleted completely.  
 
If you have any questions concerning the research study, please contact the research team 
at: Dr. Lisa M. Anderson, West Hall 235, Arizona State University, PO Box: 874902, 
Tempe, Arizona 85287-4902, Tele: 480-9658597. Or Yi Zhang, West Hall 226, Arizona 
State University, PO Box: 874902, Tempe, Arizona 85287-4902, Tele: 480-3990678, 
Email: yzhan140@asu.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a 
subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, you can 
contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board, through the ASU 
Office of Research Integrity and Assurance, at (480) 965-6788. Please let me know if you 
wish to be part of the study. 
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By signing below you are agreeing to participate to in the study. 
___________________________                     _________________________ 
Signature                                                            Date 
 
By signing below, you are agreeing to be audiotaped  
___________________________                     _________________________ 
Signature                                                            Date 
 
 
 
 
 
279 
 
APPENDIX II   
IINFORMATION LETTER (FOCUS GROUP) 
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Date 
 
Dear Sir or Madame: 
 
I am a graduate student under the direction of Professor Lisa Anderson in the Program of 
Women and Gender Studies at Arizona State University.  I am conducting a research 
study to survey subaltern groups in a metropolitan area in China to see how they respond 
to the dominant gender ideology. It seeks to collect data of the daily experience of 
marginalized groups and explore how neoliberal globalization has reshaped the 
genderscape and caused new forms of social oppression in China. 
 
I am inviting your participation, which will involve a group discussion of about 3 hours. 
Your discussion will be centered on the video clips that I provide. You have the right not 
to answer any question, and to stop participation at any time. Your participation in this 
study is voluntary. If you choose not to participate or to withdraw from the study at any 
time, there will be no penalty. You must be 18 or older to participate in the study. 
 
This research might not bring direct benefits for the participants. However, as part of a 
transnational dialogue to critique the neoliberal global oppression, this research will 
hopefully bring in policy changes that can benefit the Chinese subaltern groups in the 
future. There are no foreseeable risks or discomforts to your participation. 
 
Your responses will be confidential. The results of this study may be used in reports, 
presentations, or publications, but your name will be replaced with synonym.  
 
I would like to audiotape this group discussion. The group discussion will not be 
recorded without your permission. Please let me know if you do not want it to be taped; 
you can also change your mind after the group discussion starts, just let me know. After 
transcription, the audiotaped files will be deleted. The transcribed data of this discussion 
will be kept in my personal computer. After ten years, it will be deleted completely.  
 
If you have any questions concerning the research study, please contact the research team 
at: Dr. Lisa M. Anderson, West Hall 235, Arizona State University, PO Box: 874902, 
Tempe, Arizona 85287-4902, Tele: 480-9658597. Or Yi Zhang, West Hall 226, Arizona 
State University, PO Box: 874902, Tempe, Arizona 85287-4902, Tele: 480-3990678, 
Email: yzhan140@asu.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a 
subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, you can 
contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board, through the ASU 
Office of Research Integrity and Assurance, at (480) 965-6788. Please let me know if you 
wish to be part of the study. 
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By signing below you are agreeing to participate to in the study. 
___________________________                     _________________________ 
Signature                                                            Date 
 
By signing below, you are agreeing to be taped. 
___________________________                     _________________________ 
Signature                                                            Date 
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APPENDIX III  
QUESTIONS FOR FOCUS GROUP (FEMALE) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
283 
 
I will show all the participants the video clip of Ma Nuo, a female participant in the 
match-making TV program—If You Are the On. In this video, Ma made her (in)famous 
person claim of how to find her Mr. Right: I would rather cry in a BMW than smile at the 
back of a bicycle. Then, I will start the group discussion. These are the questions: 
1. What information does the Ma want to express in this video?  
2. How does this information relate to her femininity? 
3. How does this information relate to the mainstream femininity?  
4. Do you think whether Ma is feminine enough? Why or why not? 
5. Do you agree with Ma’s opinion? Why or why not?  
6. Do you think whether you can live to this ideal? Why or why not?  
7. Why does Ma take such an aggressive stance to express her idealized partner? 
How does this strategy relate to the social upheavals in China?  
8. If you have a chance, will you participate in this TV program? Why or why not? 
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APPENDIX IV 
QUESITONS FOR FOCUS GROUP (MALE) 
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I will show all the participants the video clip of a music video made by two sojourning 
working class men which has been circulating on the Internet for a while. Also, I will 
show the video of their performance in the Spring Festival Gala. Then I will start the 
group discussion. There are the questions I will ask: 
1. What information do the two guys want to express in their self-made music 
video?  
2. How does this information relate to their masculinity? 
3. How does this information relate to your masculinity?  
4. Do you think whether the two guys are manly enough? Why or why not? 
5. Compared with the two guys, do you think you are manly enough? Why or why 
not? 
6. Why do they assume such masculine stance for their performance? Does this 
strategy work well to convey what they want to express? 
7. What information do the two guys want to express in the Spring Festival Gala? 
8. Though they are singing the same song, what is the difference between their 
performances in the music video and at the gala? Why is there such difference? 
9. Which performance do you like better? Why or why not? 
10. If you have a chance, will you make a music video like this and post it onto the 
Internet? Why or why not? 
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APPENDIX V 
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1. In your opinion, what is the mainstream womanhood in China now? 
2. Do you think whether you can live up to this ideal womanhood? Why or why not? 
3. Do you think whether the ideal womanhood has changed during the past 30 
years? If you think it has changed, can you specify in what aspects it has 
changed? 
4. If you think your lived experience does not fit into the mainstream womanhood, 
how do you negotiate, challenge, or subvert this norm in your daily life? 
5. If you think there are any changes of the mainstream womanhood in the past 30 
years, do you think whether the changes are related to the social upheavals in 
China? If so, can you specify how? 
6. Compared with other women who can stay at home as a housewife, do you think 
whether your life is better than them? Why or why not? 
7. Compared with other superwomen who can make much money or have great 
power, do you think your life is better than them? Why or why not? 
8. Have you experienced any forms of discrimination when you are working in the 
factory?  
9. If you do experience discrimination, how does it relate to your gender?  
10. Do you think whether this mainstream womanhood makes it more difficult for 
you to be accepted as a female worker? Why or why not? 
11. Have you got any forms of support from your community (e.g., your co-
workers/fellow-villagers/families) when you are working in the factory? If so, can 
you specify in what ways? 
12. Do you think whether the ideal manhood has changed during the past 30 years? If 
you think it has changed, can you specify in what aspects it has changed? 
13. Do you think whether this ideal manhood affects your masculinity? Why or why 
not? 
14. If you think there are any changes of the mainstream manhood in the past 30 
years, do you think whether the changes are related to the social upheavals in 
China? If so, can you specify how? 
15. If you can choose, would you like to be a housewife or superwoman? Why or why 
not? 
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1. In your opinion, what is the mainstream manhood in China now? 
2. Do you think whether you can live up to this ideal manhood? Why or why not? 
3. Do you think whether the ideal manhood has changed during the past 30 years? If 
you think it has changed, can you specify in what aspects it has changed? 
4. If you think your lived experience does not fit into the mainstream manhood, how 
do you negotiate, challenge, or subvert this norm in your daily life? 
5. If you think there are any changes of the mainstream manhood in the past 30 
years, do you think whether the changes are related to the social upheavals in 
China? If so, can you specify how? 
6. Compared with other men who choose to stay at home to work, do you think 
whether your life has been getting better since you came to work in Shanghai? 
Why or why not? 
7. Have you experienced any forms of discrimination in Shanghai?  
8. If you do experience discrimination, how does it relate to your gender?  
9. Do you think whether this mainstream manhood makes it more difficult for you to 
be accepted into the urban life? Why or why not? 
10. Have you got any forms of support from your community (e.g., your co-
workers/fellow-villagers/families) when you are working in Shanghai? If so, can 
you specify in what ways? 
11. Do you think whether the ideal womanhood has changed during the past 30 
years? If you think it has changed, can you specify in what aspects it has 
changed? 
12. Do you think whether this ideal womanhood affects your masculinity? Why or 
why not? 
13. If you think there are any changes of the mainstream womanhood in the past 30 
years, do you think whether the changes are related to the social upheavals in 
China? If so, can you specify how? 
14. Do you think whether this mainstream womanhood makes it more difficult for 
you to be accepted into the urban life? Why or why not? 
15. If you can choose, will you come to work in Shanghai again? Why or why not? 
 
